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Abstract
This thesis studies the price of anarchy in supply chains, congested systems and joint
ventures. It consists of three main parts. In the first part, we investigate the impact
of imperfect competition with nonlinear demand. We focus on a distribution channel
with a single supplier and multiple downstream retailers. To evaluate the perfor-
mance, we consider several metrics, including market penetration, total profit, social
welfare and rent extraction. We quantify the performance with tight upper and lower
bounds. We show that with substitutes, while competition improves the efficiency
of a decentralized supply chain, the asymmetry among the retailers deteriorates the
performance. The reverse happens when retailers carry complements. We also show
that efficiency of a supply chain with concave (convex) demand is higher (lower) than
that with affine demand.
The second part of the thesis studies the impact of congestion in an oligopoly by
incorporating convex costs. Costs could be fully self-contained or have a spillover
component, which depends on others' output. We show that when costs are fully
self-contained, the welfare loss in an oligopoly is at most 25% of the social optimum,
even in the presence of highly convex costs. With spillover cost, the performance of an
oligopoly depends on the relative magnitude of spillover cost to the marginal benefit
to consumers. In particular, when spillover cost outweighs the marginal benefit, the
welfare loss could be arbitrarily bad.
The third part of the thesis focuses on capacity planning with resource pooling in
joint ventures under demand uncertainties. We distinguish heterogeneous and homo-
geneous resource pooling. When resources are heterogeneous, the effective capacity
in a joint venture is constrained by the minimum individual contribution. We show
that there exists a unique constant marginal revenue sharing scheme which induces
the same outcome in a Nash equilibrium, Nash Bargaining and the system optimum.
The optimal scheme rewards every participant proportionally with respect to his
marginal cost. When resources are homogeneous, we show that the revenue sharing
ratio should be inversely proportional to a participant's marginal cost.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Decentralized systems with agents who operate within their sphere of interest are
widely recognized as less efficient than their centralized counterparts. This phe-
nomenon is pervasive in social, political, economical, and even biological systems.
Papadimitriou (2001) in his seminal work, coined the term Price of Anarchy (PoA),
which measures the difference in the performance of a decentralized system to a fully
centralized system. Quantifying this value is essential in predicting system behavior
and in designing appropriate rules of action to improve its performance. The main
purpose of this research is to provide new ways for understanding and evaluating ef-
ficiency loss in complex competitive environments including supply chains, congested
systems and joint ventures.
1.1 Thesis Outline
The thesis consists of three main parts. In the first part, we focus on a distribution
channel with a single supplier and multiple competing retailers. While our application
is in supply chain management, the base game-theoretic framework which we study is
generic and captures many other applications where oligopolistic competition exists.
To evaluate the performance, we consider several metrics, such as market penetration,
total profit, social welfare and rent extraction. The second part of my dissertation
incorporates a by-product of competition: externalities. We study the impact of
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selfish behavior on societal welfare. Our model consists of several service providers,
competing for users who are sensitive to both prices and congestion. By identifying
two types of congestion effects which depend on whether one service provider's service
level could affect others' congestion cost, we measure the welfare loss in a decentralized
setting and propose novel implementation of congestion pricing which appeals to the
self-interest of participants. The third part of my thesis describes a joint work with
Retsef Levi, Cong Shi and my advisor, Georgia Perakis. This work is motivated by the
growing popularity of joint-ventures in the past decade. Decisions in such settings are
distorted by self-interests and demand uncertainties. They are further complicated
by joint business constraints.
1.2 Main Contributions
1.2.1 Supply chains under imperfect competition and non-
linear demand
In the first part of the dissertation, we study a distribution channel with a single
supplier and serval downstream retailers, whose demand depends on the prices of
all available products in the market. The main objective of this work is to under-
stand how imperfect competition, demand nonlinearity and the nature of products
(substitutable versus complementary products) affect the performance of a supply
chain.
To analyze imperfect competition, we associate product substitutability (or com-
plementarity) with a ratio between the inter-firm and the intra-firm price sensitivity
coefficients. This measure captures the interdependence of one product with respect
to other available products in the market, implying the strength of a retailer with
respect to his competitors. Based on this measure, by only knowing information on
two "representative" retailers, we are able to analytically quantify various perfor-
mance metrics including market penetration, channel profit, social welfare and rent
extraction for a supply chain with an arbitrary number of retailers with tight upper
16
and lower bounds.
We show that when the retailers compete with substitutes, the two "strongest"
retailers predominantly determine the supply chain performance. Although asymme-
try between them deteriorates the performance, a decentralized supply chain with
substitutes is fairly efficient as suggested by the performance metrics. For comple-
mentary products, we characterize how much the performance is affected by product
complementarity. The bounds imply that the performance could be primarily deter-
mined by the two "weakest" retailers. Although asymmetry between them has some
countervailing effect to combat this inefficiency, a decentralized supply chain with
complements generally demonstrates a significant loss of efficiency.
With nonlinear demand, we utilize the concept of "Jacobian similarity" to describe
the curvature of the demand function. We show that when the demand function is
concave, the decentralized supply chain is more efficient than one with affine demand.
To be more specific, with concave demand, the profit loss in a decentralized supply
chain is at most 25% of the optimal profit in a coordinated setting and improves
as the intensity of competition among retailers increases. On the other hand, with
convex demand, the inefficiency is relatively higher than one with affine demand.
1.2.2 Congested systems with convex costs: self-contained
versus spillover
In this part of the thesis, we consider competition in the presence of congestion
effects. In contrast to many studies on congestion games which consider infinitesimal
users who are price-takers with no market power (e.g., Dafermos and Sparrow 1969,
Wardrop 1952), players in our model are competing oligopolists who have sufficient
market power to influence prices. Our model consists of several service providers
with differentiated services, competing for users who are sensitive to both prices and
congestion costs which are convex and increasing with the output level. We study
two types of congestion effects depending on whether one service provider's congestion
cost could be influenced by other providers' output level. Congestion effect is said
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to be self-contained, when the congestion cost associated with one service provider
only depends on his output level. Bandwidth congestion is one such example, where
carriers use dedicated frequency bands for transmissions to avoid signal interference.
As a result, service degradation is only experienced by users in the affected network.
This is in contrast with airport congestion, where when one airline schedules an
additional flight in a congested airport, it creates additional delays for every flight
which attempts to land and take off. Congestion in this setting also has the spillover
effect as everyone in the system experiences additional delay.
We compare the total welfare in an unregulated setting where the service providers
have free access to the facility to that of the social optimum which maximizes the total
surplus, so as to assess how much welfare is lost due to decentralization. We show that
with fully self-contained cost, the maximum welfare loss in the unregulated setting is
limited to 25% even in the presence of highly nonlinear convex costs. Moreover, the
efficiency of the unregulated setting improves as the competition among the service
providers increases. The main insight is that, when costs are self-contained, service
providers take those into fully consideration when they determine their own output
level. As a result, price of anarchy in this case is bounded. With spillover congestion
cost, the performance highly depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal unin-
ternalized congestion cost and the marginal consumer surplus when an additional user
is enrolled. In particular, we show that when the marginal uninternalized congestion
cost outweighs the marginal benefit, the welfare loss in the unregulated setting could
be arbitrarily high even with affine costs. The latter validates the need of implement-
ing some rationing mechanisms in airports to curb congestion since there are rooms
for substantial potential welfare gains.
1.2.3 Joint ventures with resource pooling and demand un-
certainties
The work is motivated by the growing popularity of joint-ventures in the recent years.
In this work, we study capacity planning with resource pooling in a joint venture
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under demand uncertainties. We distinguish two types of resources pooling, based on
whether the resources are heterogeneous or homogeneous. We assume each entity in
a joint venture contributes one type of resources. When resources are heterogeneous,
they are not fully substitutable. It implies that the contribution from one entity
cannot be fully replaced by others. This is in contrast with homogenous resource
pooling, where resources are fully substitutable.
We show that with heterogeneous resource pooling, the effective capacity in a
joint venture is constrained by the minimum individual contribution. In addition,
every participant is committed to make an equal contribution in a joint venture. We
also show that, there exists a same efficient and fair revenue sharing scheme in both
Nash equilibrium and Nash Bargaining solution. The optimal scheme rewards every
participant proportionally to his marginal cost.
When resources are homogeneous, however, there does not exist a revenue sharing
scheme which induces actions to achieve the optimum which maximizes the collective
profit. Nonetheless, we propose some methods to share revenue with the worst case
performance guarantee for general convex costs. The methods suggest that the re-
ward should be inversely proportional to the marginal cost of each participant with
homogeneous resources.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The work on supply chains is broken
into Chapter 2 and 3. Chapter 2 focuses on a setting with nonlinear demand while
each retailer carries a single type of substitutable products. In Chapter 3, we consider
affine demand while each retailer carries multiple complementary products. Chapter
4 is devoted to the study on congested systems. The work on joint ventures can be
found in Chapter 5. We conclude the thesis in Chapter 6.
19
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Chapter 2
Price of Anarchy in Supply Chains
with Imperfect Competition and
Nonlinear Demand
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop tight upper and lower bounds to quantify the loss due
to decentralization in a two-tier supply chain with price-only contracts when there is
imperfect competition among downstream retailers with nonlinear demand. Browsing
through a comparison shopping engine often reveals a surprisingly wide dispersion of
prices for a same product. One of the reasons for price differentiation is imperfect
competition induced by retailer asymmetry in the market. That is, retailers are
perceived differently by consumers based on market share, brand name, reputation,
availability, etc.
Despite a large and growing literature studying the issue of supply chain coor-
dination, most papers make one of the following assumptions: (1) monopoly or a
duopoly; (2) independent (noncompeting) retailers; or (3) symmetric retailers with
homogenous products; (4) affine demand. Each of these assumptions imposes sig-
nificant limitations. Some results immediately fail once we relax the assumptions.
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For example, it is well-known that with noncompeting or symmetric retailers, every
retailer in a decentralized setting experiences sales decline compared to a centralized
setting due to "double marginalization". However, an example in Section 3.3 shows
that in an asymmetric duopoly, one retailer may charge a higher price yet sell more
in a decentralized setting. Under the symmetry assumption, it has been established
in various settings that a decentralized supply chain achieves higher channel profit
as competition in the retail market intensifies, where the intensity of competition
is measured by the number of retailers (Tyagi 1999, Mahajan and Van Ryzin 2001,
Cachon and Lariviere 2005). When retailers are asymmetric, for example, with domi-
nant retailers such as Wal-Mart and fringe retailers like local grocery stores coexist in
a market, it is ambiguous how to measure "competition", let alone quantify a supply
chain's performance.
2.1.1 Contributions
In this work, we relax all the assumptions aforementioned. Our main contributions
of this chapter are as follows.
Analytical upper and lower bounds with competition index. We associate
the level of competition faced by a product with a ratio between its cross and own
elasticities. This measure indicates the relative strength of a retailer's product with
respect to his competitors, and captures the interdependence of the products in that
market. Based on this measure, by only knowing information on two "representative"
retailers, we are able to analytically quantify various performance metrics including
market penetration, channel profit, social welfare and rent extraction for a supply
chain with an arbitrary number of retailers by deriving their respective upper and
lower bounds.
We present families of demand functions for which the bounds are tight. We also
use simulation to show that the bounds achieve an accuracy of within 7% under a
more general setting. To establish the analytical bounds, we develop the analysis
by utilizing tools such as Cassini ovals of eigenvalues and copositivity from matrix
analysis (Horn and Johnson 1985). We believe the methodology proposed in this
22
work could potentially be used in other problems.
Impact of imperfect competition. By first focusing on affine demand, we quantify
how much competition induced by product substitutability promotes output levels,
channel profit and social welfare. We show that the two "strongest" retailers pre-
dominantly determine the channel performance. Although asymmetry between them
deteriorates the performance, a decentralized supply chain with substitutes is fairly
efficient as suggested by the performance metrics. We show that with affine demand,
the profit loss in a decentralized supply chain is always less than 25%. In many real
life scenarios supported by empirical evidences, the loss is well within 15%, which im-
plies that price-only contracts are often "good enough" for supply chains in practice.
Impact of nonlinearity of demand. We show that when the demand function is
concave, the decentralized supply chain is more efficient than that with affine demand.
To be more specific, the profit loss in a decentralized supply chain is at most 25% of
the optimal profit and improves as the intensity of competition among retailers in-
creases. On the other hand, with convex demand, the inefficiency is relatively higher
than that with affine demand. The intuition is that inefficiency in a decentralized
supply chain is induced by the successive markups imposed by the supplier and retail-
ers. When demand is concave (convex), a given price change induces a proportionally
smaller (greater) change in demand than with affine demand.
Rent extraction in a decentralized chain. The study on the profit allocation
reveals that the supplier is always guaranteed with a larger share of the channel profit.
Moreover, the supplier enjoys a lion share of over 66% of the channel profit and her
share increases further as the competition in the retail market intensifies. This result
offers some explanation for the prevalence of price-only contracts in practice since
they are desirable from the perspective of the supplier.
2.1.2 Relevant literature
Two sources of competition exist in a decentralized supply chain: (i) vertical competi-
tion between the supplier and the retailers and (ii) horizontal competition among the
retailers. Since Spengler (1950) who identified the double marginalization effect, the
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problem of channel coordination and its relevant issues have generated considerable
research in both the marketing and economic literature. (e.g., Choi 1991, Krish-
nan and Winter 2007, Moorthy 1987 and Pasternack 1985). During the last decade,
the issue of coordination in supply chains has also gained a lot of attention in the
operations management literature (see Cachon 2003 for a review).
Despite numerous coordinating contracts proposed in the academic literature (e.g.,
Corbett et al. 2005, Bernstein and Federgruen 2003, 2007, Cachon and Kok 2010),
simple price-only contracts are more often observed in practice. Their prevalence
suggests the importance of quantifying the "price of decentralization", that is, the
decentralized channel performance in comparison to a centralized chain with price-
only contracts. Such analysis measures the potential gains through coordination, and
thus, allows managers to gauge whether there is a need to implement more complex
contracts. Perakis and Roels (2007) formally characterize the profit loss for various
supply chain configurations when retail prices are exogenous. Adida and DeMiguel
(2010) study a supply chain with multiple suppliers and multiple risk-averse retail-
ers in a Cournot oligopoly. Nevertheless, the authors primarily perform compara-
tive analysis for symmetric manufacturers and retailers with affine demand. For the
asymmetric setting, based on numerical simulations, they conclude that some results
obtained for the symmetric chain do not hold for asymmetric retailers. Their obser-
vation reaffirms the need to study this problem with asymmetric retailers. Netessine
and Zhang (2005) study the performance of a distribution channel from the supply
side, where the demand of one retailer is concave with respect to the stock level of
his competitors. They conclude that retailers with complements tend to understock
compared to the centralized setting, whereas they tend to overstock with substitutes.
Thus, Netessine and Zhang (2005) conclude that complements (substitutes) aggra-
vates (compensates) the double-marginalization effect.
Linear, convex, and concave demand functions can be found in the literature.
Robinson (1933)'s pioneering analysis, taken forward by Schmalensee (1981) studied
how the curvature of demand functions affect the output level in an monopoly. The
primary focus of the this body of literature (e.g., Varian 1985, Holies 1989, Schwartz
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1990, Yoshida 2000 etc.) is on how social welfare is affected when price discrimination
exists in a market. It is well-known that with a affine demand, a profit-maximizing
monopolist produces exactly half of the socially optimal output. Malueg (1994) shows
that when the demand is concave (convex), the output level becomes at least (at most)
half of the socially optimal quantity. Moreover, when demand is concave, the ratio
between the welfare loss in the monopoly to the social optimum is bounded. The
similar argument, however, does not apply when demand is convex. In this work,
we will investigate the impact of demand curvature on the performance of a supply
chain.
Lastly, our work which measures the performance of a decentralized system with
respect to a centralized system is related to a stream of literature on price of anarchy,
popularized by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999). It compares the performance
of the worst-case Nash equilibrium with respect to the centralized system. The con-
cept has been used in transportation networks (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002, Correa
et al. 2004, 2007, Roughgarden 2005), network pricing (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007,
Johari and Van Roy 2009), oligopolistic pricing games in a single tier (Farahat and
Perakis 2010a,b), and supply chain games with exogenous pricing (Perakis and Roels
2007, Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi 2009, Martinez-de Alberniz and Roels
2010).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our model
and assumptions. Section 2.3 begins with affine demand, and investigates the per-
formance by quantifying various performance metrics to showcase the impact of im-
perfect competition. We will incorporate nonliear demand in Section 2.4. Several
simulation experiments which evaluate the tightness of the bounds can be found in
Section 2.5. Lastly, we will discuss some extensions of the current model and conclude
the paper in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Problem Formulation
2.2.1 Model and assumption
We consider a two tier supply chain with a single supplier and n retailers. We denote
the retail price set by retailer i = 1, 2, ..., n by pi and we use p = (pI, ... , Pn) to denote
the entire price vector set by all the retailers. Each retailer purchases one type of
product from the supplier. We will show that this assumption can be easily relaxed
in Section 2.6. We denote the constant marginal production cost incurred by the
supplier when she fulfills retailer i's order as ci and let vector c = (ci, ..., cn). The
marginal cost may vary across the retailers as different orders may require different
levels of effort from the supplier. The supplier has to determine the contract, the
wholesale price wi for each retailer, and vector w = (wi, ... , wn). Each retailer faces
a deterministic demand, qj(p), which depends on the prices set by all the retailers.
The decision sequence is as follows. The supplier initiates the process by proposing
a wholesale price contract to each retailer. Each retailer then announces his retail
price pi and places his order quantity qj(p) from the supplier who fulfills all the orders
without delay.
Assumption 2.2.1 The demand function qi is a continuous, twice differentiable
function with respect to prices, p. Furthermore, we assume that ' < 0 for all i,
and ;> 0 for j i i.
This assumption states that the demand decreases strictly if the retailer increases
his price and increases if his competitors increase their prices. Denote the Jacobian
matrix of the demand function as -B(p) such that,
B (p) = - -- : ,
8pi 8pn ,
where B(p) is a n x n matrix. For ease of notation, we will use B instead of B(p)
for the rest of the chapter. We will utilize subscripts to distinguish this matrix
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evaluated at different values of p. When demand is affine, then B is independent of
p, and q(p) = q(0) - Bp, where q(O) is the maximum demand when products are
free. Denote #ij as the (i, j)th element of matrix B, which represents the demand
sensitivity with respect to a price change. Assumption 2.2.1 states that matrix B has
positive diagonal elements and nonnegative off-diagonal elements. Denote matrix F
as the diagonal matrix of B, i.e., F = diag(#i , ... , #nr).
Assumption 2.2.2 Matrix B is symmetric and strictly diagonally dominant for all
feasible price vectors p.
The symmetry of the Jacobian matrix of demand naturally arises from a representa-
tive consumer utility framework with a concave utility function. Furthermore, strict
diagonal dominance of the matrix implies that a retailer's demand is more sensitive to
his own price changes than to those of his competitors. This assumption follows from
the law of demand for substitutable products where a price increase by any retailer
leads to a decrease of the total sales in the market.
Assumption 2.2.1 and Definition 2.2.2 imply that the Jacobian matrix B belongs to
the class of M-matrices, also referred to as Stieltjes matrices. This class of matrices has
several interesting properties, e.g., positive definite and its inverse is componentwise
nonnegative. We refer the reader to Horn and Johnson (1985) for more information
on this topic.
Assumption 2.2.3 The demand function qj is a concave function of the price vector
p. Alternatively, the demand function qj is a nonnegative, convex function of the
prices and the individual profit for retailer i piqj(pi, p-j) is a quasi-concave function
of the price pi.
This assumption guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution in both the
decentralized and the centralized settings. It is possible to relax it to some extent,
but it involves more tedious derivations. As a result, we impose this assumption to
enhance the transparency of the model.
Assumption 2.2.4 q(c) > 0.
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This assumption states that the demand must be positive when products are priced at
cost. Products which do not satisfy this assumption are unprofitable and are expected
to be removed from the market by the profit-seeking retailers. With affine demand,
this assumption becomes q(c) = q(0) - Bc > 0.
Assumption 2.2.5 F(F + 2B)- 1 B(p - c) > 0
This assumption implies that when the items are priced at the equilibrium retail
prices, the expected demands are positive. For the case with symmetric retailers and
affine demand, this assumption can be shown to be equivalent to Assumption 2.2.4.
Adida and DeMiguel (2010) have imposed a similar assumption in their work with
affine demand.
To facilitate the analysis with imperfect competition, we consider the following
measure which captures the relative dependence of each retailer with respect to other
competitors in the market.
Definition 2.2.6 Competition index. Given a price sensitivity matrix B, we de-
fine ri for retailer i as follows, ri(-) = I |ii
By Assumption 2.2.2, 0 ; ri(B) < 1 for retailer i =1,... , n. This index is known as
diversion ratio in the economics literature (e.g., Bordley 1985), that is, the fraction of
retailer i's customers who switch to other retailers when retailer i raises his price by
1 unit, given all other retailers keep their prices unchanged. This index is positively
related to competition and negatively related to product differentiation. For instance,
when retailers are noncompeting (e.g., the products are unrelated), i.e., ri(B) = 0.
It means that if retailer i increases his price, there is no change in other retailers'
demand. Another extreme case is when ri(B) approaches 1. That is, customers view
retailer i's product and other products as fully substitutable. Thus, when retailer i
raises his price, all his lost sales switch to other retailers.
With symmetry, all retailers share the same competition index, i.e., ri(-)
for all i (without the loss of generality, we set all #ij = -1 for all j # i and #ij = # for
all i). When asymmetry exists, ri(.) differs across retailers, which in turn, implies the
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relative strength of a retailer. A "strong" retailer is one whose demand is not affected
much by external price disturbances, whereas a "weak" retailer is more susceptible
to price changes. Suppose every retailer changes his price by (, the demand change
experienced by retailer i selling substitutes is given by 3ii(1 - rj(B))(. High ri(B)
results in a small demand change, implying a strong retailer.
Based on the competition index for every retailer, ri (.), we introduce the following
two indices to approximate a market with asymmetry.
Definition 2.2.7 Given a market with n retailers whose competition indices are
ri,. -- , rn, we define
(i) One-Firm Ratio. r(1)(B) = maxi ri(B), and
(ii) Two-Firm Ratio. r(2)(B) = maxi,jljo# Vrj(B)rj(B).
We are going to show that with either index, we are able to derive tight bounds on
the channel performance. Though the One-Firm Ratio requires less information to
compute (it only looks at one retailer whose product exhibits the highest competition
index), the bounds in terms of the Two-Firm Ratio are more accurate as the ratio
contains additional information on asymmetry. We can rewrite the Two-Firm Ratio
,,±a~_ (V,-Vr-j)2as r(2) = maxiJylyg 2 2 which is essentially a geometric mean of the
two retailers with the highest competition indices and a correction term which is
determined by the asymmetry between them.
When the demand q(p) is nonlinear, the Jacobian matrix B depends on the value
of p. To establish a bound, it is key to introduce a constant that will measure the
curvature, or the degree of nonlinearity of the demand function. As a result, we briefly
introduce the concept of Jacobian similarity. We refer reader to Perakis (2007) for
more information on this concept.
Definition 2.2.8 The Jacobian similarity property. A positive semidefinite
matrix F(p) satisfies the matrix similarity property if there exists a constant K > 1
such that for all w, p and p': KwT(F(p))w > wT(F(p'))w> wT(F(p))w.
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Notice that if F(p) is the Jacobian matrix of an affine function, i.e., F(p) does not
depend on p, then r, = 1. In general, the constant K is easy to compute when
matrix F(p) is positive definite for all p. In that case, one choice for the constant
maxp maxi Ai(F(p)) that is, the ratio between the maximum and minimum eigenvalue
minp mini Ai (F(p))
of the matrix.
2.2.2 The decentralized and centralized problems
Throughout the paper, we compare the performance of a decentralized (uncoordi-
nated) supply chain to a benchmark setting of a centralized (coordinated) system.
Denote the wholesale prices, retail prices, order quantities and chain-wide profit as
w, p, q and ir respectively. We use subscripts c and d to differentiate the centralized
and the decentralized settings.
In a decentralized setting, the supplier maximizes her profit by deciding the whole-
sale prices, anticipating the equilibrium order quantities from the retailers. Each re-
tailer determines his retail prices in order to maximize his own profit. We assume a
sub-game Nash Equilibrium has been reached where no single retailer can increase his
profit by unilaterally changing his price. For each retailer i, given the supplier's equi-
librium wholesale price, wi, and competitors' equilibrium price vector, p-i, retailer
i's optimal retail price pi is a best response function to the maximization problem:
(7rd),i A max (pi - wi)q%(pi, p-i), s.t. pi > 0, qj(pi, pi) > 0.
The supplier maximizes her profit by deciding the wholesale price vector, w, given
the retailers' order quantities obtained from vector q(p(w)):
(7rd), max Ei(wi - ci) -qj(p(w)), s.t. w > 0.
The total profit in the supply chain 7rd is given by 7ra A (rd)s + Ei(7rd)ri.
In a coordinated supply chain, a central authority decides the retail prices across
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the chain with the objective to maximize the chain-wide profit:
7rc A max Ei(pi - ci)qi(p), s.t. p > 0, q(p) > 0.
Proposition 2.2.9 Under Assumptions 2.2.1 to 2.2.5, there exists a unique equilib-
rium to the decentralized supply chain problem. The equilibrium output level and the
total profit are given by
qd = Tda(T + 2Bd)- 1 Bd(Pd - c), and (2.1)
7rd = (Pd - c)Trd(Fd + 2Bd)~1 Bd(Pd - c). (2.2)
Under Assumptions 2.2.1 to 2.2.4, there exists a unique solution to the centralized
supply chain problem. The corresponding output and profit are given by
c= Bc(pc - c), and (2.3)
7rc = (pc - c)TBc(pc - c). (2.4)
Proof of Proposition 2.2.9. We first derive conditions on the decision variables
based on the optimality condition. For both the centralized and decentralized settings,
we will show that there exists a unique optimal solution to the unconstrained problem.
Next, we show that with the nonnegativity constraints, the solution is feasible. Thus,
it is also the unique optimal solution to the original constrained problem.
The decentralized problem:
Consider the decentralized supply chain problem for each retailer i, given a wholesale
price w, in the equilibrium, the output level must satisfy qd = 'd(Pd - Wd), where
rd is the diagonal matrix with matrix Bd. Substitute Wd = Pd - ]P-lqd into the
supplier's objective, i.e., (7rd)s = qa'(pd - l qd - c). Taking the first order condition
with respect to Pd, and since Bd is symmetric by Assumption 2.2.2, we obtain the
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following condition that
qd - Bd(pd - c) + 2Bdrd-7qd = 0 = (rd + 2Bd)L' lqd = Bd(pd - c).
Thus, we have shown that qd = 'd(Fd + 2Bd)- 1 Bd(pd - c), which is nonnegative
by Assumption 2.2.5. To show that nonnegative constraints are satisfied, notice that
Pd = c + (F (Fd + 2Bd)>Bd) 1 qd = c + (Bj + 2Ld 1)qd. By Assumption 2.2.2 that
matrix B is a M-matrix, thus, its inverse is nonnegative. r 1 is a positive diagonal
matrix. Therefore, Pd > c > 0. In addition, substituting qd and qd, the wholesale
price is shown to be wd = C + (Bd 1 + rd 1)qd > c. Moreover, we have established
Pd > Wd > c, that is, "double marginalization" exists with nonlinear demand and
asymmetric retailers in a decentralized supply chain. Lastly, the chain-wide profit
in a decentralized supply chain is given by 7rd = (Pd - c)'q = (Pd -- c)TrFd(Ld +
2Bd)- 1 Bd(pd - c).
The centralized problem:
The first order optimality condition for the centralized supply chain problem is given
by Bc(pc - c) = qc. To show that qc satisfy the nonnegativity constraints, notice
that when the demand function q(p) is concave,
q(O) - qc < -Bc(O - pJ =- q(O) - qc < Bcpc.
This implies that qc > q(O)-qc-Bec #4 2qc > q(0)-Bcc =4 qc > 1(q(0)-Bcc) > 0.
We obtain the last inequality by Assumption 2.2.4. To show pc > 0, by the optimality
condition, pc - c = BC-'qc. Because BC-' is nonnegative componentwise (by property
of a M-matrix) and qc > 0 which we have just shown, pc - c > 0 #> pc > c.
On the other hand, suppose the demand q(p) is convex, then
q(pc) - q(0) > -Bope =4 (Bc + Bo)pc > q(0),
where B 0 is the matrix evaluated at q = 0. Bc + B 0 is a M-matrix and its inverse is
nonnegative. Thus, with positive q(0), pc > (Bc + Bo)>q(O) > 0
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Lastly, substituting the optimality condition of qc into the objective, we obtain
that the total profit is 7rc = qj(pc - c) = (Pc - c)TBc(pc - c). D
The proof of Proposition also shows that with nonlinear demand and imperfect
competition, the existence of "double marginalization" in a decentralized supply chain
continue to hold, i.e., Pd > Wd > c.
2.3 Efficiency with Affine Demand
In this section, we investigate the performance of a decentralized supply chain with
imperfect competition when the demand function is affine. By doing so, we isolate
the impact of imperfect competition from demand nonlinearity and we will address
nonlinear demand in the next section. Note that with affine demand, the Jacobian
matrix B is constant and independent of the values of Pc or Pd.
Before we delve into the analysis, we would like to highlight that the impact of
imperfect competition could be ambiguous at the first glance. For example, with
affine demand, one can show that Pd Pc. One might conjecture that every retailer
in the decentralized chain sells few units due to the higher retail price. The following
numerical example shows, however, that this relationship may fail to hold. Consider
the following setup with 2 retailers, let demand q1(p) = 0.7413 - pi + 0.8039 P2,
1.4006
q2(p) = 0.1048 - P2 + 0.803 9 pi, c1 = = 0. This results in Pd = ;>
1.1107
1.1670 0.2336 0.3706
Pc J. However, qd = and qc = . In this case,
0.9906 0.1201 0.0524
(qd)2 > (qc)2. In general, lower sales volume for every retailer, in the decentralized
setting, can only be guaranteed in special cases such as noncompeting or symmetric
retailers.
2.3.1 Lower and upper bounds on performance metrics
We investigate three aspects of performance, the first two address the chain-wide
behavior from the channel members' perspective and the last focuses on the consumers
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and the society as a whole. We begin with chain-wide profit, defined as the fraction
of possible profit that the decentralized setting attains compared to the centralized
setting, i.e., rd/rc. Next, we consider market penetration, that is, the total sales in
a given market. The deeper the penetration, the higher the sales volume. We are
interested in finding out the fraction of sales volume captured in the decentralized
setting, i.e., eTqd/eTqc, where e = (1, ..., 1) E Rn. Next, The third performance
metric analyzes the behavior of the supply chain from a societal perspective. The
quantities of interest are consumer surplus (CS) and total surplus (TS) which is
defined by aggregating consumer surplus and producer surplus which is the channel
profit in this model.
Theorem 2.3.1 When the demand function is affine with a price sensitivity matrix
B, the chain-wide profit, market penetration, consumer surplus and total surplus of
a decentralized supply chain with imperfect competition are bounded as follows,
3 7r< 3 - 2r(2)(B) 3 - 2r(1)(B)
4 - re - (2 - r(2 )(B)) 2 - (2 -r(1)(B))2'
1 eTqd 1 1
2 - eTqc - 2 - r( 2)(B) - 2 - r(1)(B)'
1 CSd 1 1
- < d< 1 < 1and
4 - CSc - (2 - r(2)(B)) 2 - (2 - r(i)(B)) 2 '
7 TSd 7 - 4r(2)(B) 7 - 4r(i)(B)
12 - TSc - 3(2 - r( 2 )(B)) 2 - 3(2 - r(i)(B))2
The lower bounds are tight with noncompeting retailers and the upper bounds are tight
with symmetric retailers.
Since the techniques used to prove bounds on the performance metrics are similar,
we will present the proof on 7rd/7rc below. The proofs for the other metrics can be
found in the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1 on 7rd/7rc. This proof consists of three main steps.
Step 1: Preliminary work. Using Equation (2.2) and (2.4) derived in Propsition
2.2.9, we have an expression for the ratio of the profit obtained in the two settings,
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i.e.,
7rd (Pd - c)TFp(F + 2B)- 1 B(pd - c) (2.5)
7rc (Pc - c)TB(pc - c)
We will now find an expression to express qd in terms of Pc. With affine demand,
q(p) = q(0) - Bp, i.e., qc = q(0) - Bp, and qd = q(O) - Bpd. Thus, qd + Bpd -
Bc = qc + Bpc - Bc. Use the optimality conditions shown in Equation (2.1) and
(2.3), we obtain
(T (r + 2B)- 1 B + B)(pd - c) = 2B(pc - c)
z (F + B)(F + 2B)- 1 B(pd - c) = B(pc - c)
SPd-c=B-l(r+2B)(FP+B)-B(pc-c).
Substituting Equation (2.6) into Equation (2.5) and with some algebra, it is easy to
show the following:
7 _ (Pc - c)T(2B + F)(B + F)'B(B + )-'F(pc - c) (2.6)
7rc (Pc - c)TB(pc - c)
Step 2: Lower bound. To prove 7rd/7c is always greater than 3/4, it is equivalent
to prove a composite matrix 1(B) = 4B- 1 (B+FP)]F 1 (2B+FP)(B+)~ 1 - 3B'(B+
)F'BTF1 (B+F)B- is a copositive matrix. To see this, let x = B(B+r)-IT(pc-
c), which is nonnegative under Assumption 2.2.5. Notice that if 1(B) is copositive,
by its definition, xT (B)x > 0 must hold. It implies that
xTp(B)x > 0
m (B(B + F)-F(pc - c))T @(B) (B(B + r)-ir(pc - c)) > 0
4(pc - c)T(2B + F)(B + F)'B(B + )~1J7(pc - c) > 3 (pc - c)TB(pc - c)
I(pc - c)T(2B + F)(B + F)-'B(B + F)-1 J(pc - c) 3
(pc - c) TB(pc - c) - 4'
where the right-hand-side is the same expression as what we have derived for 7rd/7rc
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in Equation (2.6).
Denote G = F- 0 .5Br-0.5 , whose diagonal elements are normalized to 1 and its
(i, j)th element is defined as $ij/ / 3-jjp. It is straightforward to show that I@(B) =
F1 /2 1(G)r 1/2 . Note that r is a diagonal matrix with positive elements, thus if we
can show that 1(G) is copositive, then ID(B) must also be copositive. To prove this,
4(G) = 4G-'(G + I)(2G + I)(G + I)-' - 3G- 1 (G + I)G(G + I)G-1
= 4G- 1 (G + I) + 4G- 1 (G + I)G(G + I)-' - 3G- 1 (G + I)2
= 41 + 4G- 1 + 41 - 3G-'(G 2 + 2G + I)
= 21+ G- 1 - 3G
= (G- 1 + 3I)(I - G).
Because B is a M-matrix, G is also a M-matrix. The first term is the sum of an
inverse M-matrix G- 1 and an identity matrix, therefore, it is also nonnegative. Also,
G has diagonals equal to 1 and nonpositive off-diagonals, thus, I - G is also nonneg-
ative. D(G) which is a product of two nonnegative matrices is also nonnegative. A
nonnegative matrix is copositive and this establishes 3/4 as a lower bound.
To show that this bound is tight, consider the case with noncompeting retailers,
i.e., #ij = 0 for all j # i. Thus, the sensitivity matrix B becomes a diagonal matrix,
i.e., r = B. The profit expression in Equation (2.6) becomes,
7d (Pc - c)T(3r)(2r)-2p 2 (pc - c) 3
ire (Pc - c)Tr(pc - c) 4
This has shown that the lower bound is tight.
Step 3: Upper bound. Denote w = B1/2 (pc - c). Rewrite the ratio grd/ 7rc in
Equation (2.6) as follows,
7rd wTB-1/ 2 (2B + P)(B + )-1 B(B + r)-rB-1/2w
7re WTw
wT B-1/ 2 (I + B(B + F)-')B(I - (B + T) B)B-1/2W
wTw
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w TB-1/2 (B - B(B + F) IB(B + F)~1B)B-1/2w
wTw
w I - Bi/2(B B(B + )- 1 B(B +F)- /2W
wTw
wT(I - A2 )w
wTw
where A = B 1 /2(B + F)-1 Bi/ 2. Note that matrix I - A2 is symmetric and can be
diagonalized with a unitary matrix which corresponds to the eigenvectors. Using the
Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, the ratio 7rd/rc must be bounded by the maximum eigenvalue,
that is,
- < Amax(I - A2 )
= 1- Amin(A 2 )
= 1 - Amin(A). (2.7)
The last equality holds because matrix A is positive definite.
Amin(A) = Amin(B 1/2(B + r) B/2)
1
Amax(B-1/ 2(B + P)B- 1/ 2 )
1
Amax (I + B- 1/ 2FB- 1/ 2 )
1
1 + Amax(B- 1/2 FB- 1/2)'
Since B- 1/2 FB- 1/2 - B- 1/ 2(FB-)B1/2 and TB 1 - 1/2(F1/ 2 B-1F1 / 2 )r- 1/ 2, which
implies that B- 1/2FB-1/ 2, FB- and r1/ 2B-'r1/2 are similar matrices, i.e., they all
have the same eigenvalues.
Ami(A) 1
1 + Amax(F 1/ 2B- 1F1/ 2 )
1
m (F-1/ 2 Br-1/ 2 )
1
1 + where G = r -/2BI-1/2
1+Ami.(G)
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Figure 2-1: The upper bounds for the performance metrics (which are tight for sym-
metric retailers).
Amin(G)
1+ Amin(G)
Substitute it into Equation (2.7) and we obtain the upper bound in terms of the
minimum eigenvalue of G as shown below.
7d< 1-fAmin (G) 2
?rc - \+ Amin(G)f)
1 + 2Amin(G)
(1 + Amin(G))2-
Because the inequality (2.8) is decreasing in Amin(G), we can further bound the ratio
by lower bounding Amin(G). Substitute the inequalities in Lemma A.2.1, we obtain
the corresponding upper bounds on the chain-wide profits,
(2.8)
1 + 2Amin(G)
(1 + Amin(G)) 2
1 + 2Amin(G)
(1 + Amin(G)) 2
< 1+ 2(1 - r(2)(B))
- (1 + 1 - (B))2
3 - 2r(2)(B)) 3
~ (2 - r(2)(B)) 2
1 + 2(1 - r(1)(B))
(1 + 1 - r(1)(B))2
- 2r(1)(B))
2 + r(1)(B)) 2
Because r( 2 ) (B) < 1, all four performance metrics considered are always lower
in the decentralized supply chain than that of a centralized setting. Nonetheless,
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7ra <
7rc
7~d<
-+ T- <
nI
Theorem 2.3.1 states that as the competition index increases, the channel performance
improves. In particular, the worst case for the decentralized setting occurs in the
absence of horizontal competition (noncompeting retailers), i.e., r(2)(B) = 0. Note
that as r(2)(B) -+ 1, the performance of the decentralized setting approaches that
of a centralized setting. Figure 2-1 depicts graphically how the performance metrics
vary with competition index, r(2)(B).
Prior work on supply chains with symmetric retailers (see for example, Adida and
DeMiguel 2010 and Cachon and Lariviere 2005) concluded that efficiency improves
as the number of symmetric retailers increases. Intuitively, as the number of retailers
grows to infinity, the retailers become price-takers with zero profit margin, and hence
it eliminates the double marginalization effect. We extend the analysis to asymmetric
retailers. We show that the level of competition in the retail market depends on the
number of retailers and their relative price elasticities. Therefore, it is possible for
a decentralized chain with a small number of retailers to also achieve high efficiency,
if their products are highly substitutable. Moreover, the bounds in Theorem 2.3.1
also suggest that the performance of a decentralized supply chain predominantly
depends on the two "strongest" retailers, whose products exhibit the highest levels
of competition.
To explain this phenomenon, consider the comparison between the marginal gain
of an individual retailer's profit in the decentralized setting ((7d),/&pi) and the
marginal gain of the chain-wide profit in a centralized chain (O7rc/&pi):
vertical externality horizontal externality
9(rri)d 07r, (2.
- - + (wi - ci)#ii + Z(p3 - cy)#30 . (2.9)
As highlighted in Equation (2.9), an individual retailer in the decentralized setting
faces two types of externalities: The vertical externality occurs when the supplier
charges a price higher than her marginal cost, while the horizontal externality results
from the cross-elasticity effect of the demand.
As #ij > 0 for all i, the vertical externality is always positive, i.e., indicating
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Source Industry Products r(2) (B) 7rd/7rc
Chintagunta et al. (2002) Frozen pasta 5 0.45 87%
Ellison et al. (1997) Pharmaceutical products 3 0.750 96%
Mela et al. (1998) Cleaning supplies 9 0.875 98.7%
Table 2.1: Illustrative empirical results
that the retailer has an incentive to raise his price so as to increase his profit. The
horizontal externality can be either positive or negative, depending on the type of
products that the retailers are competing with. To be specific, when retailers are
competing with substitutes as considered in this work, ji < 0, for all j f i. It
means that the horizontal externality is negative, indicating a downward pressure to
offset the vertical externality as the two externalities act in opposite directions. In
other words, when products are highly substitutable, i.e., the intensity of horizontal
competition is high, the retailers have to undercut prices to attract sales. As a result,
it reduces the gap of double marginalization which in turn, promotes the channel
efficiency. When the horizontal externality is sufficiently large to balance the vertical
externality, the decentralized setting behaves as a centralized chain.
We conclude this subsection with three examples drawn from the literature that
we use to estimate the chain-wide profit ratio for three different industries. The
results are summarized in Table 2.1. The cited papers provide empirical estimates
of price sensitivities of competing substitutes. We symmetrize the matrix by using
(B + B')/2. We see that for all three examples, the performance of the decentralized
supply chain is comparable to the centralized setting. It implies that in a supply
chain with substitutable products, price-only contracts are quite "efficient". Thus,
the room for benefits from using more elaborate contracts, which are often costly to
implement, could be limited. This may partly explain the observation by Cachon
(2003) that price-only contracts are commonly used in practice despite a proliferation
of complex coordinating contracts proposed in the academic literature.
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2.3.2 Rent extraction in decentralized supply chains
As with all supply chain structures, the retailers and the supplier are indirectly inter-
ested in the aggregate performance of the supply chain (e.g., chain-wide profit) and
more directly interested in their own share of that profit. In this section, we analyze
rent extraction of the individual channel members in a decentralized chain, that is,
the profit allocation between the supplier and all the retailers. We use (7rd)s and (7rd)R
to denote the profits earned by the supplier and all the retailers in a decentralized
setting, where (7d)R = Ei=i(7d)ri.
Proposition 2.3.2 In a decentralized supply chain, the profit allocation between the
retailers and the supplier is bounded as follows,
1 (7rd)R 1 - r(2)(B) 1 - r(1)(B)
2 - (7r)s 2- r(2)(B) - 2 - r(1)(B)
where the lower bound is tight with symmetric retailers and the upper bound is tight
with noncompeting retailers.
Price-only contracts guarantee the supplier with a higher profit share. Being a leader
in a Stackelberg game, the supplier has the advantage of selecting the most favor-
able contractual terms by anticipating the retailers' responses. When retailers are
independent (i.e., r(2)(B) = 0), the supplier's profit exactly doubles that of all the
retailers.
The supplier also benefits from horizontal competition as her lion share of the
profit grows further. We observe that the supplier's profit increases while the re-
tailers' profits decrease with competition index. This result is consistent with our
previous analysis: Intense competition induced by high level of product substitution
essentially transfers the market power from the retailers to the supplier. For the case
of symmetric retailers, in the limit as r(2) (B) -+ 1, retailers become perfect price-
takers, leaving the entire profit share to the supplier. Based on the analysis, we see
that price-only contracts are desirable from the supplier's perspective, which offers
another potential explanation to their popularity in practice.
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2.3.3 Impact of retailer asymmetry
So far, we have developed several bounds that measure the performance of a decen-
tralized supply chain relative to a centralized setting. We showed that the bounds are
tight for special cases such as noncompeting or symmetric retailers. In this section,
we will study the impact of asymmetry among retailers on the channel performance.
As the behavior of the bounds is quite similar for all three performance metrics, we
will use the chain-wide profit ratio, i.e., Tr/7rc, as an example.
Consider the following supply chain setting with n retailers:[ rin -1i... -1
, qqoz B -1 nk -1
c= - q(0)= - B=
c q(0)
-_ -
-- 1 . -1 nk
Let k denote the asymmetry factor. The competition index is given by ri (B) =
J and r 2(B)=...= r(B) = " 1 = /k. When k = 1, all the retailers are symmetric.
Figure 2-2 shows a plot of rd/rc with respect to k for a setting with n = 3 retailers.
Proposition 2.3.3 The channel performance decreases with the asymmetry factor
k.
As the asymmetry factor k increases, ri(B) decreases for all retailers except i = 1.
Decreasing ri(B) implies weakening of retailer i or reduced competition intensity. We
have shown in Theorem 2.3.1 that the channel performance is heavily dependent on
the two "strongest" retailers in the market for substitutes, i.e., the "stronger" they
are (or equivalently, more intense the competition is), the better the overall channel
performance. As a result, as k increases, the asymmetry between the two "strongest"
retailers increases (i.e., one of them becomes "weaker"), the channel performance
deteriorates as shown in Figure 2-2.
Recall that the Two-Firm Ratio can be expressed as a geometric mean (see Defini-
tion 2.2.7) which captures the asymmetry between the two retailers with the highest
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Figure 2-2: The plot shows the exact 7rd/7rc and two upper bounds in terms of the Two-
Firm Ratio r(2)(B), and the One-Firm ratio r(1)(B), with respect to the asymmetry
factor k.
competition indices. For a fixed mean, as the asymmetry increases, r(2) decreases.
Since 7rd/7rc increases in r(2 ), the asymmetry between the two "representative" retailers
has a reverse impact on the channel performance, i.e., 7rd/7rc decreases in asymmetry.
In other words, more imperfect the competition induces a more inefficient decentral-
ized supply chain.
The analysis also highlights the benefit of using the Two-Firm ratio, especially
in settings where there is a significant difference the two retailers with the highest
competition indices (e.g., Walmart versus local grocery stores). For the given setting,
the One-Firm ratio, r(1)(B) = 6, is a constant, while the Two-Firm ratio, r(2 )(B) =
J/vk, decreases in k. Essentially, the One-Firm ratio estimates the performance of
the entire supply chain based on a single retailer. As shown in Figure 2-2, the errors
from using the bound in terms of r(1) (B) grow rapidly since r(1) (B) is independent of
k and ignores retailer asymmetry. For instance, when k = 20, the exact ratio of 7rd/7rc
for complement is 0.71, whereas the bound predicted by r(1)(B) stays at 0.44. In
contrast, the bound in terms of r(2)(B) estimates the exact value with errors around
5%, since r(2) (B) captures the asymmetry between the two "representative" retailers
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Figure 2-3: The impact of nonlinearity: rd/rc with respect to the degree a, where
the demand function is given by p(q) = p(O) - #pa.
who predominantly determine the channel performance and provides a more accurate
estimation. We will present a more comprehensive computational experiment to
compare the tightness of these two bounds in Section 2.5.
2.4 Efficiency with Nonlinear Demand
In this section, we will investigate the performance when the demand is nonlinear.
We focus on the total profit as we have seen in the earlier section that the other
metrics such as market penetration, social welfare and consumer surplus behave very
similarly. We will begin with an example. Consider the following supply chain with a
single retailer who faces a demand function: p(q) = p(O) - Op'. This function can be
convex, affine and concave, depending on the value of degree a. To be precise, when
0 < a < 1, p(q) is convex; a = 1, p(q) is affine; when a > 1, the function is strictly
concave. Figure 2-3 shows the value of Fd/rc with respect to the degree a.
Figure 2-3 shows that the efficiency of the decentralized supply chain increases
with a. In particular, when a = 1 (affine demand), the total profit of a decentralized
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supply with a monopoly is exactly 3/4 of the optimal profit. When a < 1 (convex
demand), the efficiency is lower than 3/4. Contrast this with a > 1 (concave demand),
the efficiency increases above 3/4.
We have already shown in Theorem 2.3.1 that with affine demand and noncom-
peting retailers, efficiency of a decentralized supply chain in terms of profit is exactly
3/4. Based on the example as shown in Figure 2-3, compared to affine demand,
efficiency of a supply chain is higher with concave demand and lower with convex de-
mand. In the following two subsections, we will generalize these results on nonlinear
demand and derive upper and lower bounds on the profit ratio when is also imperfect
competition.
With nonlinear demand function, the Jacobian matrix of the demand depends on
the value of p. We will use Bd and Bc to differentiate this matrix evaluated at Pd
and pc respectively. In particular, r(1)(Bc) and r(2)(Bc) refer to the One-Firm and
Two-Firm ratio with respect to the Jacobian matrix Bc.
2.4.1 Concave demand
When the demand function is concave, for a given price p, the demand q(p) > q(O) -
B5 where B is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at j5. To quantify the performance,
we will make use of the Jacobian similarity property of a nonlinear function (see
Definition 2.2.8).
Theorem 2.4.1 When demand function q(p) is concave with p, the efficiency of a
decentralize supply chain is higher than that with affine demand. In particular, the
total profit in a decentralized supply chain is bounded between
3 <7d 3 - r( 2)(Bc) 3 - r(1)(Bc)
4 - 7rc - (2 - r(2 )(Bc)) 2 - (2 - r()(Bc))2'
where K1 > 1 is the Jacobian similarity factor.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1. Without loss of generality, we will set the constant
marginal cost c = 0 in this proof.
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Lower bound: By concavity of the demand function,
qc - qd -Bd(pc - Pd)
-qc + Bapc < qd + Bdpd.
Substituting the equilibrium condition derived in Proposition 2.2.9, we obtain
(Be + Bd)pc (rd(Fd + 2Bd)~1 Bd + Bd)pd
= 2(Fd + Bd)(Fd + 2Bd)-Bdpd.
Since Bc + Bd is a M-matrix by Assumption 2.2.2, (Bc + Bd)- 1 is nonnegative and
we obtain the inequality,
(2.10)pc < 2(Be + Bd)- (Fd + Bd)(Fd + 2Bd) Bd Pd
One upper bound for -rc = p'Bcpc can be obtained by using Equation (2.10), i.e.,
7re 4pdt(Bc + Bd) 1Bc(Bc + Bd)-4'dpd
We will now multiply (2Bd)(2Bd)- 1 = I and BdB-1 = I to the inequality,
rFd < 4pid (Bc + Bd) 1 (2Bd)>1(2Bd)BcBdBd1 (2Bd)-1(2Bd) (Bc + Bd)-<Ddpd.
Using the definition of the maximum eigenvalue, it implies that
7C < Amax{(Bc + Bd)~2(2Bd)2BcB-1}4pT<D (2B)d-B(2B)dpd
Amx{(Bc + Bd)--24BdBc}p T ) dB-<dpd. (2.11)
First notice that Amax{(Bc + Bd) 2 4BdBc} > 0 since the composite matrix is positive
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definite. Next, decompose the matrix,
Amax{(Bc + Bd)-24BdBc}
=Amax {I - ((Bc + Bd) 1 (Bc - Bd)) 2 1
=1 - Amax{((Bc + Bd)-(Bc - Bd)) 2 1
<1.
Thus, Equation (2.11) can be reduced to 7rc < Pd(dBdJdpd. An lower bound on
the profit can be written as
7rd pTFd(Fd + 2Bd) 1 Bd (Pd)
7rc pT4DB 
-'4)dpdCPd'~~'dd 
.(.2
Notice that every element in this expression only depends on the value of q, the
subscript d can be dropped for simplicity.
In the proof for Theorem 2.3.1 with affine demand (i.e., constant B), we have
shown that Pd = B-1 (B + F)(2 + BF)-1 Bpc. Substitute this equation into Equation
(2.6), followed by some algebraic manipulations, one can show that the expression
is exactly the same with the right-hand-side in Equation (2.12). Therefore, we have
shown that 3/4 is a lower bound with concave demand.
Upper bound: By concavity on the demand function,
qd - qc < -Bc(pd - Pc)
-q+ Bcqd < qc + Bcqc.
By the optimality condition shown in Proposition 2.2.9,
(rd -F+ 2Bd)- 1 Bd + Bc) Pd< 2Bepc. (2.13)
The composite matrix Q is a M-matrix and its inverse matrix is nonnegative. There-
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fore, Pd < 2Q- 1Bcpc and an upper bound on lrd is given by
7r p = P Tp(ra + 2B)- 1 Bdpd
4pT BcG 1 Lfd(Fd + 2Bd)- 1 Bd(Q- 1 Bcpc). (2.14)
Note that with the affine demand, i.e., Be = Bd, Equation (2.13) becomes an equality
and Q = 2(Bc + Tc)(Fc + 2Bc)- 1 Bc = f2c. Equation (2.14) is simply,
7r = pT (rc + 2Bc)(Bc + Tc)-Irc(Bc + Tc)- 1 Bcpc = (pc).
With nonlinear demand, by using the Jacobian similarity property, there exists si >
1 such that 7d Kif(pc). Using the definition of the maximum eigenvalue of a
positive definite matrix, an upper bound on , is given by i < AmaxQ -2 Q2(Bf +
2F- 1)-'(Bc'+2Fe 1 )}. Note that when Bd= Bc, then , = 1. With this nonlinearity
factor, we obtain an upper bound on the decentralized profit, i.e.,
rai f(pc)
I~c lIc
pT (c + 2Bc)(Bc + Tc)'Fc(Bc + Tc)-Bcpc
KpTB cpc
Notice that the right-hand-side looks exactly the same as expression with affine de-
mand in Equation (2.6), except matrix Be and Ic depend on the optimal solution
pC. With the same argument in the proof for affine demand, we can obtain an upper
bound on 7rd/7rc which is in terms of the competition index evaluated at the Pc, i.e.,
7Td 3 - r( 2)(Bc) 3 - r(1)(Bc)
rc (l2- r(2) (Bc))2 - (2 -r()(Bc
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2.4.2 Convex demand
When the demand function is convex, for a given price j5, the demand q(p) < q(0) -
BP, where B is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at p.
Theorem 2.4.2 When demand function q(p) is convex with p, the efficiency of a
decentralized supply chain is lower than that with affine demand. In particular, the
total profit in a supply chain is bounded between
3 < < 3 - r( 2)(Bc) 3 - r(1)(Bc)
4K2 7- (2 - r(2)(B())2 - 2 -r()(Bc))2
where '2 and r13 are the Jacobian similarity factors.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.2. With convex demand, qd - qc > -Bc(pd - Pc).
Lower bound : It is easy to show that when the demand is convex, the inequalities
in Equation (2.13) and (2.14) switch its sign (compared to the case with concave
demand), i.e.,
lr 4p Bcil'rd(Fd + 2Bd) 1B -1 Bcpc, (2.15)
where the composite matrix Q is defined in Equation (2.13).
With nonlinear demand, by using the Jacobian similarity property, there exists
K2 > 1 such that 7d > y f (pc), where f (pc) = pT'(Fc + 2Bc)(Bc + Lc)~'1 Fe(Bc +
'c)-'Bcpc. By the definition of the minimum eigenvalue, we can obtain a bound on
r, 2 as follows,
1
- > Aminf 2 2(B- 1 + 2Fj)~1 (Bc1 + 2F- 1)}
1
Amax{ 2Q -2(Bdj + 2 Tl)(B I + 2J 1)- 1 }
- "2 < Amax{2 2 (Bd ' + 2F-1)(Bc1 + 2F')-1}.
With this Jacobian similarity factor, we obtain a lower bound on the decentralized
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profit, i.e.,
7r > 1 f(PC)
7rc K2 7c
1 pT (Fc + 2Bc)(Bc + Fc)-'Tc(Bc + rc)- 1Bcpc
K2 p[Bcpc
Notice that the right-hand-side after ' looks exactly the same as expression withK2
affine demand in Equation (2.6). We can use the same techniques to prove the lower
bound in Theorem 2.3.1 to show that the lower bound on profit with concave demand
is 4, with K2 > 1.
Upper bound: By convexity,
qc - qd -Bd(pc - Pd)
-> (Bc + Bd)pc 2 (Fd + Bd)(Ld + 2Bd)- 1 Bd Pd.
4Fd
Since 1 d is a M-matrix, its inverse is nonnegative and we obtain the inequality,
Pd -1(B + Bd)pc. (2.16)2
The profit in a decentralized setting is given by Equation (2.2). With Equation
(2.16), an upper bound can be readily written as follows,
7rd < 4 p (Bc + Bd)4D-ird(Fd + 2Bd)- 1Bd1g 1 (Bc + Bd)pc.
-4
With the Jacobian similarity property, there exists a nonlinearity factor K3 > 1 such
that 7rd K3f(pc). One upper bound on K3 is given by
K3 < Amax{(Bc + Bd)2 (2Bc)-- 2  2  (2F- 1 + B-)- 1 (2Fc- + B-')}.
The rest of the proof follows the same argument as that for the upper bound in
Theorem 2.4.1. 0
The bounds shown for concave and convex demand are very similar in the sense
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that the upper bounds suggests that a decentralized supply chain becomes more
efficient as the competition in the market increases. The notable difference between
Theorem 2.4.1 and Theorem 2.4.2 is that with convex demand, the worst case could
be lower than 3/4.
To provide some explanation to the behavior with demand nonlinearity, note that
the inefficiency in a decentralized supply chain is created by the successive markups
imposed by the supplier and the retailers. A affine demand with a constant curvature
produces a change in demand that is proportional to the price change. The same
price change induces a change in demand which is proportionally smaller with concave
demand, and larger with convex demand. Thus, the same markup in a decentralized
supply chain will lead to a proportionally larger (smaller) demand drop with a convex
(concave) demand, resulting in a larger (smaller) decrease in the total profit. Although
it should be apparent that the prices are different with different demand functions,
the intuitive explanation seems to agree with our analysis.
Our result on demand nonlinearity is consistent with the studies in oligopoly
theory. For example, Malueg (1994) show that a monopolist facing a concave demand
will produce a greater percentage of the efficient output level than if demand had been
convex. Consequently, the relative welfare loss due to a monopoly is less when demand
is concave rather than convex. We have shown that for supply chains, in terms of the
worst-case performance, the inefficiency resulting from decentralization is relatively
smaller when demand is concave rather than convex. Nonetheless, we would like to
highlight that existing results in oligopoly theory often do not generalize to the multi-
tier supply chain setting. For example, Farahat and Perakis (2009) have shown that
the efficiency (in terms of total profit) of an oligopoly decreases with competition,
whereas we have shown that a decentralized supply benefits from competition.
One interpretation of the shape of the demand curve is linked to the distribution of
reserve price in the consumers' population. One could refer reserve prices to income,
so that the shape of the demand curve can be derived from income distribution. In
particular, three kinds of society give rise to three shapes of consumers' demand: A
affine demand curve arises from a uniform distribution of reserve prices. A concave
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demand curve arises from a distribution of reserve price with a wide number of con-
sumers having a similar middle reserve price, only few "rich" and few "poor". By
contrast, a convex demand curve arises from a polarised distribution of reserve prices
with most consumers having low reserve prices, few are "rich", and only slightly more
are in the middle. Theorem 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 imply that a decentralized supply chain
tends to be more efficient when the majority of the population has the similar reserve
prices, and less efficient when the most consumers have low reserve prices and are
sensitive to prices.
2.5 Tightness of Bounds
In the earlier sections, we have quantified several bounds on the performance of
decentralized supply chains and proved that they are tight under special instances.
This section addresses a natural questions that arises in the context of our analysis:
How "good" are our bounds in general?
The first experiment is used to illustrate the tightness of the bounds for a gen-
eral setting with an arbitrary number of asymmetric competing retailers with affine
demand. For a comprehensive analysis, besides the bounds in terms of r(2 ) (B) and
r()(B), we include an additional bounds in terms of the minimum eigenvalue of the
normalized price sensitivity matrix as shown in Equation (2.9). It is crucial to note
that we are able to compute bounds with information only based on the price elas-
ticities. Neither the supplier's marginal cost c nor the maximum demand q(O) is
needed.
The experiment consists of 35 scenarios and the results are shown in Figure 2-
4. For each scenario, the number of retailers is uniformly picked between 2 and 20.
Inputs, including the price sensitivity matrix, the vectors q(O) and c are also randomly
generated. We first compute the optimal equilibrium solution and obtain the exact
ratio, 'Fd/wr. Based on the price sensitivity matrix, we also compute the corresponding
eigenvalues, the degree of substitutability and their corresponding bounds.
The bound in terms of the eigenvalue of the price sensitivity matrix gives the
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Figure 2-4: A simulation experiment for an arbitrary
ers: The plot shows the exact ratio rd/7rc and three
eigenvalue, r(2)(B), and r(1)(B).
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Figure 2-5: Histograms for errors between the exact values of 7/7rc and
bounds in terms of r(2)(B) and r(1)(B) respectively for 105 instances.
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most accurate estimation, with a maximum difference within 4% for all scenarios.
The bounds in terms of r(2 ) (B) which uses information of only two "representative"
retailers yield slightly looser estimation with accuracy within 7%. The bounds in
terms of r(1) (B) which is based on a single retailer estimate the channel performance
with accuracy within 12%.
We will now present a more comprehensive simulation experiment to compare the
two bounds in terms of One-Firm and Two-Firm ratio. Figure 2.5 illustrates a result
of a numerical simulation with 10 5 instances. For each instance, we generate a market
structure of 2 to 20 retailers and randomly generate the inputs including B, c and
p(O). We then compute the exact values of the profit ratio 7rd/7rc and the two upper
bounds. Denote the error terms which are the differences between the exact value
and the upper bound in terms of Two-Firm ratio as Ar(2) for all the instances (define
Ar(1) similarly). For each array of the error terms, the elements are grouped into
20 equally spaced bins. The histograms for Ar(2) and ArT() are plotted in Figure
2.5. The x-axis reflects the range of error terms and the y-axis shows the number of
instances that fall within the bins. Figure 2.5 depicts clearly the advantages of using
r( 2) over r(i): The spread of errors is smaller for Ar(2) than Ar(1) (i.e., [0, 0.131] vs.
[0.003, 0.195]); the mean error is also lower for Ar(2) (i.e., 0.0117 vs. 0.0439).
The results highlight a trade-off between accuracy and complexity: In order to
obtain a more accurate bound which is in terms of the minimum eigenvalue, we
need information on the price elasticities of all the retailers. Taking a practical look,
though it is relatively straightforward to estimate price elasticities, the task becomes
increasingly challenging as the number of retailers in the market grows. Measurement
errors in the data are unavoidable and eigenvalues are susceptible to perturbations
(the computational procedure can be very inaccurate in the presence of round-off er-
ror). Furthermore, computing eigenvalues is as difficult as solving the original supply
chain optimization problem and its complexity increases rapidly with the dimension
of the matrix. On the other hand, for the bound in terms of r(2 ) (B), it is sufficient
to select two retailers with the highest degree of complementarity (substitutability).
Thus, the r( 2) (B) bound is particularly useful when there is only enough data to
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make reasonable estimation about the most "representative" retailers in the market.
Moreover, r(2) (B) provides an intuitive explanation on the channel performance as it
implies the strength of the retailers and the degree of asymmetry in the market.
2.6 Extension and Conclusions
One of the assumptions used in this paper is that each retailer carries a single product.
This assumption can be easily relaxed to incorporate a setting where each retailer
carries multiple products. Consider the following supply chain, a single supplier offers
wholesale price contracts to n retailers who carry a set m of products, where m > n.
Retailer i offers product {mi_1 +1, ... , mij, where mo := 0, mn := m, and mi- 1 < mi
for i > 1. When m = n, every retailer only carries a single product. Denote the price
sensitivity matrix as B, where -B is the Jacobian matrix of demand. Let F be a
block diagonal matrix, consisting of n blocks, whose ith block is the square submatrix
of B formed by the rows and columns indexed mi- 1 + 1,..., IM. F is referred to as
the intra-firm price sensitivity matrix. Denote B = B - F as the inter-firm price
sensitivity matrix. For the setting when each retailer carries a single product, r and
B are simplified to the diagonal and off-diagonal matrix of B respectively.
This extended model allows each retailer to carry a bundle of imperfect substitutes
or complements, as lohg as the retailers are viewed as competitors by consumers. That
is, the inter-firm price sensitivity matrix B is nonpositive. It can be shown that the
lower bounds established in Theorem 2.3.1, 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 continue to hold with this
extension.
With multiple products per retailer, the competition indices r(l)(B) and r(2)(B)
need to be defined slightly differently to capture that fact that each retailer also
carries other "competing" products.
Definition 2.6.1 Competition index for product i, ri(B) for i E {1, . .. , M,
ri = |[F 1 ]f\ 1 , where [F-12]i refers to the it" row of the matrix F[-1 B and | is
the L1 vector norm (i.e., |x|1 = E" |xj).
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Remark When each retailer carries a single product, ri(B) is reduced to Defintion
2.2.7.
We normalize the price sensitivity matrix B with the intra-firm sensitivity matrix
to capture the competing effect contributed by other products carried by the same
retailer. With this definition for the competition index, the upper bounds developed
in this chapter also carry through.
Inefficiency caused by competition has been the subject of extensive research in
operations management in recent years. So far, however, primarily cases of symmetric
equilibrium have been analyzed in the literature. In this paper, we provide an in-depth
treatment of analyzing a general setting of a two-tier supply chain with imperfect
competition and nonlinear demand. We present tractable and intuitive tight upper
and lower bounds on performance metrics such as market penetration, chain-wide
profit, consumer surplus and total social welfare.
We first propose a measure to evaluate competition in a supply chain with asym-
metric retailers. We show that the performance of a decentralized supply chain im-
proves with competition. Moreover, we characterize various performance metrics with
tight bounds by using this measure. We conclude that the performance of a decen-
tralized supply chain is predominantly determined by the two "strongest" retailers.
Asymmetry between the retailers deteriorates the performance. The study on non-
linear demand suggests that compared to an affine demand, a supply chain is more
efficient with concave demand and less efficient with convex demand.
An important take-away from our analysis is that for substitutes, price-only con-
tracts are often "good enough" in the sense that there is limited room for potential
gains from implementing other more complex contracts. In addition, as price-only
contracts disproportionately favor the supplier, she has less incentive to adopt other
contracts. The results provide some partial intuition that may help explain the pop-
ularity of price-only contracts in practice.
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Chapter 3
Price of Anarchy for Supply Chains
with Partial Positive Externalities
3.1 Introduction
The issue of inefficiency in a decentralized supply chain has attracted a lot of attention
since Spengler (1950) introduced "double marginalization", i.e., two price markups,
imposed by an upstream supplier and downstream retailers. The existing literature
typically assumes that the demand of competing retailers exhibits negative externali-
ties (or substitutability), i.e., an increase in one retailer's price induces an increase in
the demand for other retailers' products. Research has shown that substitutability
reduces the double marginalization effect, hence improves the channel performance
Adida and DeMiguel (2010), Cachon and Lariviere (2001).
In this chapter, we focus on positive externalities (or complementarity), i.e., a
decrease in the price of one product results in an increase in demand for all other
products. We investigate the performance of a supply chain with a single supplier and
several downstream retailers. The supplier offers wholesale price contracts to each
retailer who carries multiple imperfect complements, inducing partial positive exter-
nalities. Most existing literature on supply chain performance with positive external-
ities typically assumes perfect complements Carr and Karmarkar (2005), Corbett and
Karmarkar (2001), Wang and Gercliak (2003, 2004), which implies that whenever a
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purchase takes place, a consumer has to purchase one product from each and every
retailer. Most complements in reality only exhibit partial complementarity - more
complement goods are sold compared to the base goods, e.g., games versus game
consoles, software versus hardware, ink cartridges versus printers, etc.
Based on a simple example, we illustrate a surprising phenomenon in a multi-
product setting with partial complementarity - double marginalization may fail to
exist in a decentralized supply chain! By characterizing the degree of complementarity
for imperfect complements, we quantify the performance of a decentralized supply
chain with respect to the centralized setting with upper and lower bounds. We show
that the decentralized supply chain loses at least 25% of the optimal profit. We derive
two lower bounds on its performance with respect to the complementarity effect which
we will rigorously define later. We present the instances when the bounds are tight and
demonstrate their performance in a general setting through numerical simulations.
Discussions on complements in the economics and the industrial organization liter-
ature tend to focus on single-tier oligopolistic settings Arora and Gambardella (1990),
Bulow et al. (1985), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1995). Most
studies on supply chain performance with complements consider assembly chains Carr
and Karmarkar (2005), Wang and Gerchak (2003, 2004) as opposed to distribution
channels addressed in this work. Netessine and Zhang (2005) studies the impact
of supply-side externalities on supply chains, where the complementary effect arises
through product availability and prices are exogenous. Our work considers demand-
side externalities that arise through prices which are endogenously determined.
3.2 The Model
We consider a supply chain with one supplier who offers wholesale price contracts to
n retailers who carry a set m of products, where m > n. Retailer i offers product
{mi_1 + 1,... , mi}, where mo := 0, mn := m, and mi_ 1 < mi for i > 1. When
m = n, every retailer only carries a single product. In the notation below, we adopt
a convention where vectors and matrices appear in boldface. As is traditional in the
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pricing literature Tirole (1988) Vives (1999), we consider affine demand functions,
q(p) = a - Bp wherea > 0. We assume that the price sensitivity matrix B is sym-
metric, which is a natural consequence of maximizing a quasilinear utility function of
a representative consumer. To model the positive externalities or complements, it re-
quires that qj(p)/&pj < 0 for all i and j, &pi(q)/&qi < 0 for all i, and api(q)/ aqj > 0
for all j # i Vives (1999). The first condition implies that the demand for comple-
ments moves in the same direction when the price of one product changes, whereas
the other conditions suggest that the prices of complements move in the opposite
directions when the supply for one product changes. For instance, if the supply for
product i increases, i's price decreases. This induces an increase in demand for prod-
uct i, which then triggers an increase in demand for its complementary product j,
resulting in an increase in product j's price. Together with the symmetry assumption
on B, it implies that B 1 belongs to the class of M-matrices and the reader is referred
to Horn and Johnson (1985) for details. Let r be a block diagonal matrix, consisting
of n blocks, whose ith block is the square submatrix of B formed by the rows and
columns indexed mi-i +1,... , m. F is referred to as the intra-firm price sensitivity
matrix. Denote B = B - F as the inter-firm price sensitivity matrix. For the setting
when each retailer carries a single product, F and B are simplified to the diagonal
and off-diagonal matrix of B respectively.
For each product, we assume that the production capacity is unlimited and marginal
costs are constant. Let c denote the vector of marginal costs. Our final assumption
is that d := B- 1a > c, implying a > Bc, i.e., the base demand at marginal costs
must be positive. We will refer to this as Assumption (*).
Throughout the paper, we compare the performance of a decentralized supply
chain to a benchmark setting of a centralized setting. Denote the wholesale prices,
retail prices, order quantities and chain-wide profit as w, p, q and r respectively. We
use superscripts d and c to differentiate the decentralized and the centralized settings.
In a decentralized supply chain, the supplier initiates the process by proposing a
wholesale price contract wi to every retailer i with the goal to maximize her profit.
Each retailer then determines his retail prices pi, given the prices set by his competi-
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tors, p-j. We assume Nash Equilibrium has been reached where no single retailer can
increase his profit by unilaterally changing his price. The problem for the supplier
and the retailers can be written as follows:
(7rd),(w) A max(w - c)Tq(p(w)), s.t. w > 0.
(7rd),i(P) A max(pi - wi)Tqi(pi, p-i), s.t. p > 0, qi(pi, p-i) 0.
In a centralized supply chain, a central authority decides production quantities
and retail prices across the chain with the objective to maximize the chain-wide profit
by solving the following problem:.
Trc(p) A max(p - c)Tq(p), s.t. p 0, q(p) > 0.
Proposition 3.2.1 In a decentralized supply chain, wd = (B d + c), Pd = !(B +
F) 4 (2B+F)d+c, qd = !B(B+F)-'Fd, 7rd = NT(2B+F)(B+F)-B(B+Lr) l .
In a centralized supply chain, pc = }(B- 1 + c), qc = !Bd, 7rc = NTBa.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1 The decentralized problem is solved by backward in-
duction. Since B-1 is a M-matrix, it is positive definite. This guarantees the existence
and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium to the unconstrained problem. We need
to show that the solution obtained from the equilibrium condition also satisfies the
nonnegativity constraint. The order quantities in the decentralized setting can be
written as, qd = 2(B- 1 + F 1 ) 1d. Since B-1 is a M-matrix, F- 1 + B-1 is also a
M-matrix, and its inverse is nonnegative. d is positive by Assumption (*), thus, we
have shown qd > 0. Similarly, we can show that Wd satisfies the nonnegativity con-
straint. For the centralized problem, qc which is a product of a nonnegative matrix
and a positive vector is clearly nonnegative. 0
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3.3 Comparative Studies on Prices and Quantities
In this section, we begin with one example which highlights a interesting phenomenon
that occurs in a decentralized supply chain with partial positive externalities. Con-
sider the following setting with two retailers and three products. Retailer 1 carries the
first two products and the retailer 2 carries the third product. The price sensitivity
matrix, marginal cost, and the maximum demand are given as follows,
0.657 0.231 0.284 0.878 1.432
B= 0.231 0.422 0.154 ,c= 0.290 ,d= 1.373
0.284 0.154 0.611 0.979 1.267
In a decentralized supply chain, the wholesale prices and the retail prices are given by
Wd = (0.879,1.336,1.025) and Pd = (0.871,1.856,1.116) respectively. Notice (Pd)1 -
(Wd)1 = -0.008. Retailer 1 is unable to cover the wholesale price and loses money
every time when product 1 is sold!
This example illustrates a characteristic unique to pricing of complements: the
base product (product 1 in the example) is priced low to generate sufficient sales
volume which stimulates the demand for its complements (product 2). The objective
is to create a level of profit which adequately covers losses sustained by the base
product (otherwise, the retailer is better off by exiting the market). The almost
universal tactic in the desktop printer business involves printers selling for as little
as $100 which include two ink cartridges, which themselves cost around $30 each
to replace. Thus the company prices low on the printers to create the anticipated
revenue flow from selling the ink cartridges.
Proposition 3.3.1 In a supply chain with partial positive externalities,
(a) Wd = Pc > C.
(b) qd < qc.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. (a) The inequality can be easily established under
Assumption (*). (b) The order quantities in the decentralized setting could be
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Figure 3-1: The total profit between the decentralized and the centralized settings
with respect to the degree of complementarity for perfect complements. The curve
serves as a lower bound for settings with imperfect complements, where r is replaced
by r( 2) and/or r(i).
expressed as qa = j(B-1 + F-')-ld. Using the Inverse Binomial Theorem, we
can expand the term (B-1 + F-1)-1 = B - (B- 1 1/2]1/ 2B-1 + B-1)-1. B-11/ 2,
F1/ 2B and B' are M-matrices, thus the second term is nonnegative. It follows
that (B-' + )' < B. Since d is positive, we obtain the desired result. D
The supplier in the decentralized setting and the central planner in the centralized
setting charge the same prices and keep a positive markup for every product they dis-
tribute. Any product whose price falls below the manufacturing cost will be dropped.
The example above illustrates that for certain products, the retail price in a decentral-
ized setting could be lower than in the centralized setting. Nonetheless, Proposition
3.3.1 states that for every product, fewer units are sold in the decentralized setting.
3.4 Comparative Studies on the Channel Profit
Decentralized supply chains are widely recognized as less efficient than centralized
settings. The ratio rd/7rc compares the channel profit in a decentralized setting rela-
tive to that in a centralized setting. Quantifying this ratio is essential in predicting
system behavior and in designing appropriate rules of action to improve its perfor-
mance. In the rest of this section, we will give a precise characterization of this ratio
which solely depends on the price sensitivity information, assuming no knowledge of
d, aside from the fact that it is positive.
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To facilitate the analysis with imperfect complements, we consider the following
measure which captures the relative dependence of one product with respect to all
other products available in the market.
Definition 3.4.1 The degree of complementarity for product i, where i E
{1..., m}, ri = |[P4-5]j 1 , where [F- 1B]i refers to the ith row of the matrix F-5
and | is the L1 vector norm (i.e., |x| 1 = E7 |x,|).
Remark When each retailer carries a single product, ri could be simplified as ri =
S 3#ij // 3 ii, where #ij is the (i, j)-element of B.
The degree of complementarity of a product, measures the relative influence of posi-
tive externalities from other available products. It indicates how strongly one product
is dependent on other retailers' products. To be precise, consider the setting when
every retailer carries a single product, the numerator E, #ij measures the aggregate
demand change for retailer i's product triggered by retailer j's price change, the de-
nominator /3ii reflects the demand change solely contributed by i's own price change.
Thus, a high ri implies a strong need to use i's product with other retailers' products.
When some retailers carry multiple products, ri compares the inter-firm positive ex-
ternalities created by other retailers' products and the intra-firm externalities induced
by other products which the same retailer carries.
By definition, ri > 0. When products are perfect complements, then ri = r for all
i. With imperfect complements, ri varies across the products. In particular, as a unit
change in demand of a base good (computer) induces a larger change in the demand
for its complement good (software), the magnitude of ri is higher for the latter.
Given a market with m products, each with the degree of complementarity ri
defined as before, we introduce the following two indices as "proxies" for the entire
market.
Definition 3.4.2 For a set of m products with the degree of complementarity given
by r = (ri, ... rm),
(i) One-firm index: r(1) = maxi ri.
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(ii) Two-firm index: r( 2) = maxi,4$i p r 3i.
The one-firm index represents the highest degree of complementarity among all avail-
able products, thus, it only requires price sensitivities with respect to that firm. The
two-firm index is defined as a geometric mean of the two highest degrees of comple-
mentarities. This index captures the asymmetry effect between these two products.
To be precise, rewrite r(2) as maxi,,IJi 1(ri + ry) - 1(fi - /j)2, where the second
term decreases with the difference between ri and rj.
Theorem 3.4.3 When retailers carry multiple imperfect complements, the total profit
of a decentralized supply chain is bounded by
3 + 2r) 3 + 2r(2) 7( 3
-~ (2<r2 ) ~ - (3.1)(2 + r(i)) 2 -(2 + r(2) )2 - 7rc 4
where the two lower bounds are tight with perfect complements, the upper bound is
tight with independent products (i.e., noncompeting retailers).
Proof of Theorem 3.4.3. We first prove the lower bounds. Denote w = 1/2a
and I as the identity matrix. Rewrite the ratio lrd/ 7rc as follows,
7Fd dT(2B + L)(B + F)~'B(B + F)- 117
7rc dTBd
wTB-1/ 2 (2B + L)(B + F>1 B(B + )-irB-1/2W
wTw
wT B-1/ 2 (I + B(B + F)-)B(I - (B + r)"B)B-1/2W
wTw
wTB-1/ 2 (B - B(B + F)-'B(B + r)-'B)B-1/2W
wTw
wT(I - B 1/ 2 (B + F)-'Bi/ 2 B1 / 2 (B + r)-'Bi/2W
wTw
wT(I - A 2 )w where A = B1 / 2 (B + r)-'B1/2
wTw'
> Amin - A 2)
= 1 - Amax(A 2 )
= 1 - A2ax(A), (3.2)
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where the last equality holds because matrix A is positive definite.
Amax(A) = Amax(B 1/ 2 (B + )~1Bi/2)
1
Amin(B-1/ 2 (B + F)B- 1/2 )
1
Amin(I + B- 1/ 2FB- 1/ 2 )
1
1 + A minB12B12
Since B- 1/ 2 FB-1/ 2 - B- 1/ 2 (FB-)B 1/ 2 and TFB-1 = r 1/ 2 (r 1/ 2 B- 1] 1/ 2 )]-1/ 2, which
implies that B- 1/2FB-1/2, B-1 and [1/ 2B-1F1/2 are similar matrices, i.e., they all
have the same eigenvalues.
Amax(A) = 11 + Amin (F 1 /2B-1i/2)
1
1 + x(r-/ 2 BP-1 / 2 )
1
1 ma.(G)
Amax(G)
1 + Amax(G)
where G = r-1/2Br-1/2
Substituting this into Equation (3.2), we obtain the lower bound in terms of the
maximum eigenvalue of G,
7rd K1+ Amax(G) 2
7c 1- + Amax(G)
1 + 2Amax(G)
(1 + Amax(G)) 2
Because the inequality is decreasing in Amax(G), we can further bound the ratio by
upper bounding Amax(G). We will show that Amax(G) 1 + r(2 ) < 1 + r(i) and
substitute this into Inequality (3.3) to establish the lower bounds.
To show Amax(G) is bounded from below by the two indices, notice that the matrix
G and F-1 B are similar matrices, thus, Amax(G) = Amax(FT1B). Using Brauer's
65
(3.3)
Theorem (see Appendix), we obtain
(Amax(L' 1B) - 1)2 <max rirj
itjlj54i
- Amax(FTB) < 1 + max r rilj#2AiV
- Amax(FTB) 1+ r(2)(B). (3.4)
Substituting Inequality (3.4) into (3.3), we obtain the first lower bound in terms of
r(2). Notice r(2)(B) < rma(B), we obtain the looser lower bound in terms of r(1).
To prove the upper bound 7rd/7,r 5 3/4, it is equivalent to prove the matrix t1(B)
3B - 4(2B + F)(B + r)- 1 B(B + r)-'r is copositive. By copositivity, xTh(B)x > 0,
for all x > 0. Thus, substituting a which is positive by Assumption (*), we obtain
aT(3B - 4(2B + F)(B + )-'1 B(B + F)-F)d > 0
dT(2B + J)(B + F)-1 B(B + F)-1 Fd 3
dTBd 4
7
rd <3
7Tc 4
To prove the copositivity of the matrix T(B), we first express B = Ti/2Gri/2
(since G = F- 1 /2 B1-1/ 2 ). Then we rewrite '1(B) as 1(B) = Fi/ 21(G)F1 / 2, where
(D(G) = 3G - 4(2G + I)(G + I)>G(G + I)-1. r is a nonnegative block diagonal
matrix, thus, the matrix 4(B) is copositive if 1(G) is copositive. Express 1(G) as
follows,
1(G) = G - I + 2G + I - 4(2G + I)(G + I)~1 (G + I - I)(G + I)-'
= (G - I) + (2G + I) (I - 4(G + I)-(I - (G + I) ))
=(G - I) + (2G + I) (I - 4(G + I)-' + 4(G + 1)-2)
= (G - I) + (2G + I)(G + I)-2(G - I)2
= (G - I) + (2G + I)((G + I)-1 (G -_ ))2.
G - I is a nonnegative matrix as G is a nonnegative matrix with diagonals equal to 1.
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The second term is a product of a positive definite matrix, (2G + I), with a positive
semi-definite matrix, ((G + I)- 1(G - I))2, therefore, it is also positive semi-definite.
Matrix <b(G) is a sum of a nonnegative matrix and a positive semi-definite matrix,
therefore, it is copositive. E
The theorem suggests that the performance of a decentralized supply chain deterio-
rates with the degree of complementarity. The best scenario that one can hope for,
arises when products are independent, i.e., ri = 0 for all i. As the products exhibit
higher complementarity effect, the total profit earned in a decentralized supply chain
decreases with respect to the centralized setting and loses at least 25% of the optimal
channel profit.
The theorem reveals two sources of distortions in a decentralized supply chain with
partial positive externalities. The first distortion is attributed to vertical competition
between the supplier and the downstream retailers. This alone costs a decentralized
setting 25% of the optimal profit. The second distortion stems from the "neglected"
complementary effect across the retailers. In contrast with a centralized setting where
all products are priced to generate a demand level that maximizes the total profit, a
retailer in a decentralized supply chain is only interested in his own profit. By ignoring
the complementary effect induced by other retailers, the retailers in a decentralized
setting charge prices which induce a lower demand level for every product as compared
to the centralized setting (as shown in Proposition 3.3.1). As the complementary effect
across the retailers grows, the second distortion increases and gives rise to a larger
profit loss in a decentralized setting.
The bounds in Theorem 3.4.3 also suggest that the rate of decrease is more sub-
stantial when the degree of complementarity is small. As illustrated in Figure 3-1,
when the degree of complementarity increases from 0 to 1, the relative profit in the
decentralized chain decreases from 75% to 55.6% of the optimal profit; when the
complementarity effect increases to 2, the decentralized setting captures less than
half of the optimal profit. The main implication is that the decentralized setting
could experience significant profit loss even when the products exhibit a small degree
of complementarity.
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Figure 3-2: Histograms for errors between the exact values of 7rd/7rc and the lower
bounds in terms of r(2) and r(1) respectively for 106 instances.
An interesting observation from Theorem 3.4.3 is that the performance of a decen-
tralized supply chain with complements is predominantly determined by the products
which exhibit the highest degree of complementarity. Since the complement good has
a much higher degree of complementarity than the base good, Theorem 3.4.3 implies
that in order to boost the performance of a decentralized chain, it is important to
"strengthen" the complementary products.
Our analysis thus far shows that the bounds in Theorem 3.4.3 are tight when the
retailers carry perfect complements, i.e., r(l) = r(2) = ri, for all i. In the following
two simulation experiments, we will investigate the performance of the bounds with
imperfect complements, i..e., there exists some i and j, where ri # ry. In particular,
we will highlight the strength of using the bound in terms of r(2) which captures the
asymmetry effect for products with partial complementarity.
Figure 3-2 illustrates a result of a numerical simulation with 106 instances. For
each instance, we generate a market structure of 2 to 20 retailers and randomly
generate the inputs including B, c and a. We then compute the exact values of the
profit ratio 7d/7c and the two lower bounds. Denote the error terms which are the
68
0.65 -
- Exact
LB(r )
0.6 -.-.. LB(r )
0.55T ' I -
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Asymmetry factor, K
Figure 3-3: The exact value of wrd/7rc and the two lower bounds as k increases from 1
to 20.
differences between the exact value and the lower bound LB(r(2)) as Ar( 2) for all the
instances (define Armax similarly). For each array of the error terms, the elements
are grouped into 20 equally spaced bins. The histograms for Ar(2) and Ar(i) are
plotted in Figure 3-2. The x-axis reflects the range of error terms and the y-axis
shows the number of instances that fall within the bins. Figure 3-2 depicts clearly
the advantages of using r(2) over r(1): The spread of errors is smaller for LB(r(2)) than
LB(r(1)) (i.e., [0, 0.143] vs. [0.003, 0.188]); the mean error is also lower for LB(r(2))
(i.e., 0.0126 vs. 0.0389).
The advantage of using T( 2 ) is even more prominent as the asymmetry between
the two products with the highest degree of complementarity increases. Consider a
setting with two retailers who each carries one product, where c = (c, c), d = (d, d)
and the price sensitivity matrix is defined as k , where k > 1 represents the
1 k#
asymmetry factor between the two retailers. When k = 1, the setting described above
is fully symmetric. The exact expression of the profit ratio can be written as, rd/7Tc =
b(12# 4 k 3 +121 4 k 2 +161 3 k 2 _9 2 k 2 _9/32 k-6#k+2k+2). Note that, in general, it is hard to express(#3+3k+2)(43 2k -1)2
the profit ratio for problems with imperfect complements in higher dimensions. The
degree of complementarity for two retailers is defined as r1 = 1/#, and r 2 = /(k#).
Thus, the two indices are r(1) = maxi ri = 1/# and r(2) = Vrir 2 = 1/(V'W/3). As k
increases, r(i) remains the same while r(2) decreases. We obtain the two lower bounds,
namely, LB(r(1)) and LB(r(2)) in Theorem 3.4.3 by substituting the corresponding
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index. Figure 3-3 records the exact value of 1rd/7rc and the two lower bounds as k
increases from 1 to 20. When k = 1, all expressions yield the same value. As k
increases, the gap between the exact value and LB(r(i)) widens to 15% since r(1)
ignores the impact of asymmetry. At the same time, the differences between the
exact value and LB(r(2)) stays within 2% for this experiment.
We would like to point out that to compute the exact values of 7rd/re, one would
have to estimate the pair-wise price sensitivity across all products in the market,
marginal costs c and maximum demand d (when products are free), which is a chal-
lenging task to begin with. Both lower bounds are independent of c and d and only
require information of one or two products with the highest degree of complemen-
tarity in the market. In addition, we have also shown that using the two-firm index
allows us to estimate the supply chain performance with high accuracy based on the
simulations.
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Chapter 4
Price of Anarchy for Congested
Systems
4.1 Introduction
In a recent study conducted by the Federal Communication Committee (FCC), it
predicts that the demand for wireless bandwidth is expected to surpass the avail-
able spectrum by as early as 2014. When the amount of wireless traffic exceeds the
available bandwidth, users in the affected network would experience spotty services,
dropped calls, and sluggish data speeds. With the rapid proliferation of new content-
rich multimedia devices such as smartphones and tablet PCs, network congestion is
becoming a common problem in many urban areas. For instance, many AT&T users
in San Francisco and New York were angered by service degradation, when AT&T,
the exclusive seller of iPhone in the United States until 2011, did not adequately an-
ticipate the demand surge in bandwidth accompanied by the device's huge popularity
(WSJ December 9, 2009). In the U.S., FCC currently auctions off spectrum bands
that then become the property of the purchaser. Given the demand for wireless band-
width is expected to grow between 25 and 50 times the current levels within 5 years
(FCC Technical Paper 2010), one may wonder what kind of measure FCC should take
to control network congestion and ensure an efficient usage of the finite bandwidth.
Besides the field of wireless networks, another area routinely plagued by congestion
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is airports. In July 2009, for example, 30% of the flights in the U.S. domestic market
arrived late, up from 20% in July 2005. It has been reported that flight delays cost
passengers, airlines and the U.S. economy more than $40 billion in 2007 (The Joint
Economic Committee Report 2008). The rise in delays, not surprisingly, correlates
with a significant increase in the number of flights. However, research shows that
the vast majority is coming from substitution away from large aircraft in favor of
more frequent operations of smaller planes. Whalen et al. (2008) found out that at
LaGuardia, for example, the average number of seats per aircraft was 143 in the first
quarter of 1998, but that fell to 94 as of the first quarter of 2007. Similar trend was also
observed in other congested airports such as O'Hare. The existing system across the
U.S. is unlikely to promote efficient use of the scarce runway space: Current landing
fees depend only on aircraft weight and do not vary by time of day; runway allocation
is mostly done on first-come, first-serve basis. In fact, the weight-based landing fees
are often blamed for creating the wrong incentives for airlines to use small aircrafts.
The widespread problem of airport congestion raises the issue of finding a rationing
mechanism to use the runway space efficiently.
One common feature in the two examples mentioned above is oligopolistic com-
petition with congestion effects. In the example of wireless communication, as of the
fourth quarter in 2008, Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, Nextel, and T-Mobile together con-
trol 89% of the U.S. market. While airports vary in sizes, a small number of airlines
usually dominates an airport in terms of flight share. For both industries,, Cournot
has received both theoretical and empirical support as a good model of competition.
Theoretically, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that Cournot models best approx-
imate the long run results of two-stage competition with capacity choice followed by
price setting. Airlines compete by first setting schedules and later set prices to fill
seats. Wireless service providers first purchase bandwidth and then determine prices
for subscriptions. Empirical work also supports Cournot models reflecting actual
competition in these two industries, see for example, Weisman (1990), Brander and
Zhang (1990, 1993), Oun et al. (1993), Parker and Roller (1997) and Faulhaber and
Hogendorn (2000).
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However, we would like to point out a subtle difference associated with the cost
effects in the two examples: As wireless service providers use different frequency
bands to reduce signal interference, congestion in one provider's network does not
affect other networks. Congestion effect in this case is self-contained, i.e., the conges-
tion cost associated with one service provider only depends on his service level, e.g.,
the number of users, the amount of bandwidth consumed. For the example of wire-
less communication, service degradation is only experienced by users in the affected
network (a bogged-down AT&T network does not affect the service quality of other
carriers). This is in contrast with the airport example: When one airline schedules
an additional flight in a congested airport, it creates additional delays for every flight
which attempts to land and take off. Besides the self-contained cost component, cost
in this setting also has the spillover effect as an increase in delay affects everyone in
the system.
In this chapter, we study both scenarios, depending on whether spillover cost is
present. We consider congestion pricing as a control mechanism to ration demand,
with the goal to improve the societal welfare. Our model consists of several service
providers with differentiated services, competing for users who are sensitive to both
prices and congestion costs. A facility manager imposes an admission-level pricing
scheme on the service providers. Relating this model to the two examples, FCC
could play the role of the facility manager and determines a unit price for bandwidth
allocated to each wireless network operator, who in turn determines how many users
to enroll. Similarly, FAA would be responsible for imposing a landing fee and each
airline determines its flight frequency subsequently.
Our main contributions of the paper are the following:
Welfare analysis with nonlinear convex costs. We compare the total welfare in
an unregulated setting where the service providers have free access to the facility to
that of the social optimum, so as to assess how much welfare is lost due to the lack of
coordination. Congestion effects are modeled as nonlinear convex cost functions which
increase with the output level. We show that with self-contained costs, the maximum
welfare loss in the unregulated setting is limited. In fact, this loss is capped at 25%
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of the optimal welfare, even in the presence of highly nonlinear costs. Moreover, the
efficiency of the unregulated setting improves as the competition among the service
providers increases. When spillover cost is also present, the performance highly de-
pends on net marginal externality, which is measured by the relative magnitude of
the marginal spillover cost and the marginal consumer surplus when an additional
user is enrolled. With positive net externality, we show that the unregulated setting
could be just as efficient as the social optimum. However, we also show that when
net externality becomes negative due to high spillover costs, the welfare loss in the
unregulated setting could be arbitrarily high, even with affine marginal cost. The
latter validates the need of implementing some rationing mechanisms in airports to
curb congestion since there are rooms for substantial potential welfare gains.
An alternative perspective on mergers in the absence of cost synergy. Most
arguments which support mergers rely on the internal efficiency gain in the form
of cost reduction (e.g., economies of scale, technological progress and eliminating
redundancy etc). We show that even in the absence of such internal cost synergy, the
society could potentially benefit from mergers. We show that it only happens when
congestion has the spilling effect. The key idea is that the merged firm internalizes
more congestion, thus, leaving a smaller amount of uninternalized congestion onto
others. This optimistic view on mergers, however, does not apply to the case when
congestion cost is self-contained. Under this setting, our analysis agrees with the
conventional wisdom that reduced competition leads to a lowered total welfare in the
absence of cost reduction. While we recognize that our model only addresses one
aspect on mergers from the perspective of total welfare, our analysis could offer an
explanation (at least partially) to the Court's rejection for the proposal between T-
Mobile with AT&T versus a clearance for the consolidation of United with Continental
airlines.
Social acceptance and a novel implementation. We address some of the
issues which traditionally have made the adoption of congestion pricing a challenging
task in practice. Firstly, to address the question of whether congestion pricing is
necessary, one needs to measure how much potential benefit such a scheme could
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offer. We quantify the welfare loss in an unregulated setting to a social optimum
by deriving tight upper and lower bounds which depend on at most two parameters.
The parameters measure the degree of competition in the oligopoly market and the
relative magnitude of the spillover cost. We demonstrate with simulations that the
bounds are able to predict the gain computed from the model for a high amount
of accuracy. Thus, instead of doing a full-blown estimation of all the inputs to the
model (which is a challenging task to begin with), it is possible to quantify the
welfare gain with confidence by only estimating a couple of parameters. We identify
one obstacle for congestion pricing to be implemented, that is, without a proper
channel of investing the revenue collected from congestion pricing, users and service
providers will be strictly worse-off. Clearly, such consequences leave individuals with
little desire to adopt the scheme. We propose a proportional rule which appeals to the
self-interest of participants by ensuring a positive welfare improvement for everyone.
As the proposed scheme ensures not only social optimality but also individual welfare
improvement, we believe it has a greater likelihood of gaining support in practice.
4.1.1 Related literature
Motivated by congestion management in transportation and communication net-
works, there has been a huge body of literature to analyze traffic in a congested
network (e.g., Hamdouch et al. 2007, Hayrapetyan et al. 2007 and Maille and Stier-
Moses 2009). Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007, Ozdaglar 2008 study competition among
profit-maximizing oligopolists who set prices on the links and congestion cost on each
link only depends on the traffic volume on that link (this corresponds to self-contained
congestion cost in this chapter). Users choose the path based on a notion of full price,
which is the sum of the price paid to the oligopolists and the congestion cost. In these
models, a single price prevails in equilibrium as a result of homogeneous services. In
this work, we adopt the full price concept to capture user equilibrium. Our model
differentiates itself from prior work by incorporating several new features, including
differentiated services, elastic demand and spillover congestion cost.
Compared to the vast amount of literature which focuses on road congestion,
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there is less work addressing congestion pricing in other settings where users have
oligopolistic power. Daniel (1995, 2001), Brueckner (2002, 2005) and Mayer and
Sinai (2003) have considered congestion pricing for airports. Most of the studies
derive their findings either through simulations with empirical data or theoretical
analysis on a symmetric duopoly. In general, the topic on congestion pricing has
long been recognized as controversial and challenging. Jones (1991) suggests that the
support for the scheme is much higher when it is presented as a complete financial
package with explicit proposals for using the revenues in his survey paper. Economists
such as Goodwin (1990) and Small (1992) analyze how to use revenues collected from
road tolls and propose dividing the money equally as an reimbursement to road users,
tax rebates and investment for new transportation services. In this work, we quantify
how much each service provider and user should gain from adopting congestion pricing
based on a proportional rule, with a goal that everyone should experience a positive
welfare improvement.
Several papers in the operations management literature have addressed the issue
of congestion in service industries (see for example, Allon and Federgruen 2007, 2008,
Cachon and Harker 2002, Weintraub et al. 2010, etc). They assume each firm owns a
resource and is only sensitive to congestion caused by users using his resource. In our
model, differentiated services belong to different service providers who participate in
an oligopolistic quantity competition to maximize their own profit. In addition, the
facility manager acts as the Stackelberg leader who determines optimal access fees
by anticipating that service providers will select their service levels according to the
equilibrium.
The optimal congestion pricing considered in our model resembles a "coordinat-
ing contract" in the supply chain literature (e.g., Corbett et al. 2005, Bernstein and
Federgruen 2003, 2007, Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi 2009, Cachon and Kok
2010). A key difference is that the objective in our model is to maximize the societal
welfare which sums over consumer surplus, producer surplus as well as the congestion
pricing revenue. We show that despite a higher societal welfare after implementing
a coordinating contract, service providers and users might be worse off compared to
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their counterparts in the unregulated setting. Therefore, it leaves little incentives for
adoption, in addition to the high administrative costs which are commonly associated
with coordinating contracts. To bypass this difficulty, based on an n-person bargain-
ing game, we show that there exists an alternative implementation which achieves
the social optimum and ensures that every entity in the system could gain from this
scheme.
Recently, several talks on mega-mergers have created quite a stir in the media,
e.g., AT&T with T-Mobile in the mobile marketplace, as well as United with Con-
tinental in the airline industry. The primary argument against mergers is that the
reduced competition could lead to many undesirable repercussions such as price in-
creases, which ultimately hurt consumers. For example, based on a symmetric setting,
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have shown exactly
such behavior under both price and quantity competition, in the absence of cost re-
duction resulting from a merger. Some economists have challenged this pessimistic
view on mergers which is based on "consumer welfare" and propose the use of "to-
tal welfare" to evaluate mergers (see for example, Neven and Roller (2005), Heyer
(2006)). Perhaps the most influential contribution which advocated the total welfare
approach in merger analysis is by Williamson (1968). By focusing on the net welfare
impact, the author argues that when the benefit from cost saving (from realization
of internal efficiency) offsets the welfare loss due to a price increases (from greater
market power), the society benefits from the merger. The key argument which sup-
ports mergers hinges on the internal cost synergy from the merger. We show in this
chapter that, even in the absence of cost reduction, mergers could be beneficial when
congestion has the spillover effect.
Lastly, our work which measures the performance of an unregulated setting with
respect to a centralized system is related to a stream of literature on price of anarchy,
popularized by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999). It compares the performance
of the worst-case Nash equilibrium with respect to the centralized system. The con-
cept has been used in transportation networks (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002, Cor-
rea et al. 2004, 2007, Roughgarden 2005, Perakis 2007), network pricing (Acemoglu
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and Ozdaglar 2007, Weintraub et al. 2010), oligopolistic pricing games in a single
tier (Farahat and Perakis 2010a,b), and supply chain games with exogenous pricing
(Perakis and Roels 2007, Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi 2009, Martinez-de
Alberniz and Roels 2010).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce a three-
level model with assumptions used in the paper. Section 4.3 performs the welfare
analysis, comparing the total social welfare achieved in the unregulated setting to the
maximum social welfare which could be achieved by implementing congestion pricing.
In Section 4.4, we evaluate the tightness of the bounds via computational analysis. In
Section 4.5, we discuss the potential merits of mergers. We address some issues which
make congestion pricing unattractive in reality and discuss potential remedies that
would make the scheme more appealing from an individual's perspective in Section
4.6. The conclusions can be found in Section 4.7.
4.2 Model
We consider a facility with n differentiated services, each offered by a provider. We
denote qi as the output level chosen by service provider i = 1,. . . , n. The service
providers compete in a quantity competition as he can control his service level qj.
The price for provider i's service is denoted by pi. We use lower-case, boldface letters
to represent column vectors, e.g., p = (pi, ... , pn) and q = (qi, ..., qn) represent the
market prices and the output levels respectively.
Given an output level q, we denote the marginal utility obtained from consuming
an infinitesimal amount of service i as ui (q). As is traditional in the pricing literature
(see Vives 1999), we consider the marginal utility function as a affine function of
output levels:
1i [ ... #1n qi
u(q)= p-Bq=
Pn On1 ... Onn gn
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where 15 = (PI... , Pn) represents the maximum prices that a user is willing to pay
for the services. Different Pi captures the quality differences perceived by consumers,
which could be affected by factors such as brand recognition, word-of-mouth effects,
prior experience with the product, etc.
Assumption 4.2.1 Matrix B is a symmetric and positive-definite matrix.
/3 jj > 0 means that each service sees a downward sloping demand resulted from
users' diminishing return. #ij > 0 captures the relationship that service i and j are
substitutes, i.e., an increase in production of service j lowers the willingness of a user
to pay for service i. Symmetry of the matrix implies that the cross-effects of any
two service providers' output changes are equal. This is a natural consequence of
maximizing a quasilinear utility function of a representative consumer.
In a congested facility, both the users and the service providers are affected con-
gestion. For the case of airport congestion, airlines have to pay extra for crew, fuel,
and maintenance costs while delayed travelers and their employers lose productiv-
ity, business opportunities and leisure activities. In this work, congestion effect is
modeled in currency equivalent terms. Let l0(q) and ly(q) denote the congestion
cost per service incurred by the service provider i and his users respectively. Denote
li(q) = l(q) + lY(q) as the aggregate congestion cost associated with a service. Thus,
when service provider i enrolls qj users, the aggregate congestion cost associated with
i and his users is li(q)qi. Let 1(q) = (l1(q), ... ln(q)), then the total congestion cost
in the system is given by qTl(q).
Assumption 4.2.2 For every i, the cost function li(q) is convex, continuous, non-
decreasing, and continuously differentiable for every component of q.
Denote the Jacobian matrix of the cost function 1(q) as R(q), where
[l1/9 ... l1 /& qn
R '.. .qJ
aln8q - -. iln|8qn
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Except with affine costs, the Jacobian matrix R(q) depends on the value of p. For
the ease of notation, we will write R instead of R(q) for the rest of this chapter. We
will use superscripts to differentiate the matrix evaluated at different values. This
assumption states that R is a nonnegative (componentwise) and positive semi-definite
matrix. Denote the diagonal part of matrix R and its off-diagonal part as FR and
Reff respectively. Denote the (i,j)the element of the matrix R as rij.
In this work, we distinguish two types of costs which are formally defined as
follows.
Definition 4.2.3 Self-contained cost, alil/q > 0. Spillover cost, Dli/&qj > 0
for all j # i.
When costs are fully self-contained, the cost associated with service i only depends
on i's output level and independent of others. It implies that the Jacobian matrix is
simply a diagonal matrix, i.e., R = TR. On the other hand, when spillover cost is
also present, one's cost increases whenever there is an increase in the system output.
Assumption 4.2.4 The maximum reservation price must satisfy, p - 1(0) > 0.
The assumption states that the maximum profit per service must be positive. If this
assumption is violated, it implies that no user is willing to pay for the service and this
corresponding "inactive" service provider could be removed from the equilibrium.
When spillover cost exists, we make use of the following assumption in our analysis.
Assumption 4.2.5 The Jacobian matrix of the cost function R is symmetric.
This assumption requires ali/Dq = Bl /8qi for all j # i. One justification is that if all
users are homogenous in the sense that enrolling an additional user creates the same
amount of additional cost to others, then this assumption holds. The assumption
simplifies the derivation in the analysis as R = RT, or rij = rji. It can be relaxed by
considering its "symmetrized" matrix with a norm which measures the asymmetry as
discussed in Sun (2006).
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To establish bounds when costs are nonlinear, it is key to introduce a constant
that will measure the degree of nonlinearity of the cost function. As a result, we
briefly introduce the concept of Jacobian similarity. We refer rthe eader to Perakis
(2007) for more information on this concept.
Definition 4.2.6 The Jacobian similarity property. A positive semidefinite
matrix F(q) satisfies the matrix similarity property if there exists a constant K > 1
such that for all w, q and q': KwT(F(q))w > wT(F(q'))w> wT(F(q))w.
Note if F(q) is the Jacobian matrix an affine function, then , = 1. Notice that
constant K is easy to compute when matrix F(q) is positive definite for all q. In that
case, the constant K = maxq maxA(F(q)) , that is, the ratio between the maximum andminq mini A(F(q))'
minimum eigenvalue of the matrix.
To interpret the bounds established in this chapter, we will introduce two notions.
They measure the level of competition and the extent of spillover respectively.
Definition 4.2.7 Competition index adjusted with self-contained cost.
Given a price sensitivity matrix B and self-contained cost I1R, the competition index
for service provider i is defined as -yj = EZj #ik/#3 ii + 2rii/#11, for all i. Let 1 =
maxi yi.
The notion that Ej #/#ijii is used to measure the intensity of competition (see Sun
2006, Farahat and Perakis 2010a,b). Suppose every service provider in the market
changes his output level by 1 unit, 3ii reflects the amount of price change which is
solely contributed by i's own output change, while Ejo #ij measures the price change
contributed by i's competitors. A high value of Eo #ij/#ii suggests that i's price
is more susceptible to his competitors' output change than his own change, implying
that service provider i faces a high level of competition. When Ejo #ij = 0 for all
i, it implies that #ij = 0 for all j # i. That is, each of service provider acts as a
monopolist and does not face any competition.
When there is self-contained cost (i.e., rii > 0), the competition index also contains
the term rii/#ij. It compares the marginal decrease in the revenue per service due
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to one's own cost increase to the decrease due to diminishing returns of the demand.
Thus, when rii/#i3 is large, it implies that the cost increase is rather steep.
Thus, -y meausres the level of competition faced by service provider i, taking into
account the self-contained cost, i.e., comparing the aggregate price impact from i's
competitors and the self-contained congestion to the price change solely contributed
by i's output change. With asymmetric service providers, 'yi differs across i. We will
use -y = maxi yi to approximate the competition intensity in the market.
Definition 4.2.8 Marginal net externality. Define pi = ry2 / pri, for all i.
Let p = maxi pi.
This ratio is nonzero only when spillover cost is present. The numerator Zji rj cap-
tures the marginal spillover cost created by service provider i, and the denominator
reflects the additional welfare increase to users when service provider i increases his
output. Thus, the term p2 could be interpreted as the external cost (spillover con-
gestion cost) versus the external benefit (additional consumer surplus) which service
provider i brings to the society. P represents the value of the "worst offender" among
all the service providers by taking the highest value of pi. When P < 1, it implies net
positive externality, that is, after taking into account of spillover cost, every service
provider is contributing more welfare to the society than the cost. When P > 1, there
exists some service provider whose spillover cost outweighs the welfare he brings to
the society, thus, the net externality is negative.
4.2.1 User behavior
Given n differentiated services available, a representative user derives a different
marginal utility ui(q) for services with provider i. A user's total disutility is the
sum of the price he is charged for the service and the congestion cost he experiences,
i.e., pi + IY(q). This term is known as full price or effective price in the literature
(e.g., Weintraub et al. 2010, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007).
We assume that each user is "small" compared to the total traffic volume in the
sense that when he switches from a service provider to another, there is no consider-
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able change in the congestion cost. We use the General Wardrop equilibrium principle
with multiple commodity flows to model user behavior in the presence of differenti-
ated services. For a given price vector p, a vector of service level q is a General
Wardrop equilibrium (GWE) if
pi + l(q) = ui(q), for all i if qi > 0;
pi + li (q) > ui(q), for all i if qj = 0.
The equilibrium condition states that for any price vector p, the full price of a user
with any active service provider, must be equal to the corresponding marginal utility
obtained in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we only restrict our attention to
these active service providers with
p = ui(q) - lu(q), for all i if qj > 0. (4.1)
When there is no congestion, the market clearing price of any service is simply its
marginal utility, i.e., pi = ui(q). The presence of congestion directly lowers a user's
willingness to pay for the service, and consequently reduces the profitability of the
service providers.
Remark In a setting with a single type of service or symmetric service providers,
GWE implies that a single full price prevails in an equilibrium. With differentiated
services, different full price values exist as the service providers leverage product
differentiation to capture consumer surplus. An ubiquitous observation is how airfares
for the same trip within the same class vary across airlines.
4.2.2 Service provider's profit maximization problem
We define the service provider i's profit function as Tri(qj, q-j) = qj(pj(qj, q-j) - tj -
lf(qi, q-j)), where qji are the service levels set by i's competitors and tj is the access
fee per service imposed by the facility manager. Without loss of generality, we assume
the unit cost of providing a service is zero. By Equation (4.1) which describes the
83
users' behavior, we obtain the following, ri(qi, qj) = (uj(qi, qj) - tj - l(qj, q-i))qi.
The dynamics between the facility manager and the service providers are modeled
as a Stackelberg game. The facility manager, announces the access fee per service,
ti. The service provider then determines his appropriate output level. We assume
service providers behave according to a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, that is, for
every access fee ti, every service provider i determines his service level to maximize
his profit, given the service level set by his competitors. Under Assumptions 4.2.1
to 4.2.5, the profit function of all service providers are diagonally strictly concave
over the strategy space, thus, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are
guaranteed.
4.2.3 Facility manager's welfare maximization problem
The goal of the facility manager is to maximize the total social welfare (W), which
is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and revenue
collected from acess fee (TR), i.e., W = CS + PS + TR. Consumer surplus is
defined as the difference between the total utility derived from consuming q units of
services and the total cost incurred by users. With affine marginal utility function,
the total utility is given by fq u(x)dx = qT(p - !Bq). The full price is given by
(p + lu(q))Tq. By Equation (4.1), full price in equilibrium is simply u(q)Tq. Thus,
CS = qT(p - iBq) - qT(p - Bq) = !qTBq. The producer surplus is the total
profit generated by all service providers, i.e., PS = ' Ti(q) = qT(u(q) - 1(q) - t) =
qT(p - Bq - 1(q) - t). The revenue collected from congestion pricing is captured by
TR = qTt. Combine all three terms, the total welfare is given by the following:
1
W(q) = qT (p _ IBq - 1(q)). (4.2)2
The welfare maximization problem (4.2) is a strictly concave optimization problem
in terms of the output level q, where q* = arg maxq W(q). To achieve the maximum
welfare W(q*) in the three-level model, the facility manager can use the access fees
such that the desirable service level q* is achieved, i.e., q(t*) = q*. Therefore,
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the access fee could be viewed as a "coordinating contract" that aligns the profit-
maximizing objective of service providers to one that maximizes the societal welfare.
Proposition 4.2.9 For a given output level q in the facility, the access fee per service
i is given by ti(q) = -3iiqi + Z l /&qi.
In the absence of spillover costs, the second term vanishes, i.e., ti(q) = -Oiiqi.
Since fii > 0, the access fee ti is negative in this case. It implies that the facility
manager has to give a subsidy to every service provider i in order to ensure the
maximum societal welfare. In the unregulated setting (i.e., t = 0), one can show that
the output level generated by the profit-maximizing service providers is always below
the socially optimal level. With the the subsidy, lower prices induce more users to
acquire the services, leading to higher welfare.
With spillover cost, the second term in the access fee holds service providers
accountable for the "spillover" they have imposed onto others. Therefore, the access
fee has to balance the size of the subsidy which encourages production and the penalty
to discourage "tragedy of the commons" phenomenon.
Proposition 4.2.9 captures a sharp contrast to the traditional road toll imposed on
road users in two distinct aspects. Firstly, in the road traffic model, the congestion
pricing is the full marginal cost, whereas an oligopolistic service provider is only pe-
nalized for the marginal cost which he has not internalized (the spillover). Secondly,
the optimal access fee considered here also includes a subsidy which encourages pro-
duction. As a result, it suggests that the optimal access fee charged to an oligopolist
would be much smaller than the traditional "toll" with the same cost function.
Relate the result to the wireless service industry where costs are fully contained,
Proposition 4.2.9 suggests that FCC should provide a subsidy so that more users
will acquire the services. On the other hand, the FAA (or the airport regulator)
should hold the airlines responsible for the additional delays which they impose onto
others. Moreover, the access fees could provide some incentives to revert the trend
of the decreasing aircraft size1 . To model this, we incorporate a parameter pi in
'Whalen et al. (2008) have shown that from 1997 to 2007, the number of departures has skyrock-
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our formulation which captures the size of an aircraft that airline i uses, and each
airline adjusts its frequency of the flights, qi/pi, to maximize the profit, where qi is
the total number of passengers to be transported2 . The access fee per flight takes
the form ti(q) = -Baqi + Ej Oil(q)/aqi/pi. If all other things being equal, an
airline with a larger aircraft will pay a lower fee. For an industry with a measly profit
margin of 0.7% in 2011 as predicted by the International Air Transport Association, a
landing fee based on the aircraft's size would provide airlines with more incentives to
use large aircrafts, which in turn ensures a more efficient use of the limited runways
and alleviates congestion. Comparing this scheme to the current practice where the
landing fees are based on the weight of an aircraft, the latter gives exactly the wrong
incentives for smaller aircrafts, which exacerbates the congestion problem in many
airports.
4.3 Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we will compare the social welfare achieved in the unregulated setting
with the social optimum. By doing so, it enables us to address a question that is
important to both theory and practice. That is, what is the maximum welfare loss
due to the lack of regulation in an oligopoly? The answer to this question helps policy
makers to gauge the need for regulation. While almost all policy changes have to deal
with huge political and financial challenges, if one can show that the loss of welfare
is significant in the unregulated setting, it provides one concrete evidence to concrete
support the implementation of new policies such as the access fees discussed in the
previous section.
Moreover, the comparative analysis also helps us isolate some key factors which
affect the efficiency of such an oligopoly. In many scenarios, "optimum" might be
infeasible to attain and it is just as important to determine what kind of actions that
eted by 35% while the total number of seats has risen by less than 6%, implying that a dramatic
decrease in the number of seats per aircraft.
2To reduce notation and enhance the transparency of the model, we only discuss the case where
each airline only uses a single type of aircraft. The case with multiple sizes of aircrafts could be
easily incorporated.
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will improve the efficiency.
Denote qN and q* as the output level in the unregulated setting and that in a
social optimum respectively. Let W(qN) and W(q*) be the the total welfare attained
in these two settings. The quantity of interest is W(qN)/W(q*). We will address
the settings with only self-contained cost and with spillover separably. We will first
establish a lower bound on this quantity which gives the worst performance guarantee,
followed by a upper bound.
With nonlinear convex costs in a model, it is generally hard to obtain closed-
form solutions. Nonetheless, we can derive optimality conditions that can be used to
quantify the total welfare. Since the Jacobian matrix on cost function depends on
the output level, we will use R* and RN to distinguish the matrix evaluated at q*
and qN respectively.
Lemma 4.3.1 Under Assumptions 4.2.1 to 4.2.5, there exists a unique solution to
both the coordinated and unregulated problems. In particular, the welfare generated in
the social optimal setting and the unregulated setting are given by
W(q*) = (q*)T( B + R*)q*, and2
1
W(qN) (q N)T( B+FB + FN)qN2R
4.3.1 Lower bound on W(qN)/W(q*)
We begin with a lemma that compares the output level in the unregulated setting
and the social optimum by making use of the convexity of the cost function and the
optimality conditions derived in Lemma 4.3.1.
Lemma 4.3.2 When cost 1(q) = (li(q), - , ln(q)) is a convex function (componen-
twise),
(B + B +R + RN N ; (B + R* + RN )q*.
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Remark When the cost function 1(q) is an affine function of q, then R is independent
from the output level q and Lemma 4.3.2 becomes an equality.
Now we are presenting the first main result in this chapter. We establish a constant
lower bound on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly with self-contained cost.
Theorem 4.3.3 When there is only self-contained congestion, under Assumptions
4.2.1 to 4.2.4, the welfare in the unregulated setting with nonlinear convex cost is at
least 3/4 of the optimal welfare, i.e., W(qN) > 1. The bound is tight when service
providers are noncompeting and have a constant marginal cost.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.3. With Lemma B.5.1 and Lemma 4.3.1, we have a lower
bound on W(qN)/W(q*):
W(qN) (qN)T (B + 2fB+ 2 N)qN
W(q*). - (qN)T(B + rB + I + RN)(B + 2RN)-1(B + B + RN)qN
(4.3)
In the absence of spillover, RN ]pN. Since all quantities are the Nash equilibrium
quantities in this proof, we drop the superscript on matrices for simplicity:
W(qN)> (qN)T(B + 2fR+ 2B)qN
W(q*) - (qN)T(B + 2 FR + FB)(B + 2]FR)- 1 (B + 2 rR + FB)qN
Denote G =- 0 5B - 5 B B = - (B + 21 R) B0 5 . This is a symmetric, nonnegative
positive definite matrix. We will first rewrite the right hand side of the inequality in
terms of matrix G and identity matrix I:
(qN)T( +2 B)qN
(qN) T (B + FB)B 1 (B + PB)qN
(qN)Tf0.5-0 5 (B + FB 2 BO. 5 f 5 qN
(qN)TFO.5-0.5(B + FB)5-1(B + B F0.5p 5qN
(qN)TF. 5 (G + 2I)]rO5 qN
(qN)Tro .5 (G + I)G- 1(G + I)FLO 5 qN
(qN)TrO.5 G-0.5 GO.5 (G + 21) GO 5G-0 O.5 qN
(qN)TJ7 .5G-0 5 G0 5 (G + I)G-(G + I)G 0 5 G-0.505 qNB B
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w TG0 5 (G + 21)G 0 .5w N
where w =G- T O-q.
wTGO5(G + I)G-'(G + I)GO5 w' B
If this ratio is at least 3/4, it implies that
4wTGO.5 (G + 21)G 0 5 w - 3wTGO. 5 (G + I)G- 1(G + I)G0 5 w 2 0, or equivalently,
wT (4G 0 .5(G + 21)G 0 5 - 3G0 '5 (G + I)G- 1(G + I)G0 5 ) w > 0. (4.4)
To prove this statement, we will use the fact that for any given vector x, if the matrix
A is nonnegative component-wise, then xTAx > 0. To show the composite matrix
in Equation (4.4) is nonnegative, we express it as follows,
4G 0 5 (G + 21)G 0 5 - 3G4 5 (G + I)G- 1 (G + I)G4.
= 4(G 2 + 2G) - 3(G -I) 2
= 4G 2 +8G-3G2 - 6G - 31
= G 2 + 2G - 31
= (G - I)(G + 31). (4.5)
Given matrix G is a nonnegative matrix, the second term which is a sum with an
identity matrix is clearly nonnegative. Now consider the first term, G - I. The off-
diagonal elements fij/( ii/ 3 ij) are nonnegative under Assumption 4.2.2, where /ij
is the ij-th element of matrix B. Its diagonal elements are given by ( 3 ii + 2rij)/i =
1 + 2rij/#i3i > 1, where rij is the i-th diagonal element of the Jacobian matrix R.
Therefore, G - I must also be nonnegative. We have shown that the composite
matrix in Equation (4.4) could be expressed a product of two nonnegative matrices.
Therefore, this composite matrix must also be nonnegative and we have shown that
the statement in Equation (4.4) holds true and the ratio is bounded from below by
3/4.
Lastly, to show that the bound is tight, note that with noncompeting service
providers, B = TB- Since 1(q) is a vector independent of q, by Equation (B. 1) and
(B.3), we see that qN - lq*. Substituting this condition into the welfare function
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derived in Lemma 4.3.1, it is straightforward to show that the ratio is exactly 3/4.
This result is surprising, especially when it is compared to other works which
have analyzed performance degradation caused by selfish behavior. Roughgarden and
Tardos (2002) and Roughgarden (2005) consider the selsh behavior of noncooperative
network users. The authors prove that if the latency of each edge is an affine function
of its traffic, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selsh network users is at
most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency. They also show that performance
degrades as the degree of the latency functions increases. We can cast our model to
show the "similarities" between our model and those works: a network with n routes,
each owned by a profit-maximizing provider and each offers a different marginal utility.
Users choose which route to take based on a full price (the price paid to travel and
disutility li(qj), where qj is the traffic on route i). Theorem 4.3.3 quantifies the welfare
degradation (producer surplus and consumer surplus) caused by the selfish behavior of
noncooperative providers and users to the maximum possible welfare. In our setting,
we have shown that regardless of the nonlinearity on the latency function, a constant
bound of 3/4 is achieved.
In the next theorem, we present the efficiency analysis for an unregulated oligopoly
in the presence of spillover cost. Let fi be the cost-to-benefit ratio evaluated at the
social optimal output level, i.e., p = maxi EO r* /#ij, where rj* = alj /qlq=q*. We
are going to show in the next theorem that in contrast to the case where costs are
fully internalized, performance degradation with spillover costs can be unbounded.
Theorem 4.3.4 With spillover congestion cost, Under Assumption 4.2.1 to 4.2.5,
the welfare in the unregulated setting depends on the the maximum spillover cost-to-
benefit ratio p and can be bounded by:
Whe f51,W(qN)> 3.When < 1, W(q*) 4ny
When p> 1, W(qN) 1- ( ) , where K' is the Jacobian similarity factor.W(q*-) - re ~ l
Proof of Theorem 4.3.4. From Lemma 4.3.2, we have (B + rB + 1TN + RN N
(B + R* + RN)q*. Denote E = B + FB + N + RN and <D = B + R* + RN, thus,
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EqN > <pq*. Note the vectors on both sides of the inequality are nonnegative. By
Lemma 4.3.1, we obtain the following,
W(qN) (qN)T(jB + LB + F )qN _ (q N)T -1(jB + rB + pN )E1 qN
Replacing EqN with 4q*, we obtain a lower bound on W(qN)) i.e.,
W(qN)
>(q*)TbE-1(-B + LB + N --1 *2 R
=(q*) (B+R*+RN)(B+TB+rTR +RN -1 B+rB+ R)
(B + TB + TN R N)-1 (B + R* + R N )*.
By making using of the Jacobian similarity properties on matricesFN and RN
exists ,' such that
W(qN)
> (q*)T (B + R* + R*)(B + LB + * + R*)<(l B + RR 2 R
there
= (q*)T (B + 2R*)(B + LB + L' + R*)l( B + LB + r*
(B + TB + R* + R*)~1(B + 2R*)q*
Note that by using the definition of the minimum eigenvalue of a positive semidefinite
matrix, 1/K' can be bounded as follows,
Amin{(B + R* + RN) 2 (B + 2R*) 2 (B + LB + N + RN)-2(B + LB + R* + R*)2
(-B+ B + N) B+ LB + r '
If costs are affine, i.e, RN = R*, then K' = 1. Combine the result with W(q*), notice
that it is all in the optimal q* space, therefore we will drop the superscript in this
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proof. Denote B = B + 2 FR,
W(qN)
W(q*)
1 (q*)T(5 + 2Roff)(5 + IFB + Rff)-'(N + 2FTB)(5 + FB + Rff)- (B + 2ROff)q*
-' (q*)T(5 + 2Roff)q*
Denote G = -0 .5 B 0 5 and E = -0 -5 Roffr0, the expression becomes
W(qN)
W(q*)
1 (q*)TG0 5(G + 26)(G + I + -)- 1(G + 21)(G + I + )-1 (G + 26)G0 q*
- K' (q*)TGO. 5(G + 2E)GOq*
Using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, the lower bound is given by the minimum eigen-
value of the following composite matrix,
W(qN)
W(q*)
1
>-Amin{(G + 21)(G + I + ) 1 (G + 26)(G + I + 6)-1}
1
Amin{(G + I+ E + I - E)(G + I+ +1 (G+ + I+ E)(G +I+ ) + }
1
=Amin{(I + (I - ")(G + I+ 5)1)(I - (I - E)(G +±I + )-)}
1
=-Amin{I - ((I - E)(G + I + =)~1))21
1 (1 - Amax{((I - 6)(G + I + 6)-1))2
Since matrix G is a nonnegative and positive definite matrix,
Amax{((I - E)(G + I + 6.)~1))2} < Amax{((I - b)(I + %)1))2
To understand the lower bound, we have to consider two cases based on how "big"
the matrix E is. Consider a function f(x) = (1 - x)2 /(1 + x)2 with x E [x, )t]. When
X > 1, f(x) increases in x. Thus, max f (x) = f (t). Thus, when all eigenvalues of the
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matrix S exceeds 1, or, equivalently, when Amax{=} > 1,
0.4 04 1 2 Ama{E}7 - 12Amax{((I - )(G + I + 6)-1))2 max . (4.6)(Amax{ =} + 1)
Note that the matrix 5 -0. 5"OffB is a symmetric matrix and it is similar
to a matrix FB1 Roff, which shares the same set of eigenvalues. By Gergsgorin Disc
Theorem, the maximum eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix could be bounded by its
radius, i.e.,
Amax{~j} Amatx{F- 1Roff} :5 max Ejiri= maxp (4.p.
Substitute this to Equation (4.6), we have obtained the desired lower bound for the
case when 0 > 1: (q N > (-1 )2)
Next, let's focus on the lower bound when p:5 1. In fact, f(x) = (1 - x) 2 /(1 + x) 2
decreases in x when x < 1, which implies that max f(x) = f(x). However, it simply
suggests that when all eigenvalues of matrix S are smaller than 1, an upper bound on
Amax{((I - %)(G + I + 6)d))2} is 1 (i.e., when (Amax{} = 0, i.e., no spillover), or
equivalently, W(qN)/W(q*) > 0, which is unfortunately, not a very useful bound. In
fact, to prove that W(qN) > (3/4r)W(q*), when p 1, we have to utilize a similar
approach to prove the constant lower bound in Theorem 4.3.3 when costs are fully
self-contained: When we expand the composite matrix, we will have 2 parts instead,
one part is shown in Equation (4.5) and another part term in terms of G and E. This
is guaranteed to be nonnegative when P > 1. FO
The main difference between Theorem 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 is that the performance
degradation in the presence of spillover could potentially be unbounded. The loss of
efficiency depends on the maximum spillover cost-to-benefit ratio P and increases for
all p > 1. To interpret this result, note that P > 1 is a sufficient condition which
states that congestion occurs in the unregulated setting, i.e., qN > q*. It implies
that when an additional user is enrolled, the increase in spillover cost outweighs the
welfare gain, resulting in a net negative welfare change. Therefore, as p > 1 increases,
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the gap between the unregulated setting and the social optimum widens.
When i < 1, the output level in the unrelated setting is below the social optimal
level. The welfare improvement brought by each additional user offsets the slipover
cost, inducing a net positive welfare gain. The worst case happens when the output
level is at its lowest compared to the optimal level, which happens with noncompeting
service providers.
4.3.2 Upper bound on W(qN)/W(q*)
In this section, we focus on finding the best performance that can be achieved in an
unregulated setting. In the rest of this section, we will use the competition index and
maximum cost-to-benefit ratio evaluated in the social optimum, i.e., 7 = ' (q*), and
i = f(q*) and derive an upper bound on the efficiency of the unregulated oligopoly
in terms of these quantities.
Lemma 4.3.5 When cost 1(q) = (11(q), - , 4n(q)) is a convex function (componen-
twise),
(B + B + ]NR N < (B + 2R*)q*.
Proof. By Assumption 4.2.2, function 1(q) = (li(q),..., ln(q)) is convex componen-
twise with q.
1(qN) - I(q*) > R*(qN - q*)
-> 1(q N) - R*qN > (q*) - R*q*
I -l(qN) + R*qN < -9(q*) + R*q*
]p - l(qN) + R*qN p - g(q*) + R*q*.
After substituting the optimality conditions from Equation (B.1) and (B.3), we obtain
the desired result. 0
To obtain the upper bound on W(qN), we use convexity to express it in terms of
q* and R* with the help of the Jacobian similarity factor.
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Lemma 4.3.6 W(q) ( - Amin{((I - E)(G + I + )-1))2}), where K > 1 is the
Jacobian similarity factor, G = r- 0 5 (B + 2 )F-0. 5 and E = 11- 0 5R* r-0. 5.
Proof of Lemma B.6.1.
W(qN)
From Lemma 4.3.1, we obtain that
where IQ = B-+FB+ N + R*. Making use of Lemma 4.3.5 which shows that
IF qN < (B + 2R*)q*, it follows that
W(qN)
<(q*)T (B + 2R*)(B + FB + N + RN-1(lB + PB + N)(B + NB + + -1R ~2 B+IB R(+Br+
(B + 2R*)q*
<r,(q*)T (B + 2R*)(B + FB + TFR + R*)-1(B + RB + Fj) (B + B + RL + R*)-1
(B + 2R*)q*,
where we obtain the last inequality by using the Jacobian similarity property that
we discussed for matrix F(q) = FN and r > 1. In particular, an upper bound on r,
is given as follows, based on the definition of the maximum eigenvalue of a positive
semidefinite matrix,
1
k Amax{(B + rB + rN + RN)-2(B + B + * + R*)2 ( B +R R 2
(-B + FB + r*)-Y1 .
2
B + N)
(4.8)
Combine this result with W(q*) shown in Lemma 4.3.1, we obtain an upper bound
W(qN) (q*)T (B + 2R*)(IB + FfB + F)(B + 2R*)q*
W(q*) < (q*)T(B + B + R* + R*)(IB + R*)(B + EB + FR + R*)q*
As all quantities are in the social optimum setting, we will skip the superscript on
matrices. Denote G = 1FB 5 (B + 2PR)FB0 5 and S = Ti 0 5 RRgff -5 , the expression
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N1 ( + R )qN (q N)TqI4Y1( B + FB + rN )X-1q N
- ( 2NT(B + 'FB +=R 2R
becomes
W(qN) (q*)T0.5(G + 2I)pO5 q*
W(q*) - (q*)TFTS 5 (G + I + E)(G + 22)- 1 (G + I + =)]Oq*.
Using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, the upper bound can be simplified as the follows.
We skip some derivations as they follow exactly the same steps in the proof for
Theorem 4.3.4.
W(qN + 2I)(G + I + 0)(G + 2")(G + I + E)-}
W(q*) -
K -(1 Amin{((I - d)(G + I+ b)))2)
D
Theorem 4.3.7 When costs are fully self-contained, under Assumptions 4.2.1 to
4.2.4, the welfare in an unregulated oligopoly is bound above by
W(q N)
W(q*) -(2 + ) 2>
where K is the Jacobian nonlinearity factor. The tight with symmetric service providers
with affine costs (i.e., K = 1).
Proof of Theorem 4.3.7. When there is no spillover, Ron' 0 or E 0 and the
upper bound in Lemma B.6.1 can be simplified to
W(qN)
W(q*) < K (1 - Amin{(G + I)21)W (q*)
=K ( 1 Amax(G + I)2)
< r, 11 (4.9)
- K(-(1 + Amax{G})2 (
where an upper bound on K is given in Equation (B.6). Note G = B 0 .5-(B + 2'R) F 0.5
is a symmetric, positive definite matrix. By the property of similar matrices, this ma-
trix is similar to T-'(B + 2FR). Thus, they share the same set of eigenvalues. Using
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the Gershgorin Disc Theorem, we can upper bound the maximum eigenvalue of a
matrix, i.e.,
Amax{G} = Amax{FB 1(B + 2UR)} < 1 + max
< 1+ maxi
= 1 +7.
Substituting these two inequalities into Equation (4.9), we obtain the the desired
bound.
In order to show that the bound is tight, note that with affine cost, K = 1.
In addition, the inequalities in Lemma 4.3.5 and Lemma B.6.1 become equalities.
Moreover, with symmetric service providers -yj = for all i, one can show that the
maximum eigenvalue of matrix G is exactly equal to 1 +,;y-. E
Theorem 4.3.7 shows that the efficiency of the unregulated setting increases as
the intensity of competition in the facility increases. The worst case happens when
the service providers are independent with monopolistic power, i.e., i' = 0. As the
competition among the service providers intensifies, the efficiency gap between the
unregulated setting and the social optimum diminishes. For example, with affine cost
(r,= 1), when -y = 1, the gap is reduced to 11.1%; as ' increases to 2, the gap
becomes only 6.25%. One could argue that the unregulated setting is quite efficient
when there is a fair amount of competition among the service providers.
Based on the analysis with only self-contained cost (Theorem 4.3.3 and 4.3.7), the
results are somewhat comforting as the worst welfare loss is bounded and this number
could be considerably smaller when there is competition among the service providers.
An explanation is that when only self-contained cost is present, the only distortion
in the unregulated setting is due to the oligopolistic power of the service providers,
which leads to higher prices and lower output level as compared to the optimum.
Competition reduces the market power of the service providers, thus, diminishing
the distortion and closing the efficiency gap. Consider the extreme example of per-
fect competition, where -+ oc, the total welfare obtained under the two settings
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converges, i.e., W(qN) - W(q*).
Theorem 4.3.8 With the presence of spillover costs, under Assumptions 4.2.1 to
4.2.5, when the maximum cost-to-benefit ratio < 1, the welfare in the unregulated
setting can be upper bounded by
W(qN)
W(q*) <Ks1 2+ -+p '))
where , is the Jacobian nonlinearity factor. The bound is tight with symmetric service
providers with affine costs (i.e., , = 1).
Remark When there is no spillover, i.e., p = 0, Theorem 4.3.8 coincides with the
upper bound in Theorem 4.3.7 with only self-contained cost.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.8. When there is spillover, an upper bound on the com-
parison of welfare achieved in the two settings are given by Lemma B.6.1, i.e.,
W(qN (1 - Amin{((I 
- E)(G + I + 2)1))2
W(q*) -
Note matrix G is positive definite and the minimum eigenvalue of the composite
matrix is bounded below by
Amin{((I - =)(G + I + 2)-1))2 > min 1A{s} Amax{G} + 1 + Af{E}/I
Consider a function g(x, y) = ((x - 1)(X+y +1))2 with x c [x, 2], where x > 0. If
t < 1, the function decreases in x. Thus, for a fixed y, the minimum of the function
is achieved with t. Therefore, we obtain the following:
When Amax{E} < 1,
Amax{} 
- 1
Amax{G} + 1+ Amax{E} ) 2
Since Amax{E} < P and Amax{G} 1+ -y, we can further lower bound the eigenvalue
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Amin{(I -( )( + I + ) )2
Figure 4-1: W(qN)/W(q*) with respect to spllover cost-to-benefit ratio P for sym-
metric service providers with affine cost, where i is set to zero (non-competing service
providers).
of the composite matrix by
Amin{((I - 5)(G+I+E)-)) 2  P; )
To obtain the tightness result, note that with symmetric service providers, Amax{E}
5 and use the same argument in the proof for Theorem 4.3.7. D
Theorem 4.3.8 states that the efficiency of the unregulated setting increases with
competition level -y and the maximum spillover cost-to-benefit ratio when p < 1.
Competition is beneficial to an unregulated setting as it reduces the distortion created
by the oligopolistic power. When p < 1, it implies that enrolling an additional user
bring a net positive welfare to the society (additional consumer surplus is larger than
the spillover cost). As a result, the efficiency of the unregulated setting also improves
with this ratio.
Figure 4-1 shows the W(qN)/W(q*) for symmetric noncompeting service providers
with affine costs (i.e., r = 1 and -y = 0). The plot shows the effect of p on the effi-
ciency of the unregulated setting. It starts at 75% because of noncompeting service
providers. Then it first increases with p albeit at a decreasing rate and decreases as
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f becomes large.
We would like to note that the upper bounds use p and ,' evaluated at the optimal
output level q*. The system welfare maximization problem is a strictly concave
maximization problem, which is easier to solve compared to obtain a Nash equilibrium
in the decentralized problem.
4.4 Simulation Experiments
So far, we have developed several bounds in terms of the efficiency analysis. We show
that the bounds are tight for the special cases such as noncompeting or symmetric
service providers and with affine costs. This section addresses a natural question,
how "good" are our bounds? In this subsection, we will evaluate the performance of
the bounds with nonlinear costs and asymmetric service providers via simulations.
4.4.1 Effect of nonlinearity and competition
In Theorem 4.3.3 and 4.3.7, we have shown that when costs are fully self-contained,
the welfare in the unregulated setting is bounded between } W(qN) ( - 1 )2,
where r, is the Jacobian nonlinearity factor with an upper bound as shown in Equation
B.6 and ;y is the competition index with the component on the self-contained cost
evaluated at the q*.
To isolate the impact of nonlinearity on the cost function, we restrict to symmetric
service providers with marginal utility function given by pi(q) = Pi - #jj qj + aiq c
(and we will discuss the impact of asymmetry in the next subsection). Because of
symmetric service providers, we will drop the subscript. For this experiment, the
number of downstream retailers is fixed to 5 and # = 5. We consider a cost function
of the following form, l(q) = cqk, where c > 0 is the cost coefficient and k is the
degree of this monomial. We run the experiment with the degree of the cost function
ranging from 0 to 10 for both noncompeting (a = 0) and competing service providers
(a = 1). The results are shown as the two curves labeled as "Exact" in Figure 4-
2. It is clearly shown that the efficiency increases as service providers compete for
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Figure 4-2: A simulation experiment to illustrate the impact of nonlinearity in the
cost functions.
all degrees k. Moreover, Figure 4-2 also shows that for all k > 0, the efficiency of
a decentralized system is strictly greater than 75%, which occurs with a constant
marginal cost and no competition. The two dotted curves labeled as "Bound" in
Figure 4-2 are computed by using the upper bound derived in Theorem 4.3.7. The
differences between the exact values and the bounds are quite small. To compute
the bound, we need to find out the maximum marginal self-contained cost evaluated
in the system solution q* which is easier to compute given the welfare maximization
problem is standard concave maximization problem.
Figure 4-3 records the result of another experiment which evaluates the bound in
Theorem 4.3.7 with competing service providers. We choose a cost function modeled
after a standard M/M/1 queue where 1(q) = M, and y > q. We use the same
marginal utility function as described in the previous experiment with # = 5. Com-
petition among service providers increases with the number of service providers, n.
Meanwhile, for a fixed number n, competition also increases with a. Figure 4-3 de-
picts the actual efficiency ratio in the solid line and the upper bound in dotted line by
adjusting the number of service providers from 1 to 20, and by varying a = 0.1, 1, 2
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Figure 4-3: A simulation experiment to illustrate the impact of competition with
self-contained cost 1(q) = q.
and 3 respectively. This experiment shows that efficiency of an unregulated setting
clearly improves with competition. Moreover, the upper bound becomes tighter as a
and n increase.
4.4.2 Effect of asymmetry
In this experiment, we focus on a setting with linear cost but asymmetric service
providers. Figure 4-4 reports the result of a simulation experiment with 500, 000
instances. For each instance, a random number between 2 to 25 is first drawn to
represent the size of the market. Next, various inputs (such as matrices B and R) are
generated to represent the asymmetric service providers (Jacobian R is independent of
q since costs are affine). For this experiment, we restrict p (see Definition 4.2.8) to be
equal or less than 1 so as to assess the quality of the upper bound we have developed
in Theorem 4.3.8 (similar behavior is observed for the comparison with the upper
bound when p > 1). We first solve the problem in the unregulated and the social
optimal settings respectively and compute the exact quantity. Next, we determine
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the corresponding upper bound in terms of ~7 and p. We summarize the differences
between the exact quantity and the lower bound in the histogram as shown in Figure
4-4. The experiment suggests that the upper bound provides a fairly accurate estimate
of the exact quantity. For most of the 500,000 instances, the differences between the
two quantities are within 0.05. Similar observations are also obtained for the other
bounds developed in the previous two subsections.
0.25-
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(D
Z 0.1 -IA
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0
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
Figure 4-4: A simulation experiment with 500,000 samples to illustrate the strength of
the upper bound in Theorem 4.3.8 where p < 1. The x-axis represents the differences
between the exact value of W(qN)/W(q*) and the upper bound grouped in bins. The
y-axis represents the relative frequency of the instances within the bin size.
4.5 Impact of Mergers Between Service Providers
Recently, talks on several mega-mergers have created a stir in the media, e.g., AT&T
with T-Mobile in the mobile marketplace, as well as United with Continental in
the airline industry. The common argument against mergers claims that consumers
could be at a disadvantage as the reduced competition leads to price increases. Views
which support merges argue that cost synergy derived from a merger could lead to
an improvement in the total social welfare. In this section, we will evaluate the
impact of mergers on the total welfare in the absence of cost synergy. For this part
of the analysis, an additional assumption of affine costs (i.e., l(q) = l4(0) + Ej lijqj)
is imposed so as to isolate the impact from mergers on the welfare. When service
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providers are also symmetric, then we will drop the subscripts, i.e., li(O) = 1(0) for
all i, and lij = l for all i and j,
Consider a pre-merger setting with n > 2 firms. Every firm competes against
each other by offering a single service. The firm determines its equilibrium service
level which maximizes the profit. We denote the two indices for all firms, namely, the
competition index adjusted with internalized congestion effect and the external-cost-
to-benefit ratio, as follow, yPre = ('r,... 'e) and Ire (nre,... , ) Suppose
m service providers decide to merge, where n > m > 2. Thus, in the post-merger
setting, there is a total of n - m + 1 firms in the market, i.e., the merged firm with
m types of services, together with n - m other firms, each providing a single service.
Without the loss of generality, let firms {1,... , m} be the merged firm. Denote
the two indices in the post-merger setting as -yPost and pPost respectively. Note that
the two indices in the post-merger setting are modified to capture the fact that the
merged firm has to determine the service levels which maximize the total profit from
all m types of services. The derivations can be found in the Appendix B.7.1. We
will use Wpre and WPost to denote the total welfare achieved in the pre-merger and
post-merger settings respectively.
Proposition 4.5.1 With symmetric service providers who offer homogeneous ser-
vices, in the pre-merger setting: yF" = (n -1 + 21)/0 and pi (n - 1)l/0 for all
i E {1,... , n}. In the post-merger setting:
" For the firms which are not involved in the merger, the competition index and the
post pre os re
congestion cost-to-benefit ratio remain the same, i.e., yo = ", o
for all j E {m + 1, ... , n};
" For the merged firm, for alli {1,. . ., m},
- when congestion effect is self-contained, 7POst = (n - m + 21)( 1 + m) <
pre
- for the merged firm, when congestion has the spilling effect, piost (n -
m)l/(# - 1 + m) < pre and y9o5t = (n - m + 2ml)/(# - 1 + m).
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For the firms which are not involved in the merger, since there are still n - 1 homoge-
nous services in the market, the relative price change with respect to quantity change
stays the same, i.e., the competition index remains the same. The same argument also
applies to the external-cost-to-benefit ratio for those firms. For the merged firm, with
the self-contained congestion, the competition index of any of its services strictly de-
creases, because there are fewer "competitors" (numerator decreases), and his impact
on prices increases (denominator increases). Similarly, consider its external-cost-to-
benefit ratio, the uninternalized congestion is reduced from (n - 1)1 to (n - m)l as the
merged firm internalizes more congestion. Moreover, being a larger firm, it also offers
more marginal benefit to the society, i.e., it increases from 3 to 3 - 1+ m. Combining
both effects, the external-cost-to-benefit ratio for the merged firm strictly decreases.
However, with the spilling congestion effect, "competition" faced by the merged firm
could potentially increase after it is adjusted by the self-contained congestion effect.
As shown in Proposition 4.5.1, when the marginal congestion cost l is high enough
(i.e., for l > 1/2(1 + n/(# - 1)), it is possible that rp"' > re, for i E {1, ... , m}.
After the merger, although the merged firm enjoys higher pricing power, at the same
time, it also has to bear more congestion cost, which increases from 21 to 2ml due to
its larger size. Thus, if we include the additional cost which the merged firm has to
internalize, it is plausible that it could be at a disadvantage after the merger.
Proposition 4.5.2 When costs are fully self-contained, when service providers are
symmetric, WPst < WPre, for all n > m > 2.
The result coincides with the conventional view on mergers, that is, without con-
sidering cost synergies, mergers reduces competition in the market and it leads to
leads to a decreases in the total social welfare. As shown in Theorems 4.3.3 and 4.3.7,
the main distortion in the unregulated setting is the oligopolistic power which leads
to "underproduction" compared to the socially optimal level. When congestion is
self-contained, a merger strictly increases the power of the merged firm, resulted in
more welfare loss in the unregulated setting.
Proposition 4.5.3 With spilling congestion effect, when pPre > 1, in the absence of
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cost synergies, mergers lead to an increase in the total welfare when service providers
are symmetric. When ppfr < 1, depending on how much congestion cost the merged
firm internalizes, the total welfare after the merge could either increase or decrease.
The result suggests that without cost synergies, it is still possible for the society to
benefit from mergers. It happens when the unregulated setting is the "bad" regime
before the merger, where the external uninternalized congestion exceeds the external
benefit of enrolling an additional user. We have shown in Proposition 4.5.1 that
one of the effects of the merger is that the decrease in external-cost-to-ratios. Thus,
the society benefits from the decrease in the external cost as a result of a merger.
The impact on the total welfare when Pre < 1 is less conclusive. From Theorem
4.3.8, when the competition index stays fixed, decreasing pPost leads to a welfare loss.
However, if the merged firm internalizes a substantial amount of congestion effect such
that the competition intensity actually increases after it is adjusted for the congestion
cost, the society could still benefit from the merger.
The results seem to provide some (at least partial) explanations to the decisions
made for the two merger proposals recently. On September 1st, 2011, the U.S. Justice
Department filed a law suit in the federal court to block the merger between the
country's second- and fourth-largest wireless carriers, AT&T and T-Mobile. In a
statement released by the Justice Department, the combination would reduce wireless
communication competition in the U.S., driving prices higher, making service worse
and offering fewer products for U.S. consumers. Our result agrees with the decision
as we have shown in the wireless market where congestion effect is self-contained,
mergers between the carriers reduce the total welfare in the absence of cost synergy.
On the other hand, the merger between United Airlines and Continental has re-
ceived its clearance from the Justice Department since August 2010. The department
said the airlines would combine "largely complementary networks, which would result
in overlap on a limited number of routes where United and Continental offer com-
peting nonstop service." While our analysis does not consider the benefit stemmed
from network effect of the merger, the results based on our model suggest that the
merger could benefit passengers and airlines (the merged airline and all other airlines
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operating in the same airport) in the regions with congested airports.
4.6 Effectiveness, Attractiveness and an Alterna-
tive Implementation
In this section, we address some of the issues which traditionally have made the
adoption of congestion pricing a challenging task in practice. We focus on the spilling
congestion effect as we have shown in the earlier section that the potential welfare
loss in the unregulated setting could be huge (an alternative interpretation is that
the potential gains from implementing congestion pricing are high). As opposed to
focusing on the aggregate impact such as the total social welfare, the main emphasis
of this section is on the individual impact of congestion pricing on service providers
and users respectively. We demonstrate that the surplus of the service providers and
the users almost always decreases after implementing congestion pricing, unless the
revenue collected from congestion pricing is utilized efficiently. Thus, it puts a lot
of emphasis on how to use the revenue from congestion pricing. Moreover, in order
to attract support for congestion pricing in reality, we attempt to design the scheme
which appeals to the self-interest of individual participants.
4.6.1 Using the revenue from congestion pricing
The economic theory behind congestion pricing relies on using the revenue collected
to improve the efficiency of the facility (recall the total welfare is the sum of consumer
surplus, producer surplus and the revenue collected from congestion pricing). In the
context of an airport, the revenue collected can be invested in infrastructure such
as constructing more runways and/or technological improvement in air control which
would increase the capacity of the airspace and reduce the impact due to bad weather.
In reality, the facility manager might only intend to use part of the revenue for that
purpose. It could also happen that the revenue collected is spent unwisely such that
only part of the expected gain is realized. To model this, we introduce a parameter
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# E [0, 1], called the revenue utilization rate, to denote the fraction of the revenue
which ultimately benefits the society. The total welfare with congestion pricing would
depend on #, W(q, #) = CS(q) + PS(q) + #TR(q).
In the earlier section, we have quantified the welfare impact from congestion pric-
ing by focusing on the ideal scenario with # = 1, that is, all the congestion pricing
proceeds have been used to boost the social welfare. In the next two propositions,
we take another look at this impact without being overly optimistic on the revenue
utilization.
Proposition 4.6.1 The optimal congestion pricing charged to the service provider,
t*(#), increase in #.
The result spells out the relationship between the size of congestion pricing and the
facility manager's ability to utilize the tax revenue to improve the social welfare. It is
intuitive as the amount that a facility manager is allowed to charge should be directly
related to his ability or commitment to utilize the revenue. Higher charge is only
justified when the facility manager is capable of utilizing a significant amount of the
revenue proceedings.
Proposition 4.6.2 There exists a q such that W*(#) > WN, for all >
The result imposes a criterion on a facility manager's ability in order to justify conges-
tion pricing. While it is straightforward to see that the total social welfare increases
with the revenue utilization rate #, Proposition 4.6.2 suggests that the intervention
from the manager could possibly lead to a welfare decrease when the utilization rate
is is low. In particular, if at most $ of the revenue is planned to benefit the soci-
ety (airlines and/or passengers in the context of airports), congestion pricing should
not be implemented. With symmetric service providers, the condition boils down to
having 0 > (3 + rmax)/(2 + rmax + Pmax). It increases with the competition among
the service providers and decreases when the external congestion cost outweighs the
external benefit. 0 is below 1 only when pmax > 1, implying a rather stringent require-
ment on the regulator's ability of utilizing the proceeds in order to justify imposing
congestion pricing.
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4.6.2 Individual impact of congestion pricing and welfare
sharing
As most individuals are somewhat concerned with aggregate performance metrics
(such as total welfare) and are more interested in their individual impact, we inves-
tigate the impact of congestion pricing on the individual service providers and the
users respectively in this subsection. Let us denote the producer surplus and con-
sumer surplus in the unregulated setting as PSN and CSN and the corresponding
quantities and the revenue collected with congestion pricing as PS*, CS* and TR*
respectively.
Figure 4-5 shows producer surplus and consumer surplus with respect to the
external-cost-to-benefit ratio (p) for the symmetric service providers for both the un-
regulated and regulated settings. When p < 1, PS* > PSN and CS* > CSN. Note
that when p < 1, the optimal congestion pricing is negative. With the subsidy from
the facility manager, it increases the profit margins of the service provider who sees
an increase in his profit. Meanwhile, lower prices also encourage more users from en-
rolling which leads to a higher consumer surplus. The reverse happens when p > 1 as
PS* and CS* are strictly less than their counterparts in the unregulated setting as the
facility manager imposes a positive charge on every service. Intuitively, PS* decreases
because the profit-maximizing service providers experience lower profit margin due to
the positive access fee. A lower consumption level results in a lower CS*. The classic
definition of total social welfare in economics with taxation is defined as the sum of
producer surplus, consumer surplus and the tax revenue (W* = PS* + CS* + TR*).
Therefore, in the settings with a positive congestion pricing (p > 1), the welfare
improvement is accrued as the "revenue" collected by the facility manager, at the
expense of both the service providers and the users. It is not surprising that when
all participants experience a surplus decrease, there is little desire for them to adopt
the scheme.
Suppose the facility manager would like to share the revenue between the service
providers and the users with the goal that every participants can do better than
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Figure 4-5: Producer surplus and consumer surplus with respect to the marginal
spillover congestion cost-to-benefit ratio, p for the identical service providers, where
# = 10, 1 = 2, P - I= 10.
in the unregulated setting. In particular, suppose ai is the portion of the revenue
TR* that is given to service provider i and #i portion of the revenue that is given
to the users enrolling under service provider i, where E(ai + 03) = 1. We denote
the new producer surplus and consumer surplus after the welfare redistribution as
PSj and CSj respectively, whereby PSj = PS + a iTR*, and CSj = CS* + iTTR*.
While every participant would like to obtain a larger share of the pie, we define the
following welfare-sharing rule such that everyone can benefit.
Proposition 4.6.3 Suppose W* = OWN, where 4 denotes the total welfare increase
after the implementation of congestion pricing. If the revenue TR* is shared according
to ci and 0j, where
PIN - PS! @CSN - CS*
ae r= j and A = - ITR* ' TR*
then PS, > PSN and CSj > CSN for all i.
The welfare-sharing rule ensures a Pareto-efficient outcome, i.e., Ei(PS,+CSi) =
W*. Moreover, it also guarantees collective individual rationality as both producer
surplus and consumer surplus experience an improvement compared to their coun-
terparts in the unregulated setting. We would like to point out the surplus obtained
u tN CSN
under the welfare-sharing rule, i.e., PS2 = ; OrW* and CSj = _: W*is equivalent to
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using the proportional value as an allocation rule in a n-person bargaining game with
their outside option as their gain in the unregulated setting. The welfare-sharing rule
also captures a notion of "fairness": It scales each entity's surplus in the unregulated
setting by a same factor, 0, which represents how much benefit the society as a whole
reaps from congestion pricing. It then compares that quantity (@PSfN or @CSf)
with every entity's corresponding surplus after congestion pricing and compensates
each participant accordingly.
In the context of airport congestion pricing, FAA has to compensate airlines and
traveling passengers by giving back the revenue collected. To compensate airlines,
FAA could give discounts on existing charges such as counter and baggage claim rental
fees. To redistribute the revenue to passengers, one remedy is to reduce airport tax
or passenger facility fees. Passenger facility charges (PFC) are special taxes which
airports collect from individual airline passengers. A PFC is imposed each time a
passenger passes through an airport eligible to collect a PFC (only a small number
of airports in the United States do not collect a PFC). The PFC is actually added to
the price of an airline ticket, and airlines are forced to collect the tax for airports at
the time the passenger pays for their ticket. Nonetheless, we recognize the difficulties
associated with implementing the proposed scheme due to the administrative burden
on both FAA and airlines.
In the following proposition, we explore another implementation of congestion
pricing which guarantees that each participant experience a welfare improvement
without going through the hassle of collecting congestion pricing and later redis-
tributing the revenue.
Proposition 4.6.4 There exists a new marginal utility function fiL(q) = Oi-n_ I 3jqj,
such that producer surplus and consumer surplus earned in the unregulated setting are
the same as the target level, PSj and CS respectively.
Under this new utility function, without any intervention from the facility man-
ager, the service providers and the users could achieve the target surplus level in an
unregulated setting, and all participating entities experience a surplus increase. Com-
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pare this new demand function with the initial model (where ui (q) = Pi - E #ijqj),
the only difference is that the maximum willingness of a representative user to pay
for i's service is changed from pi to Oj. It suggests an "easy fix" as an alternative im-
plementation of congestion pricing and welfare redistribution: For every service, the
facility manager mandates a surcharge (O8 - pi) which alters its base price. Once
the surcharge is imposed, the service providers determine their respective profit-
maximizing service level and get to keep all the revenue earned. Because of the
new higher base price, some users will choose to leave the facility and this relieves
the congestion problem. For the service providers, despite serving fewer users, they
benefit from a higher profit margin per user (due to the surcharge) and reap higher
profit. Meanwhile, the remaining users derive higher utility from using the service,
therefore, they also experience higher surplus. More importantly, this implementa-
tion bypasses the difficulties of actual implementation of congestion pricing and the
subsequent welfare-redistribution.
4.7 Conclusions
In this work, we have considered a setting where several services providers compete
for users who are sensitive to both prices and congestion by providing multiple differ-
entiated services. We have provided tight parametric bounds on the welfare loss of the
unregulated setting. We have shown that with self-contained costs, the unregulated
setting could be quite efficient and the maximum welfare loss is capped at 25%, even
with highly nonlinear convex costs. With spillover cost, the efficiency of the unregu-
lated setting highly depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal external cost
and the marginal benefit associated with enrolling an additional user. We have also
shown that the congestion pricing charged to service providers with market power is
lower than that of the traditional "road toll". Contrary to conventional wisdom that
mergers reduce social welfare, we show that in a setting with severe spilling conges-
tion effect, mergers could lead to a social welfare improvement, even in the absence of
cost synergy. Lastly, based on a welfare-sharing scheme, we proposed an alternative
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implementation of congestion pricing such that both the users and service providers
can enjoy higher surplus.
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Chapter 5
Price of Anarchy in Joint Ventures
5.1 Introduction
A proliferation of joint ventures has been witnessed across the globe in the recent
years. A joint venture takes place when two or more business partners pool their
resources and expertise to achieve a particular goal for a contractual period of time.
Joint ventures stand in the middle ground between non-cooperative competition and
merging. They provide companies with the opportunities to gain new capacity and
expertise, enter related businesses or new geographic markets, gain new technological
knowledge access to greater resources, and share risks with other venture partners.
In this work, we consider a setting where multiple entities take part in a joint
venture and each of them contributes one type of resources. We distinguish two types
of resource pooling in joint ventures, depending on whether the resources are het-
erogeneous or homogeneous. When resources are heterogeneous, they are not fully
substitutable. Thus, the effective capacity of a joint venture is limited to the the
minimum level of an individual contribution. In other words, the lowest contribution
by one partner becomes the bottleneck in planning the capacity for the joint ven-
ture. This is in contrast with homogeneous resource pooling, where the resources are
perfectly substitutable and the overall capacity of a joint venture is determined by
aggregating all individual contributions.
One example that demonstrates the success of a joint venture with heterogeneous
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resource sharing is Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary (MEEI), a hospital special-
ized in providing patient care for disorders of the eye, ear, nose, throat, head and
neck in downtown Boston. With the vast majority of its services is outpatient in
nature, MEEI experiences lower profit margins than a regular hospital and has been
pressured to increase its patient volume so as to strengthen its financial status. Since
2005, MEEI has established five satellite clinics through joint ventures by collabo-
rating with community hospitals in the suburbs. A typical agreement specifies that
MEEI provides expertise (physicians and nurses) and its brand name' while the com-
munity hospital is responsible for providing facility and other necessary hardware.
The two types of resources, i.e., expertise and facility, are not interchangeable. The
maximum number of services that can be supported in such a satellite clinics is lim-
ited by MEEI's input as well as the space constraints such as the number of operating
rooms available in the new location.
In 2003, US-based car rental firm Avis has set up a joint venture in Shanghai,
China. The new company named Anji Car Rental and Leasing, 50-50 owned by Avis
Europe and Shanghai Automotive Industry Sales Corporation, takes over the existing
fleet of 1,000 vehicles from Shanghai Anji Car Rental and operates it under the Avis
brand name. The venture expects to establish more than 70 outlets nationwide. This
is a typical joint venture with homogeneous resource sharing, where the capacity in
the new company is supported by aggregating the number of vehicles from the two
companies.
Besides the healthcare industry and car-rental industry, another sector which has
been a flurry to establish joint ventures is the airline industry. An airline alliance is
an agreement between multiple independent partners to collaborate in various activ-
ities to streamline costs while expanding global reach and market penetration. The
presence of alliances in the airline industry has followed an increasing trend since
the first large airline alliance was formed in 1989 between Northwest and KLM. By
March 2009, the three major alliances (Star, Sky Team and Oneworld) combined flew
around 73% of all passengers worldwide (Hu et al. 2012). On the cost side, there are
'The satellite clinic located within the community hospital is labeled as a MEEI branch.
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strong incentives for airlines to operate large networks as the evidences on economies
of scale have been well documented (Caves et al. 1984, Brueckner and Spiller 1994,
Keeler and Formby 1994, etc). On the revenue side, one of the fundamental attrac-
tions of an airline alliance is the ability to offer codeshare fights. Code sharing is
an agreement between two carriers whereby one carrier allows a different carrier to
market and sell seats on some of its flights. Based on empirical evidences, Brueckner
(2003) conclude that codesharing among Star Alliance partners yielded an annual
benefit of around $20 million. Morever, the information comes with codesharing can
be tremendously beneficial. Jain (2010) show that sharing information on bid prices
yields higher revenues of the order of $100 million for every big partnering carrier in
the alliance.
5.1.1 Results and Contributions
In this work, we study both types of joint venture models and address some issues
pertinent to the success of joint ventures. When several companies agree to a part-
nership, disparate interests often exist as each participant is more concerned with his
or her own gain. Given the misalignment in incentives and uncertainties in demand,
we are interested in measuring the performance of a joint venture by quantifying
the difference in the investment level and the total profit attained with respect to a
system optimal outcome.
We have shown that in a joint venture with heterogeneous resource pooling, de-
spite the existence of asymmetric parties, the equilibrium induces an equal capacity
contribution from every partner. Although multiple Nash equilibria could exist, we
show that there always exists a unique strong Nash equilibrium. In addition, we show
that there exists a fair and efficient way to share revenue such that an optimal invest-
ment decision could be reached in a Nash equilibrium. Next, we also consider Nash
Bargaining model which is a natural framework to define and design fair assignment
of the capacity investment levels between multiple players. We show that the same
revenue sharing scheme could also be used in a Nash Bargaining model to induce the
optimal decision. This optimal revenue sharing scheme indicates that the awarded
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each party receives must be proportional to his marginal cost.
For joint ventures with homogeneous resource pooling, we first prove some struc-
tural properties on the effective capacity under any demand distribution with convex
costs. The analysis is challenging as the investment of each player could only be
determined by solving a system of implicit equations. We show that joint venture al-
ways underinvests as the effective capacity is always lower than that of a coordinated
setting.
We then focus on quadratic-linear cost functions and show that, through an
intercept-argument, the effective capacity in a joint venture with respect to any rev-
enue sharing ratio is at least 1/n of the optimal level, where n is the number of
participants. Moreover, the ratio between the capacity level could be upper bounded
in terms of the cost asymmetry between the two players and the revenue sharing ratio.
While we show that there does not exist a fixed marginal revenue sharing contract
which can coordinate the players, we propose an interval for the revenue sharing ratio
which induces an outcome that is guaranteed to achieve at least 50% the optimal
profit for a 2-player model. This interval depends on the cost asymmetry between
the two players and the demand concentration.
Lastly, we consider general convex cost in the homogeneous resource pooling model
with an arbitrary number of asymmetric players. We show that a lower bound to the
efficiency of the original setting with the nonlinear convex costs is that of a modified
setting with linear costs, where the coefficients are equal to the marginal cost of each
player evaluated in the Nash equilibrium of the original problem. As a result, we show
that the comparative analysis on profit can be reduced to analyze the joint investment
level made in the Nash and the system in the setting with the linear costs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a review on related
literature in Section 5.1.2. Section 5.2 describes the two models and assumptions.
We analyze and present the main results on capacity sharing and substitution model
in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 respectively.
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5.1.2 Related Literature
This paper studies strategic capacity management under uncertainty. In the opera-
tions management literature, there is a vast body of work using the classic newsvendor
model or some variations to capture uncertainties. Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) is
the classic reference for capacitated inventory management. Papers including Ka-
puscinski and Tayur (1998), Angelus and Porteus (2002), Bradley and Glynn (2002),
Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002) consider capacity investment decisions in capacitated
Newsvendor networks. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) take a different approach at
capacity management and address how the relative timing of the decisions on capac-
ity, inventory, and price impact the sensitivity and profitability. We refer readers
to Van Mieghem (2003) for an excellent survey paper on the recent development on
capacity management. In this work, the capacity of a joint venture depends on the
contribution of multiple participants. Depending on the nature of the resources, the
effective capacity can be the minimum or the sum of individual contributions.
In many settings, capacity-investment decisions are the results after interacting
with other economic agents. Thus, it seems natural for capacity investment models
to incorporate the strategic behavior of self-interested agents. Cachon and Lariviere
(1999) consider the manufacturer's capacity investment and allocation decisions to
several downstream retailers that have private information. Caldentey and Wein
(2003) present contracts that are linear in backorder, inventory, and capacity levels
to coordinate a manufacturer and retailer production-inventory system, including
the capacity decision. Examples on single-resource, multiple-agent also include Carr
and Lovejoy (2000), Porteus and Whang (1991), Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000), etc.
Bassok et al. (1999) and Netessine and Rudi (2003) explore the impact of substitution
in an inventory context, and its effects are likely to be similar in capacity problems.
In this work, the strategic behavior of participants involving in a joint ventures is
captured in a noncooperative game, as each entity determines his level of contribution
with the goal to maximize his profit. While the revenue each party receives depends
on the effective capacity of the joint venture, the incentive of each entity might not
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be correctly aligned to one which maximizes the collective return. We consider a
fixed rate revenue sharing contract described in Cachon and Lariviere (2005) to split
revenue among the participants. To capture the high capital investment incurred in
joint ventures in the healthcare industry, we consider general convex cost function
so as to capture the diminishing returns, in contrast to linear cost function which
is common in the operations management literature (e.g., Bernstein and Federgruen
2007, Cachon 2003, Corbett et al. 2005, Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi 2009).
In this setting, we show that an "optimal" coordinating contract which enables the
parties with self-interests to behave as a coordinated entity does not necessarily exist
with homogeneous resources. We then propose a range for fixed revenue sharing ratio
which induces reasonably good outcomes.
Standing in the middle ground between non-cooperative competition and merg-
ing, one of the most fundamental building blocks of joint ventures is negotiation.
Empirical studies suggest that "the power of a joint venture is only as strong as the
negotiation behind it" (Y. and 0. 2002, Lin and Germain 1998). The topic on ne-
gotiation has gained a lot of attraction in the economics literature since Nash (1950)
(e.g., Myerson 1979, Binmore et al. 1986, Rubinstein 1982, etc). In the fast few years,
more results on negotiation have become known in the field of operations manage-
ment (see for example, Reyniers and Tapiero 1995, Miller 1992, Chod and Rudi 2006,
etc). Nagarajan and Sosic (2008) present an excellent survey paper on cooperative
game theory in the field of supply chain management. In this work, utilizing the
bargaining model, we propose a revenue sharing scheme which induces an outcome
which is coincides with the system optimum.
Lastly, our work which measures the performance of an unregulated setting with
respect to a centralized system is related to a stream of literature on price of anarchy,
popularized by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999). It compares the performance
of the worst-case Nash equilibrium with respect to the centralized system. The con-
cept has been used in transportation networks (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002, Correa
et al. 2004, 2007, Roughgarden 2005), network pricing (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007,
Weintraub et al. 2010), oligopolistic pricing games in a single tier (Farahat and Per-
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akis 2010a,b), and supply chain games with exogenous pricing (Perakis and Roels
2007, Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi 2009, Martinez-de Alberniz and Roels
2010).
5.2 Model Formulation
In this section, we first present the model for a joint venture with n players as an
uncoordinated game. As a benchmark, we also present the model in the system
setting, i.e., n entities were merged and coordinated as a single entity with the goal
to maximize the total return.
5.2.1 Joint-venture: an uncoordinated game
Consider a joint venture with n profit-maximizing players with asymmetric cost func-
tions. The joint venture generates a joint revenue R(p, K) where p is the fixed price
and K = (Ki, . . . , K,) captures the resources contributed by each player. A revenue-
sharing contract dictates that player i receives revenue #iR(p, K). Let fi(Ki) be
the convex cost associated with investing Ki resources by player i. Based on a pre-
negotiated revenue-sharing ratio A = (#1,... , #), player i tries to maximize her profit
ri (#) A #3R(p, K) - fi(Ki) by choosing her own investment level Ki, which leads to
a Nash equilibrium (NE).
5.2.2 Merger: the system optimum
Consider the centralized system in which n players are merged and coordinated as
a single player. The merger generates the highest possible profit Ir * R(p, K) -
i> fi(Ki) by collectively choosing the resource investment K. This yields the first-
best or system optimal solution.
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5.2.3 Resource-sharing models
We consider two types of resource-sharing models depending on the nature of the
resources pooled from different players. The nature of the resources determines the
effective capacity in a joint venture, which in turn affects the revenue function R(p, K).
We formally define them as follows:
Definition 5.2.1 Heterogeneous resource-sharing. The aggregate revenue gen-
erated by the joint venture is given by R(p, K) = pE(min(D, mini(K))).
The type of resource provided by each player is heterogeneous and not fully sub-
stitutable. A service can only be performed with a complete portfolio of resource
types. The effective capacity supported by the joint venture is therefore limited to
the minimum capacity level invested by the players.
Definition 5.2.2 Homogeneous resource-sharing. The aggregate revenue gen-
erated by the joint venture is given by R(p, K) = pE(min(D, Z>(Ki))).
The type of resource provided by each player is homogeneous to each other and hence
fully substitutable. A service can be performed by using the resource contributed by
any (possibly single) player. The effective capacity supported by the joint venture is
therefore the sum of capacity level invested by each player.
In the next two sections, we will study both types of resource-sharing models and
present the differences in the capacity investment and the total profit generated in a
joint venture to those in a system optimum.
5.3 Heterogeneous Resource-sharing Models
With heterogeneous resources, the effective capacity is limited by the minimum ca-
pacity invested among all players, which becomes the bottleneck capacity. Consider
the merger setting, the central planner tries to maximize the aggregate revenue by
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collectively choosing the capacity investment K, i.e.,
n
r* AmaxpE[min(K, D)] - fi(Ki), s.t. K < Ki, i = 1,. . . , n. (5.1)
K,Ki
Let K* and K*, ... , K,* be the system optimal solution.
Lemma 5.3.1 At system optimality, the capacity invested by each player is the same,
Z.e., K* = Ki for all i = 1,...,n, where K* solves P(D < K*) = 1 - 'li fi(K*)/p.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.1. Without loss of generality, if there exists a pair of players
i and j such that KZ < Kj, we can decrease the capacity invested by player j from
Kj to Kl. By doing so, the profit increases by reducing the cost while maintaining
the same revenue. Hence, we reach a contradiction. At system optimality, K* = Kl
for all i = 1, ... , n, and (5.1) reduces to a single variable optimization in which K*
can be obtained by the first-order condition. 0
In the system optimum, each individual capacity investment Ki must be reduced
to the bottleneck capacity K* when resource-sharing is heterogeneous, since any fur-
ther investment beyond the bottleneck capacity only increases the total cost and
decreases the total profit.
In a joint-venture with a pre-negotiated revenue-sharing contract #, player i tries
to maximize her profit by choosing her profit-maximizing capacity investment level
Ki based on other players' strategies K_i, which leads to a Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
7rN (0) A max #ipE[min(K, D)] - fi(Ki), s.t. K < Kj, j = 1,... ,n
SK,Ki ;K-i
Now, let KN and K',... , KN be the Nash equilibrium solutions.
Lemma 5.3.2 In joint-ventures, any KN(O) = Kf (O) = ... = KN(C) < min1 k n(Ak)
are Nash Equilibria, where Ak solves
fl( Ak)
P(D < Ak) = 1 - fk .
OP
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In particular, KSN() = KIN () KnSN(O) = min,<k<n (Ak) is a unique
Strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.2. Without loss of generality, if there exists a pair of players
i and j such that Kf,(#) < KjN(#), player j can decrease its capacity investment
from K7(#) to Kf'(3) lowering her cost and improving her profit. Thus, at Nash
equilibrium, all players must have the same capacity investment level, i.e., KN (3)
Kf(#) for all i= 1, ... , n.
Now assume that minl<kn(Ak) = Am. Now if Am < KN( 3) = Km(#), player m
always has incentives to unilaterally lower her investment level to Am since Am is her
profit-maximizer. This forces all players to invest at Am. Any capacity investment
level Am such that 0 < Am < Am is also a Nash equilibrium since no player has
incentives to unilaterally deviate from Am. In particular, KSN(3) = K SN(O)
K SN (0) Am is a unique Strong Nash equilibrium in which no coalition, taking the
actions of its complements as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way that benefits
all of its members. D
Lemma 5.3.2 indicates that the capacity invested by each player must be the
same in a joint venture. Since the revenue received by player i depends solely on
the bottleneck capacity KN () when resource-sharing is heterogeneous, any further
investment beyond the bottleneck capacity only increases her cost and decreases her
profit. Lemma 5.3.2 also implies that Ak is the profit-maximizing capacity for player
k. Since the resource-sharing is heterogeneous, the player m with the lowest profit-
maximizing capacity (i.e., Am = minlk<,(Ak)) can unilaterally choose to invest
at her profit maximizing capacity, forcing all other players to invest at the same
capacity level. Note that any capacity investment level no greater than Am is a Nash
equilibrium whereas any capacity investment level above Am is not. As a result, it is
easy to see that with the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, it is possible for a joint
venture to achieve an arbitrarily bad outcome compared to the system optimum.
So far, we have modeled the decision making process in a joint venture as a Nash
Equilibrium. Next, we will propose an alternative model where the players participate
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a Nash bargaining game to determine their respective investment decisions for a given
revenue sharing ratio #.
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). The Nash Bargaining Solution (see Ap-
pendix C) is a natural framework that allows us to define and design fair assignment
of the capacity investment levels between n players, which can derive desirable proper-
ties such as Pareto efficiency and proportional fairness. Based on a particular revenue
sharing contract #, n players choose their capacity investment levels according to a
Nash Bargaining game, i.e.,
n
max r T'(O), s.t. K < Kj, j =1...,n,
i=1
which is equivalent to solving
n
max log 7F r(#), s.t. K < K, j =1, ... , n. (5.2)
K,Ki
Let KB and K, . .. , Kn be the Nash Bargaining Solution from solving (5.2).
Theorem 5.3.3 There exists a unique revenue sharing contract,
fil(K*)
_=1 fj(K*)'1
such that the Nash Bargaining Solution, the unique Strong Nash equilibrium, and the
system optimal solution coincide, i.e., K B(*) = KSN (f*) = K*.
Proof of Theorem 5.3.3. Observe that (5.2) is equivalent to a single variable op-
timization,
N
max log (#ipE[min(K, D)] - fi(K)) . (5.3)
The first-order condition gives us
N B B3pIF(D > K) f(K) 0 (5.4)
(#ipE[min(KB, D)] - fi(KB))
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By Lemma 5.3.2, at Nash Equilibrium, KN < min15ksn(Ak), where Ak solves
P(D > Ak) = fk(Ak)
Okp
This implies that
#ipP(D > KN) - f/(KN) > 0, for all i = 1, ... , n. (5.5)
Suppose that there exists a solution -y to both the Nash Bargaining game and the
Nash equilibrium, i.e., -y = KN - KB(#).
simultaneously, implying that
Then -y must satisfy (5.4) and (5.5)
ipP(D > -y) - f21(-y) = 0 for all i = 1, ... , n. (5.6)
If such -y exists, -y = KSN(), i.e. -y is the unique Strong Nash equilibrium since
y = A1  ... = An= min1<k<n(Ak) by (5.6).
Now summing (5.6) over all players and E" 1i = 1, we have
(5.7)pP(D >)- f (y) = 0.
By (5.6) and (5.7), we know that # must be of the following form,
= f i' ()
Moreover, note that by Lemma 5.3.1, (5.7) implies that -y = K* Since K* is the
unique system optimal solution, there exists a unique revenue sharing contract
f (K*)
n 1 fj(K*)'
such that -y = K* = KSN(0*) = KB (3*). FD
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i = 11 ... n,
Theorem 5.3.3 shows that when resources are heterogeneous, there is a way to
rely on the revenue sharing contract to eliminate the incentive misalignment among
the players and induce the system optimal outcome. In addition, the way to do so
is the same when the players' behavior is predicted by a Nash equilibrium as well as
the Nash bargaining solution.
In addition, besides inducing the efficient decision, the optimal revenue sharing
contract in Theorem 5.3.3 also embodies the notion of proportional fairness. For an
investment level K*, player i bears a marginal cost f4(K*) and the aggregate marginal
cost is given by summing up the marginal cost of every player participating in the
joint venture, >j fj(K*). Theorem 5.3.3 specifics that the marginal revenue ratio
which player i is entitled to receive (#3 ) should be equal to the proportion of his
marginal cost to the aggregate marginal cost (fj(K*)/ EZ f(K*)). In simple words,
"fairness" in this context suggests that every participant in a joint venture should be
awarded "proportionally" to the risk (cost) she has to undertake.
5.3.1 Numerical Examples
We conduct numerical studies to compare our approach with the existing approach
adpoted by some joint-ventures (such as MEEI). In the existing model, joint-ventures
set their capacity investment level according to the long-run average demand, i.e.
KEX - ]E[D]. In addition, they split the revenue based on how much each party
invests in total capacity. More specifically, they set the revenue sharing parameter to
be
EX _ (KEX)
- = fj(KEX)
We consider a 2-player game with unit service price p = 1200. Assume that the
demand follows a normal distribution, and the cost functions to be quadratic, i.e.
fi(Ki) = aiK2/2 + biKi + ci for i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, we let ai = 1,
a2 = 0.5, bi = b2= 100 and ci = C2= 0. Table 5.1 shows the simulation results.
The simulation results show that our approach outperforms the existing approach
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Demand Player 1 Player 2 Total
Share Profit (x 105) Share Profit Profit (x 105)
RS EX RS EX % RS EX RS EX % RS EX %
N(800,100) 63.8% 62.5% 2.19 1.70 29% 36.2 37.5 1.11 1.01 8.8% 3.30 2.72 21%
N(800,200) 63.5% 62.5% 2.06 1.40 47% 36.5 37.5 1.06 0.84 26% 3.12 2.24 39%
N(800,300) 63.3% 62.5% 1.86 1.10 69% 36.7 37.5 0.96 0.66 46% 2.83 1.77 60%
N(700,100) 63.5% 62.1% 2.12 1.77 20% 36.5 37.9 1.09 1.08 1.2% 3.21 2.84 13%
N(700,200) 63.3% 62.1% 1.92 1.47 31% 36.7 37.9 1.01 0.90 12% 2.93 2.37 23%
N(700,300) 63.0% 62.1% 1.69 1.17 45% 37.0 37.9 0.89 0.72 24% 2.58 1.89 37%
Table 5.1: Numerical results comparing the revenue-sharing contract (RS) with the existing contract (EX).
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by increasing the profit of both players. The profit increases in the variability of
the demand distribution. Moreover, we observe that the proportional sharing scheme
based on marginal costs (our approach) gives slightly more weight to the less cost-
effective player as compared to the proportional sharing scheme based on total costs
(the existing approach).
5.4 Homogeneous Resource-sharing Models
When resources are homogeneous, they are completely substitutable for one another.
The effective capacity is therefore the sum of the individual capacity invested by
each player. The alliances among airlines and car rental companies are some of the
applications of this model.
In a merger (system), the central planner tries to maximize the aggregate revenue
by collectively choosing the capacity investment K, i.e.,
n
maxpE[min(L, D)] - fi(Ki).
7T-Ki
i=1
where the total capacity investment L is the sum of all Ki's, i.e., L A Ke with e
being the column vector with all one's.
Lemma 5.4.1 Define an auxiliary function
n
g(L) : maxpE[min(L, D)] - f (Ki), s.t. L < L.
Ki
Then g(L) is concave in L where L is the budget on total capacity investment.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.1. Suppose L* is the optimal solution to the system problem.
It is easy to see that for all L > L*, g(1L) = 7*. For all L < L*, the budget constraint
becomes tight. It suffices to show that
ni n
h() =min fi(Ki), s.t. Ki=
i=1
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is convex in L. For any A E [0, 1],
n
- A)L 2) =min f2(AKi
Ki, Ki._
+ (1- A)Kj) s.t. Ki = Z ,
and
n
Ah(L 1 ) + (1 - A)h(L 2) = min A fi(K) + (1 - A) fi (K)
Ki,K.
n n
s.t. SKi =ZL1 , -K =Z 2.
i=1 i=1
By convexity of function fi for i = 1, . . . , n, for any Ki, we know that
fi(AKi + (1 - A)Kj) > A f (Ki) + (1 - A)fi(Kj).
Taking the minimum with respect to the same constraints preserves the inequality,
we have
h(AL, + (1 - A)L2) > Ah(L 1 ) + (1 - A)h(L 2).
This completes the proof. D
In a joint-venture with a pre-negotiated revenue-sharing contract /3, player i tries
to maximize her profit by choosing her profit-maximizing capacity investment level
Ki based on other players' strategy K_i, i.e.,
7r () max
SK,Ki;K-i
#ipE[min(L, D)] - fi(Ki),
which leads to a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5.4.2 The total capacity investment level in a joint-venture is no greater
than that in a merger (system), i.e., i= K < (_= K|.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.2. Suppose that, without loss of generality, Kf ;> K*. Then
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h(AL, + (1 Kz = Z2,
n
't =
we have
Op - f(f ) <p - fj(K*) <p - fj(K*)
#3p - #p ~ p
Take F- 1 on both sides (F-1 is monotonely increasing, so the sign does not change),
then we have E l KN < J' Kl. D
The result in Lemma 5.4.2 does not depend on demand distribution or symmetry
among the players. It shows that the effective capacity in a joint venture is always
lower compared to a system optimum. However, when the players have asymmetric
costs, it is likely that some players over-invest as compared to their counterparts in
the optimal setting. In particular, the individual contribution depend on the revenue
sharing ratio #.
In contrast to the heterogeneous resource sharing case where an optimal revenue
sharing method exists, one can show that there does not exist a fixed revenue sharing
method which will induce the system optimal actions in the Nash equilibrium. In
other words, there does not exist 0 such that 7r(/3) = r.
In the rest of the section, we will investigate the following questions: (1) For a
fixed revenue sharing ratio #, how is performance in a joint venture compared to the
optimum. (2) How to choose / such that we can have some performance guarantee.
We will first restrict ourselves to linear quadratic costs. We begin with a 2-player
game and extend our results to a n-player setting. In the end of this section, we will
consider n-player setting with general convex costs.
5.4.1 2-player game with linear-quadratic cost functions
Assume that the cost functions are linear-quadratic, i.e.,
f,(K 1 ) = a,(K, + b,)2 + c1 , f 2 (K 2 ) - a2 (K 2 + b2 )2 + c 2.2 2
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Without loss of generality, assume that ai 2 a 2. Now define R1 = Ki + b1 and
K 2 = K2 + b2, and their corresponding modified total capacity investment levels,
LN _ LN +b 1 +b 2, * = L*+b1+b 2.
Lemma 5.4.3 For a 2-player game with any demand distribution D and linear-
quadratic cost functions, for all 01 < 0.5, the ratio of the total capacity investment
level in the system to that in the joint-venture is upper and lower bounded by
LN / 1a2 + 02al >1 2 - > 2>-
L* a 1 +a 2  2
CDF )
0 LN LA B C L
Figure 5-1: A graphical proof for Lemma 5.4.3.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.3. The lower bound is proven by Lemma 5.4.2. Now we show
how to obtain an upper bound by utilizing an intercept argument. By optimality
conditions, we have
ND K1p - a1(K " - b1) _ /2p - a 2 (K2N - b2)P(D < K + K22P
By changing of variables,
N ~- 1 pNal= 022p - a2 K2NP(D +b 1 +b 2 K $1 + K2N) 01P /2P
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Then #2ai11N = O1a 2R 2N and we have
- N O1a2 +0$2al N - N 31a2 + 2al NL = or L = /2 
-
lia2 02al
Thus, we have
P(D + b1 + b2 < LN) =1! ( a1a2  LN. (5.8)p #1 a 2 + 02ai/
By the similar transformation of the first-order condition in the system optimal, we
have
P(D + bi + b2<*)=1-- a1a2  * (5.9)p (ai + a 2
As shown in Figure 5-1, the horizontal axis is the modified total capacity investment
level and the vertical axis is the cumulative distribution function of the demand. The
upward sloping curve (cumulative distribution function) represents the left hand sides
of (5.8) and (5.9), and the two downward sloping lines represent the right hand sides
of (5.8) and (5.9). Thus, LN and P can be solved graphically. We also observe that
L* B C a1+a2
LN - LN A -1a2+02a1
where the points C and A are the x-intercepts which can be evaluated from (5.8) and
(5.9). R
Lemma 5.4.3 shows that for a 2-player game with linear-quadratic costs, the ef-
fective modified capacity in a joint venture depends on both the cost asymmetry as
well as the revenue sharing ratio. However, the worst case, *= 2LN, can happen
under two circumstances: (1) equal revenue sharing (#1 = 02) and independent of cost
asymmetry, and/or (2) with symmetric players (ai = a2) and independent of revenue
sharing contracts (with the assumption that 31 < 0.5. Intuitively, dividing revenue
equally among asymmetric entities sounds like a bad idea. It is surprising to see that
having symmetric players in a joint venture could lead to the worst outcome, and
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having different revenue sharing contracts might not mitigate its impact. Note that
when #1 > 0.5, it is easy to construct examples that worst case becomes unbound.
Lemma 5.4.3 also highlights a notable difference between the homogeneous and
the heterogeneous resource pooling. Note that in Theorem 5.3.3 for the heterogeneous
resources, we have shown that the optimal revenue sharing rule suggests that every
player should be compensated proportionally to his share of the marginal cost to the
aggregate marginal cost. That if, if ai a2 , the optimal way to share revenue must
follow that #1 #2. Lemma 5.4.3 implies the exact opposite, i.e., in order to have
the worst case performance guarantee, given a1 > a2, then #1 < /32!
The intuition is that for heterogeneous resource pooling, the effective capacity of
the entire system is constrained by a bottleneck capacity due to certain key players.
To induce these players to produce at K*, they have to be awarded such that they
are willing to produce at K* but not lower. Now consider homogeneous resource
pooling, every player can contribute to the effective capacity, the only difference is
the cost. Therefore, one should encourage the cost efficient player to produce more
and discourage those with higher cost. It is captured by a lower revenue sharing ratio
for the player with higher marginal cost.
This observation on a 2-player game can be generalized to a n-player game as
shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4.4 Consider a n-player game with cost structure a1 > a2 - -- a,
and revenue sharing contract #1 _< #2 - - -O . Under any demand distribution D
and any linear-quadratic cost functions, the ratio of the total capacity investment level
in the system to that in the joint-venture is upper and lower bounded by
L N Zi=1~
IaN-L* -E - n
With n-players, the worst case in terms of the effective capacity is L* = , i.e.,
the worst case of a joint venture decreases as the number of participants increases. The
result is intuitive as with more parties involved, it becomes increasingly challenging to
coordinate the joint venture. Similar to the 2-player game studied earlier, the worst
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case occurs with symmetric players and/or equal sharing of the revenue when players
are asymmetric.
In the next theorem, we will show that the profit generated in a joint venture can
be bounded by the optimal profit.
Theorem 5.4.5 For a 2-player game with any linear-quadratic cost functions and
any demand distribution with mode m, we have
7rN (#3) 1
7r - 2) for all ai > a2 and #3 1 mp+1[2mp + (a1/a2 + 1)'
Moreover, the optimal #* that maximizes the total joint-venture profit falls in the
following interval,
#1*' E 1 mp+ 1
ai/a 2 + 1' 2mp + (ai/a2 + 1)I
Proof of Theorem 5.4.5. By Lemma 5.4.3, we know that
LN -_ 1 a2 + / 2al N N _31a2 +,32al Nor Lf K2ai
The Nash profit functions can be expressed as functions of LN i.e.,
(ala 202 + a2a /2 \2
7r(#p) = pE[min(LN -b 1  b2  a + a 2 ) 1 2  _ N 1 _ c2 -2) 1 - (~2 (a201 + a1#2 )2)-C2 (5.10)
If we impose a budget constraint L < LN on the system optimal, the budget-
constrained system optimal profit can also be expressed as functions of LN i.e.,
_ pE[min(LN - b1 - b2, D)] - 2 aia2 )
(2(a2 + ai))
LN2 - c 1 - C2,
Observe that g(L N) = 7r'(3) when #1 = 1. By Lemma 5.4.3, we know that for all
01 < }, L < 2. In addition, g(L) is concave in L by Lemma 5.4.1. Thus, we have
g ( 1 = 1)
g(IL*)
?grN (#1 = ( )
-2g(L*/2)
7r- (#1 = j)
-2g(LN)
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11
2
g(LN)
N (13 = j)
7r 2
1
2'
Now let D = D + bi + b2 . Since
IP(D L N)l 1 ( ala2 LN
p #1a2 + (1 - #1)ai )
dLN
d#1i
L N al-aa2 (al-a2)
p (1a2+(1--1)ai)2
p
aja2
81a2+(1-01)ai
We have by (5.10),
d7r (#1)
d#1
-(1 - P(T) < LN)L N ala2(al -a2)
ffD(LNv) + al (la 2 7~~N #1Oa2+(1 #1j)ai
a a 2(1 -2#1) N2  (12
(a201 + ai(1 - #1))3 (1a2 +
LN 2
(/312 + (1 - #1)ai)3
a2a2(1 - ol)2
(1 - #1)ai) 2 )
1 2 (a - a2)(al + a2 )1 -
p(#3a2 + (1 - #1)al)fb(LN) +
LN N
d#1
01)+a2a2
+ a2a1(1
ala 2
If the mode of D is m, then 7r (#1) is decreasing in #1 for all
C mp + a2
[2mp + ai + a 2 2
and 7ry(#1) is increasing in #1 for all
-0'ai + a2l
Thus, the optimal 0* lies in the following interval
X (E a 2  mp + a 2
ai + a 2 2mp + ai + a2
This completes the proof. D
In Theorem 5.4.5, we propose an interval for which the aggregate Nash profit is
guaranteed to achieve at least half of the optimal profit. The interval depends on
the cost asymmetry between the two players and the mode of demand. In particular,
the interval shrinks as the two players have more similar cost structure, i.e., with two
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-2201)).
fully symmetric players, the best revenue sharing ratio asks for an equal division of
the revenue. On the other hand, the interval widens as the mode of demand increases,
i.e., if the demand distribution is flatter, our proposed revenue sharing contracts have
more rooms for error in capturing the peak demand.
For a n-player game, we show that an equal revenue sharing scheme could guar-
antee a worst case performance of at least 1/n of the optimal profit as shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5.4.6 For a n-player game with any linear-quadratic cost functions and
any demand distribution, if we choose #j = 1/n, i.e., dividing the aggregate revenue
equally among all the players, we have
7rN (3) 1
7* -n
Proof of Proposition 5.4.6. From a 2-player setting, one can see that the profit
functions can be expressed as functions of L,
7rT(L) = pE[min(L + bi + b2 ,D)] - a1 ) -- ci - c 2.(2(a2 + ai))f
Note that it is equivalent to 7r(# 1 , #2) when #1 = 02 = 0.5, where
Nir.N1(aja 2 32 + a 23 2
7N (0) = pE[min(LN + bl +b 2,D)] - i + 12 L N2 - c1 - C2-2(a2#1 + a1#2)2)
In Lemma 5.4.1, we have shown the concavity of 7rT(L). Then by making use of the
bound on investment level as shown in Proposition 5.4.4, we obtain the desired result.
5.4.2 n-player game with general convex costs
We consider n-player games with asymmetric convex cost functions. Denote f =
(fi(Ki)) 1 as general convex cost functions. Let irN(f) and 7*(f) be the Nash and
system profit of n players with respect to the general cost f, respectively. Define the
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Price of Anarchy with respect to f as
7N (f)
POA(f)= N
7r*(f)
We first show that POA(f) can be lower bounded by POA(f) where f is a set of
modified linear cost functions.
Proposition 5.4.7 The price of anarchy on the total profit of a joint venture is lower
bounded by
POA(f) N Nf =POA(f),
7r*(f)
where f = (f1, fn) are linear cost functions such that fi = ai - Ki where a =
f!(Kf).
Proof of Proposition 5.4.7. By convexity of fi for all i - 1,. n, we know that
f (Kz*) > f. (KN) + fz'(KN)(Ki - KN
Therefore
POA(f) pE[min(LN, D)] - Z" f=(Kf)
pE[min(L*, D)] - =1 fi(K,)
pE[min(LN, D)] - En f (K)
pE[min(L*, D)] - Z_'" (fi(Kf) + fi(Kf)(Ki - K ))
(5.11)
Since
0 = fi(0) > f (Kf) + fj(K )(-K) => fi(Kf) - fi(Kfl (K) < 0
we add (5.12) onto both the numerator and denominator of (5.11),
POA(f)
(5.12)
pE[min(LN, D)] + E" (-fi(Kf) + fi(Kf)
pE[min(L*, D)] + E" =(-fj(Kf) - fl(Kf)(Ki - K )
- fj(Kf)(Kf))
+ f,(Kf) - f;(i
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r fl(Kfl)
pE[min(LN, D)] - E' f(K[)(Kf)
- pE[min(L*, D)] - E fi(Kf)(Ki*)
Now let kfj" and kR be the Nash Equilibrium solution and the system optimal solution
with respect to the same problem but with the modified linear cost functions such that
i= a-Ki where ai = fj'(Kf). Correspondingly, 1LN - Z k and I* = =1 kl.
Since kj = K (having the same set of first-order conditions), we have
n n
pE[min(LN, D)] - 1 f!(Kf )(K ) = pE[min(LN, D)] - aik.
i=1 i=1
Because Rf is the optimal capacity investment level for the modified problem, it
implies that
n
pE~min(L*,I D)] - E~ fz(KV)(KZ*) < pIE [min(.L, D)] - aiki.
Thus, we have
POA(f) > pE[min(LN,D)] - E'" aik
pE[min(L*, D)] - EI aiKi ~
This completes the proof.
7rN(f) 
= POA(f).
7r*(f)
F
By making use of Proposition 5.4.7, we can obtain a lower bound on the profit by
using the cost asymmetry factor and the ratio between the investment levels in the
Nash and the system optimum.
Lemma 5.4.8 Price of anarchy on the total profit of a joint venture is lowered
bounded by
POA(f)= 7rN(f)
7r* (f)
1N
> a
-L*
where the cost asymmetry factor is given by
mini a
a = <1.
maxi a
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F(x))
1
am/P
0 x
Figure 5-2: A graphical proof for Lemma 5.4.8.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.8. Assume that, without loss of generality, am = ai a2 <
... K a,, am. Define the set P = { aj = am}. If |PJ = s, s symmetric players
invest in the system optimal solution and therefore L* = sk* for i E P.
LN - ~
POA(f) = fLNo F (d - i 1 aska
S F(x)dx + f LN FD(x)dx - amLN
1N LN 1 a
>N 1 N * =
_ 
Z= aiLN E= i - L N)k- amL*
_ a (LN _ kN)
iZ=1 aiL* - cxmL*
am(n - )LN >LN
aM(n - 1)L* I*
where the cost asymmetry factor d = am/am < 1. This completes the proof. F
Note that equal revenue sharing induces equal marginal costs for every player in a
Nash equilibrium, since #i = ai/ En a. Therefore, & = 1, and the comparison
between the profit can be reduced to a comparison between the total investment
level, i.e, >'
Next, we will present the how the profit in a joint venture can be bounded from
below by the system optimum. Define the demand spread
~ m max fD(x)
OM min fD(y)
where x < LN y <
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Theorem 5.4.9
POA(f) ;> d ~,
1 - nf + (n- 1)6
where f = maxi ak/p, and N> 1 measures the demand spread.
F(x)
1
0
1- a m / p
x
Figure 5-3: A graphical proof for Theorem 5.4.9.
Proof of Theorem 5.4.9. First we lower bound the ratio of LN to L*.
LN
I*
LN
LN + (E 1 ai - am)/(6Omp)
(1- E a/p)/M
.(1 - E l /p)/OM + (Z. 1 ai - am)/(Omp)
p E-n_ ai + (E_ n ai - am)N
p - naM
p - naM + (n - 1)aMO
1 - nr
1 - nf + (n - 1)f5'
where = aM/p. This result then follows from Lemme 5.4.8. l
Note that when D is uniform, the demand spread 0= 1, we have
1 -n
POA(f) ;> 
_
Figure 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6 show the lower bounds on POA with uniform demand,
normal demand N(400, 100) and exponential demand exp(400), respectively. The
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lower bound on POA decreases as the number of players increases or the marginal
cost to price ratio increases. We also observe that the lower bound on POA has a
steeper rate of decrease when the demand spead is higher. Note that in our simulation,
the exponential demand has the highest demand spread (0 = 7.35), followed by the
normal demand (= 3.86) and then the uniform demand (0= 1).
Lower Bound on POA
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Figure 5-4: Lower bound on price of anarchy for uniform demand.
5.5 Conclusion
In this work, we study resource pooling and capacity planning in joint ventures under
uncertainties. We distinguish two types of resources pooling, based on whether the
resources are heterogeneous or homogeneous. When resources are heterogeneous, the
effective capacity in a joint venture is constrained by the lowest level of contribution
from one participant. We have shown that every participant is committed to make
an equal contribution in a joint venture with heterogeneous resources. We have also
shown that, there exists a same efficient and fair revenue sharing scheme in both
Nash equilibrium and Nash Bargaining solution. The optimal scheme rewards every
participant proportionally to his marginal cost. When resources are homogeneous,
however, there does not exist a revenue sharing scheme which induces actions to
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Lower Bound on POA
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Figure 5-5: Lower bound on price of anarchy for normal demand.
achieve the optimum. Nonetheless, we propose some methods to share revenue with
the worst case performance guarantee. The methods suggest that the reward should
be inversely proportional to the marginal cost of each participant with homogeneous
resources.
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Lower Bound on POA
0.9
0.8-
0.7-
0.6-
O 0.5-
n =2
0.4-
0.3 n 3
n =4
0.2-
0.1
00 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
marginal cost to price ratio (r)
Figure 5-6: Lower bound on price of anarchy for exponential demand.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Inefficiency caused by decentralization has been the subject of extensive research in
operations management in recent years. In this thesis, we studied its impact on supply
chains, congested systems and joint ventures.
The study on supply chains has revealed that when downstream retailers compete
with substitutes, product substitutability promotes output levels, channel profit and
social welfare. Although asymmetry deteriorates the performance, a decentralized
supply chain with substitutes is fairly efficient. The opposite happens for comple-
ments. Although asymmetry has some countervailing effect, a decentralized chain
with complements exhibits a significant loss of efficiency, which suggests that large
potential gains could be achieved through coordination. In addition, a decentralized
supply chain is relatively more efficient compared to its optimal counterpart when
the demand is concave rather than convex.
An important take-away from our analysis is that for substitutes, price-only con-
tracts are often "good enough" in the sense that there is limited room for potential
gains from implementing other more complex contracts. In addition, as price-only
contracts disproportionately favor the supplier, she has less incentive to adopt other
contracts. The results provide some partial intuition that may help explain the pop-
ularity of price-only contracts in practice. Nevertheless, our results suggest that com-
plex coordinating contracts should be applied to decentralized supply chains with
complementary products as the loss due to lack of coordination could be huge. One
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could also argue that in this case, both channel members have an incentive to coor-
dinate as they both could benefit from a profit increase.
The analysis on congested systems with profit-driven service providers shows that
the impact of decentralization primarily depends on the nature of costs. When the
costs are fully self-contained, maximum welfare loss is limited to 25% of the social
optimum, even in the presence of highly nonlinear convex cost. The inefficiency
decreases further with competition among the service providers. However, with the
spillover cost, the potential welfare loss could be arbitrarily severe. The results provide
some evidences on the usefulness of airport congestion pricing as potential gains from
coordination could be huge.
The last topic in this thesis focuses on capacity planning and resource pooling in
joint ventures under demand uncertainties. We have shown that the performance of a
joint venture heavily depends on the nature of resources. In particular, when resources
are heterogenous or not fully substitutable, the effective capacity in a joint venture
is constrained by the lowest level of contribution from one participant. The optimal
revenue sharing scheme rewards every participant proportionally to his marginal cost.
When resources are homogeneous, however, there does not exist a revenue sharing
scheme which induces actions to achieve the optimum. Nonetheless, we propose some
methods to share revenue with the worst case performance guarantee. The methods
suggest that the reward should be inversely proportional to the marginal cost of each
participant with homogeneous resources.
The methodology that we utilize is a departure from traditional approaches and
thus gives rise to new and interesting theoretical and computational challenges. To
establish the analytical bounds in this thesis, we have utilized tools from matrix
analysis such as Cassini ovals of eigenvalues, M-matrix and copositivity (Horn and
Johnson 1985). We believe the methodology proposed in this thesis could potentially
be used in other problems.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Useful Matrix Analysis Results
Proofs in the paper utilize a number of results from matrix analysis. For complete-
ness, we state them in the following lemmas (see Horn and Johnson 1985 for more
information) 
.
A.1.1 M-matrices
A square matrix whose off-diagonal elements are nonpositive is called a Z-matrix. A
symmetric Z-matrix is a M-matrix if and only if it is positive definite. M-matrices
enjoy several structural properties some of which are listed below.
Let A be an M-matrix and B be a Z-matrix such that A < B:
" A 1 exists and A 1 > 0;
* B is an M-matrix and B 1 < A-1 ;
" AB- 1 and B- 1A are M-matrices;
* Any sum of M-matrices is still an M-matrix;
" Any principle submatrix of A is an M-matrix.
" If D is a positive diagonal matrix, then DA and AD are M-matrices.
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A.1.2 Inverse binomial theorem
If A, U, B, V are matrices with appropriate dimensions, then(A + UBV) 1 =
A-' - A-'UB (B + BVA-'UB) 1 BVA-1, provided A and B + BVA 1 UB are
nonsingular.
Lemma A.1.1 (Inverse of M-matrices) If A and B are M-matrices and B > A,
then B- 1 < A- 1 .
Lemma A.1.2 (Brauer's Ovals Theorem) Let A be a square matrix, Ri(A)
aj I, for 1 i < n. Cassini ovals are defined as, Oi= {lz - aiiI|z - ajj I
Ri (A)Rj(A)} for all i # j. Then, all the eigenvalues of A lie inside the union of the
Cassini ovals, i.e., A(A) E Uj jOjj.
A.2 Preliminary Results: Bounds on the Mini-
mum Eigenvalue
Lemma A.2.1 The minimum eigenvalue of matrix G = -1/ 2Br- 1/2 is bounded by
Amin(G) > 1 - r( 2)(B) > 1 - r(l)(B).
Proof of Lemma A.2.1. The matrix G and T--1BT are similar matrices, thus,
Amin(G) = Amin(LT BT). Notice Ri(T-BT) =i= ri(B). By Brauer's
theorem (Lemma A.1.2), we can write down the following:
(1 - Amin(FT BT)) 2 < max r (B)rj(B)
- Amin(FlBT) > 1 - r(2).(B)
Since r(2)(B) < r(1)(B), it completes the proof. R
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A.3 Proof for the Results in the Paper
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1 eTqd/eTqc
Upper bound
Let X be a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements such that Xe = pc - c.
e Tq _ e TB(B+ )-'TXe
eTqc eTBXe
wT(B)- 1/2B(B + F) 1 FX(B)-1/ 2w
wTw , where w = (B) 1/ 2e
< Amax ((B)- 1 / 2 B(B + r)-'TX(B)-1/2)
= Amax ((B + )'F)
Amin (L-1 (B + IF))
1
1 + Amin(T- 1B)
( By similar matrices)
Because the bound is decreasing in Amin(-'B), we can upper bound it by lower
bound the eigenvalue. By Lemma A.2.1, it implies
eT qc
eTqc
1
- 2< 2- r(2)(B) - 2 - r (1)(B)*
Lower bound
To prove the lower bound that eTgq is always larger than 1/2, we are trying to provee q,
e Tqd eTB(B + F)-lFXe> 1
eTqc eTBXe - 2
4 2eTB(B + P)-'FXe - eTBXe > 0
+ (qa)T (2B 1'(B + F)-X-1 - B-'(B + F)T~1 X-1 BF-1 (B + F)B- 1 ) qd 2 0,
D(B)
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1
that is, it is equivalent to prove <b(B) is nonnegative. To see this, rewrite <b(B) as
follows,
= B-(B+ F)FX (21 - BF- 1(B + F)B')
= (F- 1 + B- 1 )X~1 (21 - (MF-' + I))
= (F-' + B- 1)X 1 (F - B- 1) F-1
<b(B) is clearly nonnegative because it is a product of four positive/nonngative ma-
trices. 0
A.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1 CSd/CSc and TSd/TSc
Preliminary work
Given the demand function in terms of prices as q(p) = q(O) Bp, its corresponding
demand function in quantities is given by p(q) = p - B'q, where p = B'p(O).
Consumer surplus (CS) is the difference between the utility which a representative
consumer derives from consuming q units of products (U(q) = PTq - jqTBlq) and
the cost he spends on acquiring them (qTp).
CS - U(q) - pTq(p) = Iq(p)TB-q(p). (A.1)
The total surplus (TS) is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus
which is the channel profit in the model.
TS = PS(p) + CS(p) = (p(q) - c)T q(p) + Bq(p)TBlq(p).
2
Upper bound
From Equation (A.1), the ratio between the consumer surplus is given by
CSd 1/2(qa)TB-lqd
C, 1/2(qc )TB-lqc
(A.2)
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wTB-1/ 2 F(B + F)-'B(B + F)-'FB-1 /2 w
wTW
, where w = B /2(pc - c)
<Amax ((B 1 / 2 (B + F)lrB-1/ 2)T (Bi/ 2 (B +)-'TB-1/2))
- Amx(Bi/ 2(B + r)"TB/
SAax((B + ) F')
1
A2min (F- (B + r))
1
(1 + Amin( -B))2
(By similar matrices)
. Now consider the total surplus defined in Equation (A.2),
TSd (Pc - c)T (4B + 3F)(B + F)- 1 B(B + r)'T(pc - c)
TSc (Pc - c)T3B(pc - c)
Denote w = B 1/ 2 (pc - c), then the expression becomes
A
TSd
TSc
1 wT B-1/ 2 (4B + 3F)(B + F)-'B(B + T)-'TB-1/2'W
3
1
< 1Amax(A)
-3
wTw
= Amax ((4B + 3T)(B + F)-1 (B + F)~1F)3
1
= Amax ((41 - F(B + F)-1 )(B + F)- 1 F)
= Amax (4(F'B + I)-1 -
3 (F-
1B + I)-2).
The function 4/x + 1/x 2 decrease in x, thus the maximum eigenvalue of matrix A is
obtained at the minimum eigenvalue of matrix F- 1B + I.
TSd < 1 4
TSc - 3 11 + Amin(F-1B)
1
(1 + Amin(T -1B))2
_ 4Amin(FL'B) + 3
3(1 + Amin(r-1B))2
The ratio is decreasing in Amin(- 1B), thus, we can upper bound the ratio by using
Lemma A.2.1 to obtain the desired upper bound for CS and TS.
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Lower bound
To prove the lower bound, i.e., Csd > , it is equivalent to prove the following,
q TB-lqd 1
qTB-lqc - 4
e 4qdB--lqd - q B 1 qc 2 0
q (4B- 1 - B 1 (B + F)F-1 B- 1 (B + F)B-1 ) qd 0
<b(B)
To prove that matrix <b(B) is nonnegative, notice that
<D(B) = 4B- - (B- 1 + 1X)B(B- 1 + r-1)
= 4B' - (-' 1BT-1 + 2F-1 + B 1 )
= 3B- 1 - 2r-1 - r-'BI-
= (3B-1 + F- 1)(I - BT- 1).
<D(B) is the product of two nonnegative matrices, thus, it is also nonnegative.
To prove the lower bound that Tsd > 7 , it is equivalent to prove 4(B) = B-(B+
r)r - 1 (4(4B + 3r)(B + F) 1 - 7BF -(B + F)B 1 ) is nonnegative.
(qa)T<D(B)q > 0
-- (Pc - c)T (4(4B + 3F)(B + r)- - 7BF-1 (B + P)B- 1 ) B(B + F)-TF(pc - c) 0
- (Pc - c)T (4(4B + 3P)(B + F)'B(B + <TIT - 7B) (Pc - c) > 0
(Pc - c)T(4B + 3r)(B + F)-B(B + F)-i(pc - c) >7
(pc - c)T (3B) (Pc - c) 12
TSd> 7
TSe 12
Similarly, we express <D(B) as rT1/2<1(G)Fi/ 2 and prove <D(G) is copositive.
<((G) = G-1 (G + I)(4(4G + 31)(G +I) - 7(G + I))
= 4G 1 (4G + 31) - 7G-1 (G + 1)2
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= 161 + 12G 1 - 7(G + 21 + G- 1)
= 21 - 7G + 5G 1
= (I - G)(5G- 1 + 71)
<D(G) is a product of nonnegative matrices and that has established the bound. 0
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Given the setting, r( 2)(B) = n-= J/vk. By Theorem 2.3.1, rd/7c(B) < +2 /
where the uppe bound decreases in k, i.e., when the asymmetry factor k > 1,
ra/rc(B) +/ < 3 /k)2 (2+)2 = 7rd/7rclk=1. The last equality holds as the bounds are
tight for symmetric retailers where k = 1. 0
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
We first derive the profits earned by the retailers (7d)R and the supplier (7rd)s respec-
tively. For complements,
n
(7rd)R = (7d) ri
i=1
= (pd - w)Tq
- ((B + F)-1(2B + F)(pc - c) + 2c - (pc + C)) qd
= ((B + F)- 1(2B + F)(pc - c) - (Pc - ) T q
= ((B + F)~1 ((2B + F) - I)(pc - c))T g
= ((B + P)-1 B(pc - c))T qd
= (Pc - C)TB(B + F)-1 B(B + F)<'(pc - c)
(rd)s = (wd - c)Tqd
1
- (Pc - c)TB(B + F)-IF(pc - c)
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Let w = B1/2(B + F) 1F(pc - c), then we obtain
(7rd)
(7d) s
wT B-1/2 (B + r)F- 1 B(B + F)"Bi/2W
wTB-1/ 2 (B + F)F 1 (B + F)(B + F)- 1 B1 / 2w
The lower bound is obtained by noticing
Q
S wT AGA-lw where A = B-1/2
wTA(G + I)A- 1 w'
zT z where Z Qi/2w
ZT (I + Q- 1) w'
1
Amax (I + Q- 1)
1
1+ ()Xi Q)
Amin(Q)
Amin(Q) + 1
Amin (G),
Amin(G) + 1
(B + F) and G = -B
The bound is increasing in Amax(G), thus, it is can be lower bounded by lower
bounding Amin(G) by using Lemma A.2.1, we obtain the two lower bounds, i.e.,
1 - r( 2)(B)
2 - r(2)(B)
1 - r(i)(B)
- 2-r( 1 )(B)
To prove the upper bound that (d)R < , it is equivalent to prove that matrix(7rd) S - 2'
<D(B) is copositive, where <k(B) = B- 1(B + F)L- 1 (I - 2B(B + IF)). To see this, by
definition of copositivity,
(q)Tb(B)q > 0
- c)) T <D(B) (B(B + L)-'F(pc - c)) > 0
(Pc - C)T B(B + F)-L'(pc - c) > (Pc - c)T2B(B + F)- B(B + F)- F(pc - c)
(Pc - c)TB(B + F)- 1B(B + F)- 1 F(pc - c) 1
(pC - )TB(B+ FV)-F(pc - c) - 2
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(7rd)R
(7rd)s
since Amin(Q) = Amin(AGA 1 ) = Amin(G)
(rd)
(rd)s
== (BB + r) Fr(pc
(7d)R 1
(7d)s 2
<b(B) = (B- 1 + 1 )(I - 2B(B + F)-)
= (B-1 + -1)( - B)(B + )-1
= (I - F- 1B + B-IT - I)(B + r)~ 1
= (I - F-1 BI- 1 B)B-lT(B + r)-
= (I - -17B)(I + r- 1B)B-iT(B + r) 1
= (I - F-1 B)(B-iT + I)(B + )-1
=(r - B)(B-1 + T-1)(B + r)-I
We have shown that <D(B) is a nonnegative matrix by expressing it as a product of
three nonnegative matrices, thus, the upper bound of - holds for substitutes. El2
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2.9
Proof. For every access fee per service, t = (ti, ..., t,), the corresponding output
level in a subgame perfect equilibrium, qSPE (t), must satisfy the following profit-
maximizing condition for every service provider i for all i, pi - tj - E 3i q7PE (tj)
3iiqSPE(ti) - Oci(q)/0qi q qSPE(t) = 0.
The total social welfare is given by
W(q)CS(q) + PS(q) + TR(q) = jqj(Pj - Y 3qj) - Eci(q).
One way to find out the optimal congestion pricing is to substitute qSPE(t) into the
profit-maximizing condition, i.e., W(qSPE(t)), and maximize it with respect to t.
Alternatively, we can first determine the optimal service level, q*, that should be
maintained in this facility so as to maximize the total welfare. The optimal service
level, q*, must satisfy, pi - E ojqj - ac (q)/8qj = 0|q=g.. By comparing it with
equilibrium condition, we obtain the desired result on the access fee as a function of
output level q and satisfies qSPE(t*) _q*
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3.1.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.1. The welfare objective is given by
1
W(q) = qT (P - Bq - 1(q)).
2
The optimality condition can be written as VW(q) = p - Bq - 1(q) - Rq = 0,
where matrix R denotes the Jacobian matrix of function 1(q). It is important to note
that the matrix R depends on the output level q. Since VW(q*) = 0, we get
p - l(q*) = (B + R*)q*, or (B.1)
(B.2)q* = (B + R*)-l(p - 1(q*)).
Substitute Equation (B.2) into the welfare objective, we obtain the following:
W(q*) = (q*)T P - 1(q*) - IB(B + R*)-l(p - I(q*))
= (q*)T(-B + R*)(B + R*)-(p 
- 1(q*))
2
1
= (q*)T(-B + R*)q*.
2
The profit function of service provider i is given by 7ri = qi(pi - EZ #ijqj - li(q)).
The equilibrium condition for all service providers can be written in the matrix form:
p - Bq - 1(q) - FBq - FRq, where FB and FR represent the diagonal matrix of B
and R respectively. Since qN satisfies the equilibrium condition, we obtain
N) = (B +q B or
qN = (B + FB + CN)-1(p - 1(qN)).
(B.3)
(B.4)
Substituting Equation (B.4) into the welfare objective gives rise to the welfare achieved
in the unregulated setting:
W(qN) (q N)T _ (qN) 1 B(B + LB + ]CN)- _ (qN))
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= (qN )T( B+B +2 R)(B+ rB + - N
Proof of Lemma 4.3.2. By convexity on cost function 1(q) = (11(q), - - - , 1,(q))
(Assumption 4.2.2),
1(q*) - l(qN) > RN (q* - N)
1(q*) - RN q* N (q ) - RN qN
S-1(q*) + RN q* < -(qN) + RN qN.
Adding a positive vector p to both sides maintains the inequality, i.e,
p -1(q*)+ RN q* <p-1(qN)+RNq N.
After substituting the optimality conditions derived Equation (B.1) and (B.3), we
obtain the desired result: (B + rB + FN + RN )qN > (B + R* + RN)q* 11
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4.3.5
Proof. By Assumption 4.2.2, function 1(q) = (li(q),... , 1,(q)) is convex componen-
twise with q.
l(qN) - 1(q*) > R*(qN - q*)
I 1(qN) - R*qN > 1(q*) - R*q*
= -l(qN) + R*qN < -l(q*) + R*q*
p - I(qN) + R*qN < p - 1(q*) + R*q*.
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= (qN)T(I B+ 1 'B + 9N)qN
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3.2
After substituting the optimality conditions from Equation (B.1) and (B.3), we obtain
the desired result. 0
B.5 Lemma B.5.1 and its proof
Lemma B.5.1 The optimal societal welfare is bounded by the following,
W (q*) < -(q N T (B + TB + RN) (B + 2R N -1(B + TB2
Proof of Lemma B.5.1. Denote Q = B + FB + IN + RN andE= B + R* + RN.
By Lemma 4.3.2, we know that QqN > Eq*. Note that both QqN and Eq* are two
nonnegative vectors. By Lemma 4.3.1,
(q*) = (q*) I -1 B + R*)E-'Eq* < (qN T -(B + R*)E- q2 -2
where we have replaced Eq* by QqN. Expand this expression further,
W(q*)
<(qN)TQE-1(B + 2R*)E-lqN
2
= (qN)T T(B + 2RN -0.5 (B + 2R N)0.5E-1 (B + 2R*)E -1(B + 2RN)0.5
(B + 2RN)-0.5 qN.
By the definition of the maximum eigenvalue, this expression is upper bounded by,
W(q*) -AmaxfA}(qN)TG(B + 2RN)-lfqN
2
(B.5)
Now let us focus on this composite matrix A. By the property of similar matrices,
Amax{A} = Amax{E2 1(B + 2R*)E-l(B + 2RN)}. Under the Assumptions 4.2.1 and
4.2.2, it is clear that matrix Amax{A} > 0 since A is positive semi-definite. Expand
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+ N+ RN N
this matrix,
Amax{A}
=Amax{(B + R* + RN)-1(B + 2R*)(B + R* + RN)-1(B + 2RN)}
=Amax{(I + (B + R* + RN-1(R* - RN)) (I + (B + R* + RN)-1(RN - R*))
=Amax{I - ((B + R* + RN)-1(R* - RN)) 2
=1 - Amin{((B + R* + RN-1(R* - RN)) 2.
It is clear that Amin{ ((B + R* + RN)-1 (R* - RN)) 2 > 0 because it is also a positive
semidefinite matrix. As a result, Amax{A} 1. From Equation (B.5), W(q*) <
1(qN)TO(B + 2RN)-1gqN.
B.6 Lemma B.6.1 and its proof
Lemma B.6.1 W(q) (I - Amin{((I - E)(G + I + )1))2}), where K > 1 is the
Jacobian similarity factor, G = ]p0.5 (B + 2F &)F-- 5 and = 60.5R r-0.5
Proof of Lemma B.6.1. From Lemma 4.3.1, we obtain that
_ N)T( + 1 'B + Jj)qN
_ (qN)TIF 
-11( B +2
where T = B + FB + TN + R*. Making use of Lemma 4.3.5 which shows that
xWqN < (B + 2R*)q*, it follows that
W(qN)
<(q*)T(B + 2R*)(B + rB + r N + RN)- 1 ( 1 B + FB + F)(B + B +R ~2 rR(+B N + RN)-1
(B + 2R*)q*
:s(q* )T (B + 2R*)(B + TB + F* + R*)-( IB + rB + Fh)(B + rB + F* + R*)-1
(B + 2R*)q*,
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W(qN) + TpW4'q N
where we obtain the last inequality by using the Jacobian similarity property that
we discussed for matrix F(q) = pN and t > 1. In particular, an upper bound on ,
is given as follows, based on the definition of the maximum eigenvalue of a positive
semidefinite matrix,
<Amax{(B + TB + I + RN)-2(B + rB + T + R*)2 (B + rB + FN)
(-B + rB + IF*~}. (B.6)
Combine this result with W(q*) shown in Lemma 4.3.1, we obtain an upper bound
W(qN) (q*)T (B + 2R*)(IB + rB + RF)(B + 2R*)q*
W(q*) ~ (q*)T(B + FB + FR + R*)(IB + R*)(B + rB + FT + R*)q*
As all quantities are in the social optimum setting, we will skip the superscript on
Denoe G= ]- 0 .5 ( +2r-P 0 .5 and = '- 0 5 R 0 .5 th
matrices. Denote G = (B + 2FR) B and S = RofrF' the expression
becomes
W(qN) (q*)TF0 5 (G + 2I)LOB5 q*
W(q*) - (q*)TFr 5 (G + I + E)(G + 2-")(G + I + E)f~ 5 q**
Using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, the upper bound can be simplified as the follows.
We skip some derivations as they follow exactly the same steps in the proof for
Theorem 4.3.4.
W(q Ama(G + 21)(G +1 + ) 1 (G + 26)(G + I + 6)-}
W(q*)-
< i(1 - Amin{((I - E)(G + I + )-))2)
0
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B.7 Proof for Proposition 4.5.1
B.7.1 Preliminary result: two indices for the post-merged
(multiple-product) setting
In the pre-merger setting where each service provider only provides a single service,
the competition index adjusted with internalized congestion effect can be written as
follows, rpre - e . . .,) = |B (Bof + 2PR)1, where 1.1i is the L1 norm (the
row sum of absolute values of the elements in a matrix). The external-cost-to-benefit
ratio can also be written in a compact form, i.e., pPre - ('e,... gre) = B lRof|1.
When the firms merge, the merged firm needs to make decisions on the service
011 -. - - r1
level for all m types of services. Matrix BM =. ; C Rmxm represents
Lmi ... Omm_
the merged firm's price change of all m products with respect to a unit change in the
quantity of these products. Let FBP"'t assembles each firm's own quantity sensitivity
coefficients into a block diagonal matrix and BOffP"' - B - FBP"' represents each
firms's price change with respect to his competitors' output change. Similarly, as
the merged firm determines his service level, he also takes into the congestion effect
experienced by all m types of services. We define FRP"'t and ROffPost in a similar way.
BM RM
1
'B p /m+1,m+1 , FRpost m+1,m+1 , where
L/gnn JLinnJ
ii . .. 1m
RM =.
[m1 -. -1 mmJ
Thus, the competition index for each service in the post-merger setting can be writ-
ten as rooSt _ (r ost, ... I no) = I(Bpos t ' -(BoffPOSt + 2FR1pos) Similarly, the
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post-merger external-cost-to-benefit ratio is defined as EPost - ( 0Most, . .. ") -
(PBPOS) lRoffPostr
B.7.2 Proof for Proposition 4.5.1
We use one property of block diagonal matrices to prove this result: An inverse of
a block diagonal matrix is still a block diagonal matrix. In particular, (FBpOst) 1
Bm-1
1/#m+1,m+1 
, where Bm- 1 =f-- 
_ (I- H) E Rmxm, where
1/#nn
I is an identity matrix and H is a matrix of all Is. Given the definitions for rPost and
plost, it is straightforward to show the desired results. E
B.8 Proof for Proposition 4.5.2
Firstly, we observe that for a market with n types of services, the optimal total
welfare, W*, remains the same before or after the merger as W* is the outcome
when a central planner jointly determines the service level for all types of services,
irrespective of who owns them. With symmetric service providers and self-contained
congestion effect, the lower bound on efficiency loss in Theorem 4.3.7 is tight, i.e.,
1 - WPre/W* = 1/(2 + rPre)2 , where rpre = (n - 1 + 2l)/#. After the merger, the
service providers are no longer "symmetric" due to the differences in their sizes. Thus,
Theorem 4.3.7 serves as a lower bound to the quantity 1 - WPost/W*. By Proposition
4.5.1, r' < rP'e for all i. Thus, 1 - WPost/W* > 1/(2 + rPre) 2 , which leads to the
conclusion that WPost < Wpre. 0
B.9 Proof for Proposition 4.5.3
The bound on 1- WN/W* < (P-1)2 is tight for symmetric service providers as shown
in Theorem ?? when p > 1. After the merger, pPos' decreases, indicating a welfare
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improvement. When p > 1, the bound depends on both p and r. For a given pPost,
one could construct examples by varying rPoSt to have WPost which could be higher
or lower than the pre-merger value. L
B.10 Proof for Proposition 4.6.1 and Proposition
4.6.2
With the utilization rate #, the societal welfare W(q, #) is given by
W(q, #) = CS(q, #) + PS(q, #) + #TR(q, #)
- qT(p - I - B/2q - Rq) + (# - 1)qTt
- qT(jp - T - B/2q - Rq) + (# - 1)qT( -I- (B + R + FB + FR)q)
We can then show that the optimal service level, q*(#) is given by
q*(#) = ((2 - 1/#)B + 2R + 2(1 - 1/#)(FB + R))' -( )
which decreases in #. Since the optimal congestion pricing is given by t* = p - I -
(B + R + TB - FR)q*, it follows that t* increases with #. Moreover, the optimal
societal welfare is given by
W*(#) = W(q*, #) = 1/2(p - I)T ((2 - 1/#)B + 2R + 2(1 - 1/#)(FB + FR)> 1 (P
which also increases in #. O
B.11 Proof for Proposition 4.6.3
When we redistribute the revenue collected from congestion pricing as suggested,
producer surplus for service provider i becomes PS = PS* + aiTR* = PS* +
ZPS.s; TR* = @PSN. Similarly, we can show that CS2 = V)CSN. Since V) =
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W*/WN > 1, both the service providers and the users are better off than their
counterparts in the unregulated setting after the revenue is redistributed. O
B.12 Proof for Proposition 4.6.4
Consider a new marginal utility function fi(q) = 64 - E' #ijqj, where O represents
a representative user's maximum willingness to pay for service i. Under this demand
function, producer surplus of service provider i in the unregulated setting is given by
PSj = qi(6i - i - E±(ij + lij)q,). The goal is to have PS = PSj, i.e., the value
which service provider i receives in an unregulated setting equals to target surplus
level. In the unregulated setting, the equilibrium service level with the new demand
function satisfies E4N = (B + R + FB + FR)-(E -i). There exists a 02 which satisfies
Ps = 4N (6 - 1I - EZ (Oi, + lij))4j), or equivalently, PS = (64 - li) E Mig(O - lj),
where M= (B+R+rB + rR>'(FB + R)(B + R±+ B + R> -
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 5
C.1 Nash Bargaining Game
A n-person Nash Bargaining game consists of a pair (K, w), where K C R' is a
compact and convex set and w E K. Set K is the feasible set and its elements give
utilities that the n players can simultaneously accrue. Point W is the disagreement
point - it gives the utilities that the n players obtain if they decide not to cooperate.
Game (K, w) is said to be feasible if there is a point v E K such that vi > wi and
v2 > w2 . The solution to a feasible game is the point that satisfies the following four
axioms,
1. Pareto optimality: No point in K can weakly dominate v.
2. Invariance under affine transformation of utilities
3. Symmetry: The numbering of the players should not affect the solution.
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If v is the solution for (K, w), and
S C RS is a compact and convex set satisfying w E S and v E S C K, then v
is also the solution for (S, w).
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) If game (K, w) is feasible then there is a
unique point in K satisfying the axioms stated above. This is also the unique point
that maximizes R~> (vi - wi) over all v E K.
167
168
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., A. Ozdaglar. 2007. Competition and efficiency in congested markets. Math-
ematics of Operations Research 32(1) 1-31.
Adida, E., V. DeMiguel. 2010. Supply chain competition with multiple manufacturers and
retailers. Forthcoming in Operations Research .
Allon, G., A. Federgruen. 2007. Competition in service industries. Operations Research 55
37-55.
Allon, G., A. Federgruen. 2008. Service competition with general queueing facilities. Oper-
ations Research 56 827-849.
Angelus, A., E. L. Porteus. 2002. Simultaneous capacity and production management of
short-life-cycle, produce-to-stock goods under stochastic demand. Management Science
48(3) pp. 399-413.
Arora, A., A. Gambardella. 1990. Complementarity and external linkages: The strategies of
the large firms in biotechnology. The Journal of Industrial Economics 38(4) 361-379.
Bassok, Y., R. Anupindi, R. Akella. 1999. Single-period multiproduct inventory models
with substitution. Operations Research 47(4) pp. 632-642.
Bernstein, F., A. Federgruen. 2003. Pricing and replenishment strategies in a distribution
system with competing retailers. Operations Research 51(3) 409-426.
Bernstein, F., A. Federgruen. 2007. Coordination mechanisms for supply chains under price
and service competition. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management 9(3)
242-262.
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, A. Wolinsky. 1986. The nash bargaining solution in economic
modelling. The RAND Journal of Economics 17(2) pp. 176-188.
Bordley, R. 1985. Relating elasticities to changes in demand. Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics 3(2) 156-158.
Bradley, J. R., P. W. Glynn. 2002. Managing capacity and inventory jointly in manufac-
turing systems. Management Science 48(2) pp. 273-288.
Brander, J. A., A Zhang. 1990. Market conduct in the airline industry: An empirical
investigation. The RAND Journal of Economics 21(4) pp. 567-583.
Brander, J. A., A Zhang. 1993. Dynamic oligopoly behaviour in the airline industry. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 11(3) 407 - 435.
Brueckner, J. K. 2002. Airport congestion when carriers have market power. American
Economic Review 92(5) 1357-1375.
Brueckner, J. K. 2005. Internalization of airport congestion: A network analysis. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 23(7-8) 599 - 614.
169
Brueckner, J. K., P. T. Spiller. 1994. Economies of traffic density in the deregulated airline
industry. Journal of Law and Economics 37(2) pp. 379-415.
Brueckner, Jan K. 2003. The benefits of codesharing and antitrust immunity for interna-
tional passengers, with an application to the star alliance. Journal of Air Transport
Management 9(2) 83 - 89.
Bulow, J. I., J. D. Geanakoplos, P. D. Klemperer. 1985. Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic
substitutes and complements. The Journal of Political Economy 93(3) 488-511.
Cachon, G. P. 2003. Handbook in Operations Research and Management Science: Sup-
ply Chain Management, chap. Supply chain coordination with contracts. Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 229-339.
Cachon, G. P., P. T. Harker. 2002. Competition and outsourcing with scale economies.
Management Science 48(10) 1314 - 1333.
Cachon, G. P., A. G. Kok. 2010. Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On
contractual form and coordination. Management Science 56(3) 571-589.
Cachon, G. P., M. A. Lariviere. 1999. Capacity choice and allocation: Strategic behavior
and supply chain performance. Management Science 45(8) pp. 1091-1108.
Cachon, G. P., M. A. Lariviere. 2001. Contracting to assure supply: How to share demand
forecasts in a supply chain. Management Science 47(5) 629-646.
Cachon, G. P., M. A. Lariviere. 2005. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing
contracts: Strengths and limitations. Management Science 51(1) 30-44.
Caldentey, R., L. M. Wein. 2003. Analysis of a decentralized production-inventory system.
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management 5(1) 1.
Carr, S., W. Lovejoy. 2000. The inverse newsvendor problem: Choosing an optimal demand
portfolio for capacitated resources. Management Science 46(7) pp. 912-927.
Carr, S. M., U. S. Karmarkar. 2005. Competition in multiechelon assembly supply chains.
Management Science 51(1) 45-59.
Caves, D. W., L. R. Christensen, M. W. Tretheway. 1984. Economies of density versus
economies of scale: Why trunk and local service airline costs differ. The RAND Journal
of Economics 15(4) pp. 471-489.
Chintagunta, P. K., A. Bonfrer, I. Song. 2002. Investigating the effects of store-brand
introduction on retailer demand and pricing behavior. Management Science 48(10)
1242-1267.
Chod, J., N. Rudi. 2006. Strategic investments, trading, and pricing under forecast updat-
ing. Management Science 52(12) pp. 1913-1929.
Choi, S. C. 1991. Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailerwinter.
Marketing Science 10(4) 271-296.
Corbett, C. J., G. A. DeCroix, A. Y. Ha. 2005. Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply
chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard. European Journal of Operational
Research 163(3) 653 - 667.
Corbett, C. J., U. S. Karmarkar. 2001. Competition and structure in serial supply chains
with deterministic demand. Management Science 47(7) 966-978.
Correa, J. R., A. S. Schulz, N. E. Stier-Moses. 2004. Selfish routing in capacitated networks.
Mathematics of Operations Research 29(4) 961-976.
170
Correa, J. R., A. S. Schulz, N. E. Stier-Moses. 2007. Fast, fair, and efficient flows in
networks. Operations Research 55(2) 215-225.
Dafermos, S. C., F. T. Sparrow. 1969. The traffic assignment problem for a general network.
Journal of research of the National Bureau of Standards 73(2) 91 - 118.
Daniel, Joseph I. 1995. Congestion pricing and capacity of large hub airports: A bottleneck
model with stochastic queues. Econometrica 63(2) 327-370.
Daniel, Joseph I. 2001. Distributional consequences of airport congestion pricing. Journal
of Urban Economics 50(2) 230 - 258.
Deneckere, R., C. Davidson. 1985. Incentives to form coalitions with bertrand competition.
RAND Journal of Economics 16(4) 473 - 486.
Ellison, S. F., I. Cockburn, Z. Griliches, J. Hausman. 1997. Characteristics of demand for
pharmaceutical products: An examination of four cephalosporins. The RAND Journal
of Economics 28(3) 426-446.
Farahat, A., G. Perakis. 2009. Profit loss in differentiated oligopolies. Operations Research
Letters 37(1) 43 - 46.
Farahat, A., G. Perakis. 2010a. The anarchy of price competition. Working paper.
Farahat, A., G. Perakis. 2010b. A nonnegative extension of the affine demand function and
equilibrium analysis for multiproduct price competition. Operations Research Letters
38(4) 280-286.
Farrell, J., C. Shapiro. 1990. Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis. American
Economic Review 1(80) 107-126.
Faulhaber, G. R., C. Hogendorn. 2000. The market structure of broadband telecommuni-
cations. The Journal of Industrial Economics 48(3) 305-329.
FCC Technical Paper. 2010. Mobile broadband: The benefits of additional spectrum. http:
//hraunf oss . f cc . gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-302324A1.doc.
Federgruen, A., P. Zipkin. 1986. An inventory model with limited production capacity
and uncertain demands ii. the discounted-cost criterion. Mathematics of Operations
Research 11(2) pp. 208-215.
Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole. 1984. The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog ploy, and the lean and
hungry look. American Economic Review 74(2) 361-366.
Goodwin, P. B. 1990. How to make road pricing popular. Economic Affairs 10(5) 6-7.
Goyal, M., S. Netessine. 2007. Strategic technology choice and capacity investment under
demand uncertainty. Management Science 53(2) 192 - 207.
Hamdouch, Y., M. Florian, D. W. Hearn, S. Lawphongpanich. 2007. Toll pricing in multi-
modal traffic assignment. Transportation Research Part B 41(3) 275-291.
Hardin, G. 1968. Tragedy of the commons. Science 162(3859) 1243-1248.
Hayrapetyan, A., E. Tardos, T. Wexler. 2007. A network pricing game for selfish traffic.
Distributed Computing 19 255-266.
Heyer, K. 2006. Welfare standards and merger analysis: Why not the best? Economic
Analysis Group Discussions Paper, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
Holmes, T. J. 1989. The effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. The
American Economic Review 79(1) pp. 244-250.
Horn, R., C. Johnson. 1985. Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
171
Hu, X., R. Caldentey, G Vulcano. 2012. Revenue sharing in airline alliances. Forthcoming
in Management Science .
Jain, H. 2010. Alliance revenue management in practice : techniques and simulation anal-
ysis. Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA.
Johari, G. Y., R. Weintraub, B. Van Roy. 2009. Investment and market structure in indus-
tries with congestion. Forthcoming in Operations Research .
Jones, P. 1991. Gaining public support for road pricing through a package approach. Traffic
engineering and control 32(4) 194-196.
Kapuscinski, R., S. Tayur. 1998. A capacitated production-inventory model with periodic
demand. Operations Research 46(6) pp. 899-911.
Keeler, J P., J P. Formby. 1994. Cost economies and consolidation in the us airline industry.
International Journal of Transport Economics 21(1) pp. 21- 45.
Koutsoupias, E., C. Papadimitriou. 1999. Worst-case equilibria. Proceedings of 16th Sympos.
Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. 404-413.
Kouvelis, P., M. A. Lariviere. 2000. Decentralizing cross-functional decisions: Coordination
through internal markets. Management Science 46(8) pp. 1049-1058.
Kreps, David M., Jose A. Scheinkman. 1983. Quantity precommitment and bertrand com-
petition yield cournot outcomes. The Bell Journal of Economics 14(2) 326-337.
Krishnan, H., R. A. Winter. 2007. Vertical control of price and inventory. American
Economic Review 97(5) 1840-1857.
Lin, X., R. Germain. 1998. Sustaining satisfactory joint venture relationships: The role
of conflict resolution strategy. Journal of International Business Studies 29(1) pp.
179-196.
Mahajan, S., G. Van Ryzin. 2001. Inventory competition under dynamic consumer choice.
Operations Research 49(5) 646-657.
Maille, P., N. E. Stier-Moses. 2009. Eliciting coordination with rebates. Transportation
Science 43(4) 473-492.
Malueg, D. A. 1994. Monopoly output and welfare: The role of curvature of the demand
function. The Journal of Economic Education 25(3) pp. 235-250.
Martinez-de Alberniz, V., G. Roels. 2010. Competing for shelf space. Forthcoming in
Production and Operation Management .
Martinez-de Alberniz, V., D. Simchi-Levi. 2009. Competition in the supply option market.
Operation Research 57(5) 1082-1097.
Mayer, C., T. Sinai. 2003. Network effects, congestion externalities, and air traffic delays:
Or why all delays are not evil. American Economic Review 93(4) 1194-1215.
McGuire, T. W., R. Staelin. 1983. An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical
integration. Marketing Science 2(2) 161-191.
Mela, C. F., S. Gupta, K. Jedidi. 1998. Assessing long-term promotional influences on
market structure. International Journal of Research in Marketing 15(2) 89 - 107.
Milgrom, P., J. Roberts. 1995. Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organi-
zational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19(2-3) 179
- 208.
Miller, K. D. 1992. A framework for integrated risk management in international business.
Journal of International Business Studies 23(2) pp. 311-331.
172
Moorthy, K. S. 1987. Managing channel profits: Comment. Marketing Science 6(4) 375-379.
Myerson, R. B. 1979. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica
47(1) pp. 61-73.
Nagarajan, M., G. Sosic. 2008. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain
agents: Review and extensions. European Journal of Operational Research 187(3) 719
-745.
Nash, J. F. 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18(2) pp. 155-162.
Netessine, S., F. Zhang. 2005. Positive vs. negative externalities in inventory management:
Implications for supply chain design. Manufacturing and Service Operations Manage-
ment 7(1) 58-73.
Netessine, Serguei, Nils Rudi. 2003. Centralized and competitive inventory models with
demand substitution. Oper. Res. 51(2) 329-335.
Neven, D. J., L. H Roller. 2005. Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political
economy model of merger control. International Journal of Industrial Organization
23(9-10) 829 - 848.
Oum, Tae Hoon, Anming Zhang, Yimin Zhang. 1993. Inter-firm rivalry and firm-specific
price elasticities in deregulated airline markets. Journal of Transport Economics and
Policy 27(2) pp. 171-192.
Ozdaglar, A. 2008. Price competition with elastic traffic. Networks 52 141-155.
Papadimitriou, C. 2001. Algorithms, games, and the internet. STOC '01: Proceedings of
the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 749-753.
Parker, Philip M., Lars-Hendrik Roller. 1997. Collusive conduct in duopolies: Multimarket
contact and cross-ownership in the mobile telephone industry. The RAND Journal of
Economics 28(2) pp. 304-322.
Pasternack, B. A. 1985. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities.
Marketing Science 4(2) 166-176.
Perakis, G. 2007. The "price of anarchy" under nonlinear and asymmetric costs. Mathe-
matics of Operations Research 32 614-628.
Perakis, G., G. Roels. 2007. The price of anarchy in supply chains: Quantifying the efficiency
of price-only contracts. Management Science 53(8) 1249 - 1268.
Porteus, E. L., S. Whang. 1991. On manufacturing/marketing incentives. Management
Science 37(9) pp. 1166-1181.
Reyniers, D. J., C. S. Tapiero. 1995. The delivery and control of quality in supplier-producer
contracts. Management Science 41(10) pp. 1581-1589.
Robinson, J. 1933. The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Macmillan, London.
Roughgarden, T. 2005. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy. MIT Press.
Roughgarden, T., E. Tardos. 2002. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of A CM 49
236-259.
Rubinstein, A. 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1) pp.
97-109.
Schmalensee, R. 1981. Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price
discrimination. The American Economic Review 71(1) pp. 242-247.
173
Schwartz, M. 1990. Third-degree price discrimination and output: Generalizing a welfare
result. The American Economic Review 80(5) pp. 1259-1262.
Small, K. A. 1992. Using the revenues from congestion pricing. Transportation 19 359-381.
Spengler, J. J. 1950. Vertical integration and antitrust policy. The Journal of Political
Economy 58(4) 347-352.
Sun, W. 2006. Price of Anarchy in a Bertrand Oligopoly. Master's thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, USA.
The Joint Economic Committee Report. 2008. Your flight has been delayed again: flight
delays cost passengers, airlines, and the us economy billions. http: //j ec. senate.
gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File-id=47e8d8a7-661d-4e6b-ae72-Of1831dd1207.
Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
Tyagi, R. K. 1999. On the effects of downstream entry. Management Science 45(1) 59-73.
Van Mieghem, J. A. 2003. Capacity management,investment, and hedging:review and recent
developments. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management 5(4) 269 - 302.
Van Mieghem, J. A., M. Dada. 1999. Price versus production postponement: Capacity and
competition. Management Science 45(12) pp. 1631-1649.
Van Mieghem, J. A., N. Rudi. 2002. Newsvendor networks: Inventory management and ca-
pacity investment with discretionary activities. Manufacturing and Service Operations
Management 4(4) 313.
Varian, H. R. 1985. Price discrimination and social welfare. The American Economic Review
75(4) pp. 870-875.
Vives, X. 1999. Oligopoly pricing: Old ideas and new tools. MIT Press.
Wang, Y., Y. Gerchak. 2003. Capacity games in assembly systems with uncertain demand.
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management 5(3) 252-267.
Wang, Y., Y. Gerchak. 2004. Revenue-sharing vs. wholesale-price contracts in assembly
systems with Random Demand. Production and Operations Management 13(1) 23-
33.
Wardrop, J. 1952. Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. Proceedings of the
Institution of Civil Engineers, Part II 1(36) 352-362.
Weintraub, G. Y., R. Johari, B. Van Roy. 2010. Investment and market structure in indus-
tries with congestion. Forthcoming in Operations Research .
Weisman, E. 1990. Trade in Services and Imperfect Competition: Application to Interna-
tional Aviation. Kluwer Academic.
Whalen, W. T., D. W. Carlton, K. Heyer, 0. M. Richard. 2008. A Solution to Airport
Delays. Regulation 31(1) 30-36.
Williamson, 0. E. 1968. Economies as an antitrust defense: The welfare tradeoffs. American
Economic Review 58(1) 18.
Y., Luo, Shenkar 0. 2002. An empirical inquiry of negotiation effects in cross-cultural joint
ventures. Journal of International Management 8(2).
Yoshida, Y. 2000. Third-degree price discrimination in input markets: Output and welfare.
The American Economic Review 90(1) pp. 240-246.
174
